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
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
LTC ROBERT M. BENNING
MAJ EDWARD A. HAMILTON
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SURVEY OF SELF-CRITICISM IN
SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY JOURNALS
-1978-

GARMISCH, GERMANY

APO NEW YORK 09053

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SURVEY OF SELF-CRITICISM IN
SELECTED SOVIET MILITARY JOURNALS

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Student research rept.,

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148 p.

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Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Benning,
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FOREWORD

This special project was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Benning, Major Edward A. Hamilton and Major Allan Gimian, Class of 1978. The report highlights criticisms of the Soviet Army in non-technical fields, as expressed in selected Soviet military publications. While not conclusive in itself, the report describes some of the problems of training, motivation and discipline faced by the Soviet Army.

The authors were assisted by Mr. Gregory M. Viktorov, Professor of Military Science, who provided the initial research from Voennyi Vestnik, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, and Tyl i Snabzhenie.

This report is a continuation of a pilot project begun in 1975 and will serve as the model for future reports on self criticism of the Soviet military expressed in these key publications.

Comments of the readers are invited and should be addressed to the Commander, U.S. Army Russian Institute, APO New York 09053.



ROLAND LAJOIE
LTC, MC
Commander

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INTRODUCTION

This paper examines Soviet press treatment of current shortcomings and problem areas in nontechnical fields of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is based on a thorough review of three key Soviet military publications listed and described below. These journals were selected as the most important and the most representative of current Soviet military writings.

An essential premise of this research is the belief that meaningful research can be accomplished using widely published Soviet military writings. While it is recognized that the Soviet press contains much propaganda, it must still serve as an important method of communications for a vast armed forces complex. The myriad of problems facing the Soviet military, as any other military force, cannot be dealt with exclusively through communications with limited readership. It is the position of the authors that the Soviets do address real and important problems openly in a number of cases and that a reading and comprehension of these problems is important to a broad understanding of the Soviet military.

A particular characteristic of Soviet writing that should be explained prior to an analysis of this report is that it is normal in Soviet writings to call attention to specific problems by referring to particular units or individuals. Considering the function and the circulation of these periodicals, it seems logical to assume that these problems discussed reflect concern of the military leadership for improvement in various areas.

The following open press Soviet sources have been used as the basis for this research document:

Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), Issues 1-12, 1977. A monthly army journal which concentrates its efforts on military training, combat and combat support functions, and military leadership. The primary target audience is the regular and reserve officer corps of the army.

Tyl i Snabzhenie Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil (The Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces), Issues 1-12, 1977. A monthly military journal which concentrates its efforts on support organizations and systems of the rear. The primary target audience is regular and reserve officers of the Armed Forces and specialists in combat service support fields.

Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (The Communist of the Armed Forces),
Issues 1-24, 1977. A bi-monthly military-political journal of
the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy
which concentrates on Party and political personnel, programs and
activities of the Army and Navy. The primary target audience is
regular and reserve officers, Party and political organs, organi-
zations and officials of the Army and Navy.

I N D E X

For simplicity, the following abbreviations are used:
VV = Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald); T&S = Tyl i Snabzhenie (Rear and Supply); KVS = Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces). Following these abbreviations appear the volume number of the given journal for 1977, the assigned page number within this work on which the article can be found. For example, VV 5-1-9 indicates Voennyi Vestnik, volume 5 for 1977; the first article summarized from that volume; and page 9 of this work.

Agitation and propaganda:

Deficiencies in criticism and self-criticism programs in the GSFG - KVS 19-1-34.

Failure to consolidate propaganda means - VV 7-2-107.

Hatred for the enemy - KVS 6-4-8.

Inadequate propagandizing by Party activists in explaining the decisions of the XXV Congress of the CPSU - KVS 18-1-3.

Low level of effectiveness - KVS 9-4-13, KVS 11-1-22.

Low participation of Communists - KVS 16-1-28.

Poor use of graphic aids in unit dayrooms for propaganda purposes - KVS 24-3-42.

Poor use of Party information - KVS - 12-2-24.

Problems in training of propagandists - KVS 11-2-23.

Airborne Operations:

Lack of flexibility, poor cover and concealment - VV 9-5-115.

Problems encountered in airborne night training exercise - VV 1-5-86.

Camouflage:

Weaknesses in camouflage procedures - IV 4-4-99.

Combined Arms Operations:

Lack of coordinated action between motorized rifle units and their attached artillery support - VV 2-6-91.

Defense against weapons of mass destruction:

Lack of skill and flexibility on part of battalion commanders in NBC environment - VV 11-5-118.

Poor use of individual and organic vehicle protective equipment - VV 11-4-118.

Discipline:

Deficiencies in field training exercises attributed to a low level of discipline - VV 3-4-94.

Disciplinary problems in units - VV 6-1-102.

Formalistic approach to discipline - KVS 16-1-28.

Ineffective efforts to prevent disciplinary problems in troop units - T&S 6-5-65.

Influence of the collective on discipline - KVS 16-5-30.

Poor junior officers cause disciplinary problems - KVS 4-2-5.

Problems resulting from failure to follow regulations - T&S 8-5-73.

Problems with violations of regulations - KVS 16-1-1, KVS 16-5-30.

Regulations related to planning and disciplinary problems - KVS 6-2-7.

Weak party structure causes disciplinary problems - KVS 4-1-4.

Food Service:

Complaints about quality of food - T&S 3-2-51.

Deficiencies in unit dining facilities - T&S 5-2-58.

Failure of medical personnel to exercise proper control - T&S 3-2-51.

Inadequacies of dining facilities - T&S 2-2-47.

Poor attitude of mess personnel - T&S 2-1-46.

Food Service: (con't)

Poor hygiene practices - T&S 2-2-47.

Poor support of Naval School students - T&S 4-6-57.

Selection of personnel to attend cooks school - T&S 2-2-47.

Komsomol organizations:

Attitudes and actions counter to communism - KVS 5-1-5.

Failure to use positive reinforcement to encourage good performance - KVS 10-4-20.

Poor work of Komsomol organizations - KVS 9-1-11, KVS 9-2-11, KVS 16-5-30.

Problems in Komsomol indoctrination - KVS 3-3-4.

Shortcomings in Komsomol organization activities - KVS 23-1-40.

Leadership:

Difficulties experienced by junior officers in establishing their authority as leaders - VV 2-2-49.

Need for improvement in leadership techniques - VV 1-1-83.

Poor relationship of officers with subordinates - VV 12-4-122.

Problems with subordinates - KVS 9-2-11, KVS 13-1-25.

Letters of complaint:

Poor response to letters from soldiers and their families - KVS 10-1-16.

Living Conditions:

Inadequate officers' quarters - T&S 3-3-52.

Inadequate preparation of quarters for winter - T&S 3-2-51.

Lack of initiative, creativity and imagination in overcoming deficiencies in living standards - T&S 6-2-62.

Lack of proper organization of transient facilities - T&S 9-2-75.

Living Conditions: (con't)

Poor repair and maintenance of barracks - T&S 1-1-44,
T&S 3-3-52.

Poor support of Naval School students - T&S 4-6-57.

Maintenance:

Deficiencies in maintenance training and performance
of maintenance at unit level - VV 4-3-98.

News Media:

Inadequate news coverage of military activities - T&S 5-6-60.

Noncommissioned Officers Competence and Training:

Problems with young, inexperienced sergeants - VV 1-5-86.

Officer competence and training:

Crude, foul-mouthed officers - KVS 10-5-22.

Development of company- and battalion-level commanders
by regimental commanders and other senior leaders -
VV 2-4-90.

Improper guidance, counseling and development of junior
officers - T&S 8-4-72.

Insufficient knowledge of engineer equipment and operations
on the part of combat arms officers - VV 12-2-120.

Insufficient knowledge of organic equipment - VV 9-3-113.

Insufficient self-study - VV 9-1-111.

Lack of knowledge of junior leaders - KVS 9-2-11,
KVS 11-1-22.

Lack of personal responsibility among rear services
officers - T&S 7-2-67.

Need for improved level of training for officers of the
Air Defense Forces - VV 2-7-92.

Officers don't know their men - VV 5-4-101.

Officer competence and training: (con't)

Poor performance of rear services officers - T&S 5-7-61.

Poor pedagogical training of officers - T&S 2-4-49.

Poor training of combat arms officers in engineer operations - VV 12-2-120.

Poor training of officer candidates- KVS 10-2-17.

Problems in development of junior officers by battalion commanders - VV 3-5-96.

Problems with assignment and promotion of junior leaders - KVS 10-2-17

Problems with integration of newly-commissioned political workers into units - KVS 9-5-15.

Problems with integration of young officers into units - T&S 1-3-46.

Weak tactical knowledge among junior officers - KVS 1-3-2.

Orders:

Vagueness in written and verbal orders - VV 1-3-84.

Party-political activities:

Failure of Party organs to assist commanders in raising the level of troop discipline - VV 2-1-88.

Insufficient efforts by Party representatives to correct training deficiencies - KVS 19-2-35.

Insufficient screening of Party candidates - KVS 6-3-7.

Lack of Party activity - KVS 1-1-1.

Low results in political and Marxism-Leninism training in the Chernigov Red Banner Guards Airborne Division - KVS 24-2-41.

Necessity for political indoctrination - VV 5-2-100.

Need for improvement in Party propaganda programs - T&S 5-1-57.

Party-political activities: (con't)

Need for improvement of Party-political effectiveness in troop units - VV 1-2-84.

Party membership in the Armed Forces (problems with recruiting, preparation and training of candidates) - KVS 10-3-18.

Political activities among warrant officers - KVS 3-4-4.

Political cadre shortcomings - KVS 3-1-3.

Political indoctrination in units - KVS 8-3-11.

Poor leadership - KVS 1-2-1.

Poor work of Party organizations - KVS 9-3-12, KVS 12-1-23, KVS 16-4-29.

Problems among political lecturers - KVS 7-3-9.

Shortcomings in development and education of military cadres - KVS 10-2-17.

Shortcomings in political training of officers, political instruction for warrant officers and political activities of NCOs and EM - KVS 22-1-39.

Shortcomings in preparations for the 60th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution - KVS 17-1-31.

Personal Appearance:

Factors contributing to sloppy personal appearance of troops - T&S 5-3-53.

Poor appearance of Naval School students, T&S 4-6-57.

Poor personal appearance, T&S 1-1-44.

Preventive Medicine:

Failure to inspect dining facilities - T&S 3-2-51.

Inadequacies in dietetic meals for troops suffering from gastrointestinal disorders - T&S 5-4-59.

Inadequate participation in preventive medicine programs by medical personnel - T&S 7-1-66.

Preventive Medicine: (con't)

Inadequate veterinary medicine controls in the prevention of infectious and parasitic disease - T&S 8-3-71.

Problems in preventive medicine - T&S 1-1-44.

Problems with medical facilities - T&S 12-3-80.

Rear Service Support:

Deficiencies in supporting the daily life of a soldier - VV 7-1-106.

Ground forces supply deficiencies - T&S 11-1-77, T&S 11-2-78.

Naval supply problems - T&S 9-1-74.

Reconnaissance:

Poor use of reconnaissance resources in developing intelligence - VV 3-3-94.

Remote garrisons:

Shortages of warehouses, refrigerators and coolers - T&S 1-1-44.

Retail sales activities:

Deficiencies in retail sales operations throughout the Soviet Armed Forces - T&S 7-3-68.

Lack of organization of sales personnel - T&S 1-1-44.

Limited selection of merchandise - T&S 2-1-46.

Problems in military bookstores - T&S 12-4-81.

Problems in retail store operations of the Moscow Central Department Store - T&S 5-5-60.

Security Consciousness:

Lack of vigilance in rear services installations - T&S 6-1-62.

Seminars:

Problems in supply-oriented seminars - T&S 12-2-79.

Socialist Competition:

Deficiencies in competition for best rear services units - T&S 8-2-70.

Deficiencies in the conduct of socialist competition within troop units - VV 4-1-96.

Failure of Communists to set the example in socialist competition - T&S 8-6-74.

Failure to assign specific tasks - VV 11-4-118.

Formalism - KVS 9-2-11, KVS 15-1-26, KVS 16-2-28.

Inadequacies in the socialist competition program among medical units - KVS 19-3-36.

Insufficient attention to socialist competition programs by commanders and Party representatives of the Kiev Military District - KVS 20-1-37.

Overlooking problems in meeting goals - KVS 6-1-7.

Problems in competition - KVS 4-1-4.

Problems with motivation - KVS 15-1-26.

Soldiers Tearooms:

Deficiencies noted in the All-Army and Navy competition - T&S 2-3-48.

State property and funds:

Poor accounting procedures - T&S 2-6-50.

Problems in funding, budgeting and expenditures of rear services units - T&S 8-2-70

Unauthorized expenditure of funds - T&S 2-6-50, T&S 4-5-55.

Supply Economy:

Waste and spoilage of foodstuffs, fuel and lubricants - KVS 17-2-32.

Tactics:

Failures in applying modern tactics - VV 6-3-103.

Training:

Analysis of wasted training time - VV 12-3-122.

Artillery training problems - VV 6-5-104.

Chemical training deficiencies - VV 8-5-111.

Commanders avoiding field training - VV 12-1-119.

Deficiencies in field training exercises of rear services units - T&S 6-4-64.

Elevated training scores - VV 6-4-104, VV 6-4-104.

General training deficiencies - VV 7-3-107.

Inadequate use of major training areas - VV 12-1-119.

Insufficient field training of engineer units - VV 12-2-120.

Insufficient night training - VV 12-1-119.

Lack of realism in training - VV 2-5-91.

Marksmanship training deficiencies - VV 5-1-100.

Modern equipment causing training problems - VV 6-7-106.

Negative effect of reducing standards for troop training - KVS 21-1-37.

Officer training problems - VV 5-3-101, VV 8-4-110.

Planning deficiencies - KVS 7-2-9.

Poor driver's training and vehicle maintenance - T&S 12-5-81.

Poor logistical support of training - T&S 4-2-54.

Poorly conducted tank battalion FTX - VV 9-4-114.

Poor preparation of military specialists - T&S 9-3-75.

Poor training practices of rear-service units - T&S 3-1-51.

Poor use of military training films in units and training centers - VV 1-6-87.

Problems with radio communications training on BMD - VV 11-3-117.

Training: (Con't)

Problems encountered in a two-day motorized rifle battalion training exercise - VV 3-2-93.

Road marches and training deficiencies - VV 8-1-108.

Training center deficiencies - VV 6-6-105, VV 8-2-109.

Training for the nuclear environment - VV 7-4-108.

Training in aviation units - KVS 8-1-10.

Training of guard personnel too stereotyped and general in nature - VV 9-6-116.

Training of rear service personnel - T&S 12-1-79.

Training problems with amphibious tank operations - VV 11-2-117.

Training records deficiencies - KVS 3-2-3.

Training time utilization - KVS 2-1-2.

Training with simulators - VV 8-3-110.

Unimaginative approach to combat training - VV 3-1-92.

Transportation:

Unit transportation shortcomings - T&S 10-1-76.

Troop Service:

Deficiencies in the administration of routine troop service functions - VV 4-2-97.

Deficiencies in routine troop services for naval personnel - KVS 24-4-43.

Unit Effectiveness:

Deficiencies in effectiveness of a successful unit - VV 2-3-89.

Low standards causing poor efficiency - KVS 2-3-3.

Reduced readiness levels - KVS 5-2-6.

KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL

Volume 1

1. Editorial, "Za Vysokuiu Deistvennost' Partiinzi Raboty" (Towards High Effectiveness in Party Work).

This editorial describes problems resulting from the last series of meetings held in preparation for general elections within the lower levels of the Party apparatus in the Soviet Army and Navy. This was the first series of meetings to take place after the 25th Party Congress. The problems cited deal with various aspects of Party efficiency. In many units, there is insufficient intolerance toward numerous shortcomings which lowered military preparation and ability. In these units, there is weak, if any, condemnation of personnel accepting lower standards or overstating the unit accomplishments to bring them up to previous standards. Leaders show an irresponsible attitude towards the accomplishment of their unit's mission. In one unit, the fact that a subordinate unit did not accomplish its basic mission caused some anxiety, but the failure was explained away by the fact that higher demands had been placed on that unit. Many units are not thorough in the assigning of missions. In many cases, units do not actively fight drunkenness or alcoholism. There are no clear-cut, well thought-out programs for the education of soldiers, to include the use of mass-media. Many units lack the required criticism and self-criticism sessions, and in many other cases, this criticism is insufficient or misdirected. The line of criticism is down, without the upward flow. Most units lack any means of verification of programs designed to eliminate irresponsibility, repetition and waste. There is no qualitative screening for new Party members, with the prime factor for acceptance being the quantitative Party requirements.

2. General-Colonel P. Gorchakov, Chief of the Political Directorate, Strategic Rocket Forces, and a member of the military council, "Partiinym Organizatsiiam-Konkretnoe Rukovodstvo" (For Party Organizations-Concrete Leadership).

General-Colonel Gorchakov states that political organizations are providing insufficient leadership for Party elements. Leaders are striving for vast quantities of projects, at the expense of quality. They are allowing mundane procedures to crowd out important problems, are allowing sub-par results and are accepting decisions without examining previous problems of the same nature. Not all Party members are fulfilling their responsibilities. The author feels that political sections should devote more time to the analysis and

evaluation of problems in order to facilitate the arrival at the optimum solution, as opposed to the more common acceptance of a solution so as to grapple with the next problem. More attention to the ideological-theoretical preparation of organizational activists would elevate the level of discipline and allow the political specialists to more clearly channel the political education of these activists. General-Colonel Gorchakov feels that these shortcomings are allowing an unacceptable laxness to creep into the Party organizations.

3. General-Colonel F. Krivda, Commander of the Southern Group of Forces, "Taktika-Serditsevina Polevoi Vyuchki" (Tactics-The Core of Field Training).

General-Colonel Krivda states that there is a current problem with the level of tactical knowledge and preparation among junior officers. Their understanding of modern warfare and its demands is weak, and yet some senior officers seem unconcerned about this major shortcoming. He cites one exercise during which the reconnaissance leader was unable to report the actual enemy position or anything about the enemy. Nothing was said about his inability to accomplish his mission. Senior NCO's, due to their lack of tactical knowledge, were unable to provide examples for their men, to react to changing tactical conditions, or to fully utilize modern battle-field technology.

Volume 2

1. General of the Army A. Epishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, "Kachestvu Uchely-Partiinuiu Zabotu" (The Quality of Studies - A Party Concern).

General of the Army Epishev cites problems in both services with the proper utilization of training time and the assignment of training goals. He states that the use of military personnel to harvest crops detracts from their military preparedness. Many training goals have become paper exercises, with officers glossing over or simply hiding unit shortcomings in order to present the unit in the best possible light. Komsomol and Party activities must be increased to create an atmosphere conducive to training every unit to reach its full potential.

2. Captain V. Ovsianikov, "Kogda Podvedeny Itogi" (When Sums Are Totaled).

Captain Ovsianikov cites the phenomenon of a commander taking

over a unit long considered outstanding. Because of his desire to do everything himself, the overall discipline in the unit fell. Party demands within the unit became lax, and that, coupled with the appointment of an unqualified individual to head the Soldier's Council, caused the effectiveness of the Party structure to be nil. The deficiencies didn't become evident to senior officers until after annual competitions. (This use of an individual incident often shows general training deficiencies in Soviet line units.)

3. General-Major A. Kasatkin, "Politicheskaya i Trudovaya Aktivnost' Voennykh Stroitelei" (Political and Labor Activities of Military Builders).

General-Major Kasatkin discusses shortcomings in military construction units. These problems arise from inexperience and lack of technical knowledge on the part of individual workers and insufficient supervision. New people aren't properly trained and there is no attempt at modernization. Consequently, many units have not fulfilled their norms, and in many cases, construction has been substandard because of these deficiencies. New workers see low standards accepted by others and so accept the same low standards. Supervision on complex projects is superficial, allowing deficiencies and errors to flourish.

Volume 3

1. General-Major V. Korolenko, Deputy Chief of the Personnel Directorate, Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy, "V Nogu So Vremenem" (In Step With Time).

General-Major Korolenko states that political cadre are not fulfilling their responsibilities in the education of young officers. They are ignoring the Party development of these officers. Senior leaders are remaining aloof from the educational process. New political officers, recently graduated from political schools, are not counselled and helped by supervisors, but instead are left to find their own way, to "stew in their own juices", as the author puts it. There is no attempt to help the professional development of these new officers.

2. General-Lieutenant V. Novikov, member of the military council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Leningrad Military District, "Chtoby Slovo Prevrashchalos' v Delo" (So That the Word Becomes the Deed).

General-Lieutenant Novikov discusses problems occurring in his military district. Units are apparently overqualified on paper and underqualified in actuality. Based on certain parameters, decisions are made to overcome specific problems. Then, instead of carrying these decisions out to their logical ends, new decisions are made and randomly applied. Pre-competition meetings are highly charged, with everyone lauding everyone else and explaining the morrow's goals. Then, these goals are not attained during the competition. Self-criticism is then not utilized to find the problems. Shortcomings are explained by the failure to apply Soviet principles and ideals, with no one actually taking any personal blame.

3. Major I. Bogovik, assistant for Komsomol affairs to the Chief of the Political Directorate, Moscow Military District, "Umenie Uvlech'" (The Ability to Entice).

Major Bogovik comments on problems within the Komsomol organizations in the military. Komsomol Secretaries, puffed up with self-importance, have no time to keep themselves current in their normal military duties. They don't give the necessary "pep talks" to their fellow soldiers, or, when they do, their talks are given colorlessly and without any originality. They have trouble relating to their fellow soldiers, making it difficult for the Komsomols to attract new members. Problems are mentioned without solutions being offered. This lack of leadership, according to the author, is affecting the military Komsomol organization.

4. Colonel E. Baranov, "V Pole Zreniia - Politicheskaiia Ucheba Praporshchikov" (In the Field of Vision - The Political Training of Warrant Officers).

Colonel Baranov discusses the necessity of increasing the political propaganda directed at warrant officers. His article states that some units have political training one hour per week, which he considers insufficient. The training is not receiving the necessary command attention, and in some cases, is simply being lost in the mass of other training. Commanders and political workers are not paying sufficient attention to the political level of warrant officers and must upgrade current programs directed at them.

Volume 4

1. General-Lieutenant M. Popkov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Asian Military District, "Kommunisty i Sorevnovanie" (Communists and Competition).

General-Lieutenant Popkov illuminates problems in the communist system of competition and in the system of criticism among individuals and among units. This criticism is designed to increase military proficiency. He states that many units allow individuals to get by without fulfilling their socialist obligations in the unit. Responsibilities for various tasks are assigned, then overlooked. The Party principles of trust and exactingness are forgotten. Older leaders can't imbue the younger leaders with these qualities, and irresponsibility is a rising phenomenon. Problems of haste and slovenliness in the evaluation of military competition are becoming more and more prevalent, and that, coupled with the raising of test scores by officers, is making the whole system of military competition useless.

2. Senior Lieutenant V. Nikulin, assistant secretary of a Komsomol bureau in a subunit, "Vzyskanie i Vzyskatel'nost'" (Punishment and Strictness).

Lieutenant Nikulin discusses problems among Komsomols and activists in the subunit. People are brought before boards only for major offenses, and the board usually sentences them severely, considering its job done at this point. There is neither a follow-up on the case nor any attempt to foresee major violations based on each individual's attitude in general. Major disciplinary violations are entered on to the violator's registration card and become a permanent part of his record. Lieutenant Nikulin feels that these major violations can be forestalled by watching each soldier. Every major offender had a history of minor offenses, and had failed to "broaden his horizons" through political education, and had failed to grasp the importance of his socialist responsibilities to his unit and society in general. Lieutenant Nikulin states that by increasing the demands placed on the Komsomols, these "slackers" can be brought back into line.

Volume 5

1. General-Lieutenant M. Sobolev, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, "Armei i Flotskomu Komsomolu - Partiinu iu Zabotu" (Towards the Army and Navy Komsomol - Party Concern).

General-Lieutenant Sobolev has written a relatively long article in which he looks into Komsomol activities in both the Army and Navy. There are apparently still many problems among the komsomols. The new generation is not being educated in the proper spirit of communism, leaving them politically weak. The Leninist concept of

combining the theoretical with the practical has not been stressed, and theoretical knowledge outshines practical experience in political work. Many of the young komсомols display attitudes and behavior that are contrary to socialism, to include drunkenness, low morals, neglect of duty and lack of discipline. The Komсомol organization has called for a merciless war against these, and other "sins", including foul language, coarseness and idleness, and is attempting to create circumstances under which the offender will recognize and correct his errors. There is a plan to combat formalism and bureaucracy, as these two "put out the fire within the heart." In some units, komсомols attend various soldiers' meetings, as they are supposed to do. But they place unattainable goals before these organizations, then offer no advice as to how to attain these goals. Many commanders and political workers don't sufficiently understand the inner workings of the Komсомol Organization, and thus don't properly use it. There is no understanding of the need to increase the reach of the organization, to embrace as many people as possible, so as to get them all involved in supporting socialism.

2. Major V. Nesterenko, a regimental assistant chief of staff, "C Pravogo Flanga Na Levyi" (From The Right Flank To The Left).

This article, written by Major Nesterenko, is extremely critical, listing only deficiencies in the present system. He begins by stating outright that units are not combat-ready, and have lost their proficiency. The current level of training is much lower than previous years, and the demand for high norms has diminished. And, according to the author, the slide has not stopped. Fiery competition among units is a thing of the past, and the communist elements within these units have not reacted or have done little to offset the slump. Even among them, the level of demand and responsibility is down. The Party Bureau has lost its former position. It hasn't demanded that Party members increase their activity. The author raises the question of the effectiveness of Party work, as it hasn't really permeated daily life. Last spring's training cycle went well, but the influx of new men caused a drastic drop in combat proficiency. Older soldiers didn't share their technical knowledge with the new men. Commanders didn't plan ahead to facilitate training, but instead, were looking back on their accomplishments. Party members demanded less of themselves as well as less of others. Seminars and discussions pinpointed the causes for this drop in combat readiness, but only after the summer training cycle, too late to affect the units. One final reason for the deficiencies, according to Major Nesterenko, was the Party member's ability to criticize anyone but other Party members, allowing them to slip into complacency.

Volume 6

1. Editorial, "Sorevnovaniiu-Vysokii Nakal" (Towards Competition - High Intensity).

This editorial discusses the benefits of competition at all levels and in all segments of Communist life -- military, industrial, agricultural, et al. It states that in many military units, however, the necessary conclusions are not drawn from failures to meet goals, and deficiencies were not corrected during the first months of the winter training cycle. Red tape and conventionalism slowed the process of increasing productivity at all levels.

2. General-Colonel P. Lushev, Commander of the Baltic Military District, "Sluzhbe Voisk-Ustavnuui Organizatsiiu" (Toward the Service of Forces - A Regulated Organization).

General-Colonel Lushev discusses the importance of regulations in military life, an importance that goes to the point that not knowing the regulation is in itself a violation of the regulations. Yet, he states that many commanders don't follow these regulations in everyday planning, arriving at conclusions haphazardly. The absence of planning and utilizing regulations is cited as a prime reason for violations in discipline within the units. Subordinate commanders hasten to implement general guidelines of senior officers without properly planning and preparing for the consequences of the new orders. And still others react to violations of regulations as they occur, without trying to plan ahead, to forestall these violations, or to educate the unit in such a way as to eliminate the lack of understanding of regulations, a prime factor leading to violations.

3. Captain V. Baranov, a political instructor specializing in organizational-Party work, "Rekomenduiu i Ruchaiu" (I Recommend and Guarantee).

Captain Baranov discusses the importance of recommending an individual for Party membership. The sponsor should know his candidate thoroughly, should know his goals, moral character and attitudes. Then, the Party member doing the recommending should assume responsibility for the new Party member and his constant Party development. Unfortunately, according to the author, Party members are recommending friends as a favor, or recommending anyone who asks, writing glowing introductions, then not helping the new member or guiding him through the course of his Party development.

Many Party members couldn't remember who had recommended them or whom they had recommended. In many instances, people were recommended who were obviously unfit for Party membership. Many Party members vote favorably for personnel based on the written recommendation alone, and not on personal knowledge of the positive and negative aspects of the proposed candidate. General-Colonel Iushev considers this a major problem affecting the strength of the Communist Party.

4. Colonel Pogonin, "Sviashchenna Nasha Menavist' K Vragam" (Sacred Is Our Hatred for the Enemy).

Colonel Pogonin looks into the problem of developing and maintaining hatred towards imperialism, a hatred necessary for the soldiers of the Red Armed Forces. He relates examples to help create this hatred towards the West and states that such examples should receive more coverage in Soviet newspapers. Agitative propaganda should play an important role in the development of this hatred, but in many units it is not properly utilized, or it is spread with no clear purpose. Propagandists are overlooking historical facts which could be used. And to be a true patriot, one must hate the enemy. All methods must be applied to increase the hatred of imperialism and the Western world.

Volume 7

1. Colonel U. Orlov, "Chtoby Vsegda Byt' Nacheku" (In Order to Be Always on the Alert).

This article deals with the situation existing in the anti-aircraft regiment commanded by the author, Colonel Orlov. He states that Communists must be the guiding light and force behind perpetual betterment of the unit's combat abilities, they must be the teachers who elevate the level of the unit's military might. According to the Colonel, much has and is being done to keep the unit one of the best. Yet he also describes numerous deficiencies. The positive experiences and new developments in sub-units should be publicized, so that other units can benefit, and this is not being done. And the Party Organization is letting this slip by. This needs to be corrected. Commanders don't always insure optimum conditions for uninterrupted advancement of a Communist's theoretical development. Even members of the Communist Party are allowing errors to pass uncorrected. They are not educating subordinates, but rather are doing everything themselves, upgrading their own knowledge and personal recognition without raising the level of knowledge of co-workers. Others are careless in their approach to their own

work. All these deficiencies exist in the Colonel's own regiment, considered one of the best in the district.

2. General-Major A. Soshnikov, First Deputy Chief of the Political Administration of the Moscow Military District, "Delovitost' i Operativnost' v Partiinoi Rabote" (Efficiency and Drive in Party Work).

In this article, General-Major Soshnikov is concerned about the work of political organizations and personnel. He covers numerous problem areas, with examples of each problem. In one instance, one political section was inundated with plans and requirements, most of which were time consuming and counterproductive, in that they added little to the over-all effectiveness of the unit. Most were monthly plans merely being reworked and designed to be used by small groups of officers. Political officers were forced to work excessively long hours, lowering their work efficiency and causing them to scurry around aimlessly. Added to this was their inability to plan ahead, the endless paperwork, and the lack of verifying and checking of the end product. The officers were losing their desire to fulfill missions because of always being faced with masses of triviality. Another unit, because of inefficiency and weak planning, was unable to complete its training cycle. In many cases, information failed to get passed up or down the chain of command, or was held at one level until it was useless. Another unit suffered from an inability to properly allocate time or to differentiate between primary and secondary problems. Some skim over problems, not solving any of them thoroughly. Political sections aren't creating conditions conducive to the development of trained cadre. They cause overwork, loss of free time or time formerly devoted to the individual's self-development. Too much time is spent on useless meetings, discussions and self-criticism, time better spent elsewhere. Critical personnel are pulled out of units to "hash-over" old problems, leaving no qualified individual to handle newly-arising problems.

3. Colonel G. Gusev, "Vse Tsennoe, Peredovoe - V Praktiku Politzaniatii" (Everything Is Valuable, Foremost - In the Practice of Political Activities).

Colonel Gusev, a candidate for an advanced degree in history, recounts the strong and weak points of political indoctrination among sergeants and enlisted men. Using one unit as an example, he cites the many deficiencies in training and what causes them. Soldiers and officers both try to skip political lectures, and the lecturers are unable to attract them to lectures. Many lecturers

are poorly prepared, haven't thought out their presentations, and are weak in political theory. They present the material dryly, without color, and without any attempt to inflame the listeners. In many groups, the audience doesn't participate as desired. There is no interplay between audience and lecturer. Many listeners have trouble even understanding the basic questions being discussed. There is little work being done to help those people grasp the essence of lectures. The inability to organize the lectures is touted as a main reason for the low quality of lectures and seminars.

Volume 8

1. "V Bor'be Za Bezopasnost' Poletov" (In the Struggle for Safety of Flights).

The author in a series of questions and answers attempts to explain the successful record of an aviation unit. Preflight thoroughness and intense knowledge of all aspects of flying are the key, according to the assistant commander in charge of flying preparation for military pilots-sharpshooters, Lieutenant Colonel Tikhonovyi. And yet omissions in preflight planning and checks are seen, pilots fail to study prerequisites for each flight, and flight knowledge and abilities are not kept sharp and up to date. Violations of standing orders are due to pilots and crews not following through on planning. Individual pilots, after receiving the highest qualifications, quit working and lose the fine edge necessary for successful flying of modern military aircraft. They have difficulties when problems arise in flight, and are unable to react with the required speed and efficiency. These facts of negligence, carelessness, complacency and lack of discipline are harshly criticized, but still exist.

2. Major N. Slobodianiuk, secretary of a Party committee in a regiment, "Za Punktom Resheniia" (Beyond the Point of Decision).

Major Slobodianiuk is writing about the lack of support by Party members for Party work. The members feel that the Party officers organize everything, and there is nothing for the rank-and-file members to do. Lectures are given in a haphazard fashion, without the lecturer trying to establish rapport with the audience. Senior Party officials look on without stepping in to help establish this rapport. The general theme of the article is that shortcomings in everyday Party functioning are apparent, but members shrug all responsibility off on to Party officers, while they in turn ignore or overlook these same problems.

3. Colonel A. Luk'ianov, Chief of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and Assistant Chief of the Political Directorate of the Transbaikal Military District, "Zabota ob Ideinoi Zakalke Ofitserov" (Concern Over the Ideological Tempering of Officers).

Colonel Luk'ianov covers requirements for officer ideological training. Numerous problems seem evident in this field. Some officers don't utilize the offered possibilities to the fullest. Each unit is supposed to have a political reading room, and yet many do not. Many officers don't use these facilities when they are available. Instructors of Marxism-Leninism aren't properly prepared for their seminars, and participating officers show a distinct weakness in theoretical Marxism-Leninism. Commanders are not demanding sufficient political growth among junior officers. The junior officers, in turn, are developing an irresponsibility towards their own ideological-theoretical and political development. Staff officers don't participate in the required ideological training and don't hold required lectures. Senior officers don't counsel junior officers remiss in their political training. All these problems are undermining the strength of the officer corps.

Volume 9

1. Captain G. Logvinenko, Assistant to the Chief of the Political Section of a division (responsible for Komsomol work), "Pochin Obiazvaet...." (The Initiative Obligates One....), pp. 28-33.

In this article Captain Logvinenko discusses the positive experience of one Komsomol organization of a certain aviation unit which adopted the slogan, "For complete interchangeability" (meaning that they were striving for an effective cross-training program), and how this "initiative" was put into action. At the very end of the article he states that in several Komsomol organizations things do not go so well. They engage in lengthy discussions of plans for a new campaign to raise effectiveness, but they do not go any further than just talking about it. Control over fulfillment of the established task is the element which is frequently missing.

2. General-Major M. Goglev, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, "Sila Voinskogo Kollektiva" (The Strength of the Soldier Collective), pp. 41-47.

General-Major Goglev discusses the role of the collective in military units and the need to increase that role. He points out

several obstacles which stand in the way of raising the effectiveness of military collectives. One of these is that among the young commanders (sergeants) there are some who are not able to maintain a proper professional relationship with their subordinates, and who do not use their disciplinary rights reasonably. This is explained primarily by their lack of knowledge of the general troop regulations. Some sergeants have not sufficiently mastered their own duties, do not know how to give orders and supervise their fulfillment, and are not familiar with the rules of military courtesy between superiors and subordinates, seniors and juniors.

There are some Komsomol organizations which seldom bring up questions of a moral-ethical nature or cases of a lack of discipline on the part of individual comrades for public judgement. They tend to condone these shortcomings and fail to severely censure the attempts of some soldiers and sergeants to disregard the general interests of the unit in favor of their own personal interests.

In one company commanded by Captain Vasiliev, the educational work is poorly organized. In spite of the fact that the company has low scores in training and service, it escaped the attention of the senior leaders. In the course of two months no general meetings were held, the results of socialist competition were not announced, and wall newspapers and news bulletins were not issued. The mass sports program was neglected. The television set did not work, and sessions for listening to the latest news were not organized. In the unit only a little more than one-third of the soldiers visited the library, and among these there was not one soldier in his first year of service.

In the company of Capt. Vasiliev disciplinary practice has a one-sided character: punishment predominates, encouragement for excellent service is poorly used. Besides thanks, no other forms of encouragement are used.

Concerning socialist competition, formalism and "paper testing" are severely criticized. If one checks the record of each soldier's achievements, he sees only "fives" (maximum scores). But when the soldiers are quizzed about their achievements, they do not even know what is required to achieve such a score. Formalism gives birth to a lack of principles in evaluations, dampens the spirit of the participants, and undermines faith in the possibilities of socialist competition.

3. Colonel A. Shurygin, Doctor of Historical Sciences, "Kollektivnost' i Personal'naya Otvetstvennost'" (Collectivity and Personal Responsibility), pp. 48-55.

In this article COL Shurygin discusses personal responsibility within the Communist collective leadership arrangement. He states that too often problems are discussed within the Party collective, but then everyone tends to work individually toward realization of the established goals, rather than working together, with the result that the tasks are not always fully accomplished.

Several Party organizations are violating the Party regulation on the required frequency of meetings. The meetings are poorly prepared, and the Communists are not active enough during these meetings. There are cases where resolutions are passed which, by their vagueness and diffusiveness, actually lower the activity of the meetings and do not contribute to a feeling of personal responsibility for assigned tasks among the members of the collective.

In one unit meetings are held and resolutions are passed, but the resolutions do not assign anyone responsibility for tasks, and a time is not established for completion of the action. Therefore, the meetings are held, but the problems still remain.

In other instances meetings are held, decisions are made, responsibilities are assigned, and the "what", "when", and "where" of the project are specified. But they fail to organize checks on fulfillment of the tasks. As a result, the time passes and many tasks are not accomplished. Consequently, the same problems and resolutions appear two or three times at Party meetings.

Some party committees spend too much time discussing insignificant questions while the really important issues are not touched upon. In one unit some real deficiencies were discovered in the Marxist-Leninist instruction of officers and the political training of enlisted personnel, but the Party organization did not even discuss this problem.

Occasionally there are Party organizations where some members do not have assigned tasks, but rather tend to stand on the sidelines. In one particular unit the Party organizations addressed the current problems in a very formal manner, and even wrote its decisions in the form of a "protocol". But after a time people began to forget who was responsible for what, and as a result the majority of the tasks were performed by the secretary of the Party organization. The rest of the people were simply present at the meeting. Thus, in form this organization was "collective", but not in content.

4. Colonel (retired) V. Arkhipov, Lieutenant-Colonel (retired) I. Moshkovskii, "Zhivoe Slovo" (The Living Word), pp. 56-63.

This article is concerned with the effectiveness of propaganda lectures and seminars conducted in military units. A certain political officer is criticized for a lecture he gave to a group of "praporshchiki" (warrant officers) on the theme: "Topical Questions of Training and Educating Troops in Light of the Decisions of the 25th Party Congress of the CPSU". Although the subject was of primary importance to each member of the audience, and although the speaker outlined the general requirements for training and education of the troops and accurately quoted various documents, the lecture did not generate any interest on the part of the audience.

The authors suggest that if the speaker, along with outlining the general requirements, had spoken about the specific role of his listeners and had relied more on their experience, they would have listened with more interest. Each would have felt that the demands of the Party related to him personally, which would have inspired him to do all that is required.

The speaker understood the need to tie his lecture to the lives and service of his listeners. Therefore, at the end of his talk he called out the names of several "praporshchiki", dividing them into two groups -- those who are moving forward, and those who have not achieved success. However, this did not produce the desired effect, since many in the audience did not know specifically why some of their comrades were praised, while others were criticized. The speaker failed to cite specific examples of praiseworthy or poor performance on the part of those named.

In other places visited by the authors the speakers were competent and well-prepared in their subjects but were not sufficiently versed in the art of public speaking. At a certain conference, one of the speakers buried himself in his notes and lulled everyone to sleep with his bureaucratic language and his demands "to raise the level", "to pay more attention to emotions", "to not let the moment of action slip away", etc.

He who is careless about the form of his speech risks not being understood. On the other hand, pursuit of external beauty of speech to the detriment of content is commonly called "gabbing" and "idle talk". Someone who is totally helpless on the stage will hardly generate questions from the audience. The ideal is a correct combination of good delivery with good content.

In the opinion of the authors, increasing the quality of oral presentations is hampered by serious deficiencies in the planning of activities by the agitation and propaganda collectives and by the groups of lecturers. Here is a characteristic example. In the course of six months two political workers, both captains, were tasked to prepare and deliver four lectures each on extremely

important and difficult topics. If we consider that both officers are loaded down with their regular assigned duties, when will they have time to do this? There is no question about the need for such lectures, but because of a shortage of qualified propagandists, a few comrades are overloaded with work. Pursuit of quantity frequently results in a lowering of quality, and somehow they have become accustomed to this.

A few words about the "technical" preparation of a lecture. Frequently one observes the following scene: the speaker has already mounted the stage, and only then is it discovered that the microphone hisses, is garbled, or does not work at all. While the microphone is being repaired, time is wasted. On one occasion the Officers Club of one of the Moscow Military District garrisons invited a speaker from the capital. A large hall was reserved for his talk and an advertisement of the lecture was displayed. That evening one of the authors was present and observed how the embarrassed manager of the Officers Club explained to the speaker, a doctor of philosophy, why there were only 20-30 people in the lecture hall. "Today we had field training," he said, "the officers are tired, and that's why they didn't come."

It was a brilliant lecture and the subject of every conversation the next day. Many officers were sorry that they missed the opportunity to hear a famous scientist. They would have come despite being tired. The problem was caused by carelessness in formulating the text of the advertisement. They gave the name of the speaker, but failed to mention that he was a doctor of philosophy.

5. Colonel V. Mogutov, "V Interesakh Stanovleniya Molodykh Polit-rabotnikov", (In the Interest of Developing Young Political Workers), pp. 64-71.

As the title suggests, this article is concerned with the rapid and smooth integration of recent graduates of military-political institutes into their units. Admitting that not all graduates are prepared to immediately assume their duties as deputy subunit commanders for political affairs, the author discusses various methods for developing the requisite skills for dealing with people and leading and directing unit political training.

In this generally positive article several problems are discussed, such as young political officers who avoid speaking before the troops because of shyness or even fear. Some of them conduct political training in a boring manner, speaking in a monotone and fearing to tear themselves away from the written text. Because of nervousness they sometimes cannot find the right words, or begin to read their prepared text so rapidly that contact with the audience is completely lost.

Certain Party committees and bureaus fail to exercise proper control over the independent study of the young political officer, and do not deal severely with those who do not pay proper attention to their ideological growth.

Individual educational work with young political officers is sometimes not conducted with a purpose. Some of them fail to receive the proper supervision from senior officers. Some even stop studying and gradually begin to forget that which was learned in the military-political institutes. Consequently, they begin to lose their authority and the respect of those around them. A certain lieutenant failed to become an effective political officer after more than a year of service in his unit, primarily because of a careless attitude toward his work, and because his superiors did not properly supervise him or offer help when it was needed. As a result he was finally removed from his position.

Volume 10

1. Lead Editorial, "Sovershenstvovat' Rabotu s Pis'mami" (To Improve Work With Letters), pp. 3-7.

This article encourages all personnel in positions of authority to react positively to letters from soldiers, their families, and civilian workers in the Soviet Army. The importance of this work is still underestimated, the letters and the problems which generate these letters are given only a superficial analysis. In a number of garrisons little attention is paid to explaining to the personnel the processes of Soviet lawmaking, the rules of military service, and the prescribed privileges for service members and their families. There are cases where formal, unqualified answers are given to the questions, which generates another stream of letters.

A careless attitude toward the proposals, requests and complaints of the correspondents sometimes causes them to appeal to the next higher authority. For example, a certain officer informed the director of the district and regional military commissariats several times about deficiencies in the city military commissariat and about the improper conduct of a certain military commissar. But they did not react to his complaints. Then he wrote a letter to Moscow. Upon checking, it was determined that his complaints were justified. The guilty parties were dealt with severely both by the Party and by the Army. A reserve sergeant wrote a letter to the subunit in which he had served and requested that they send him a character recommendation for enrollment in an academic institution. The request of the former soldier, who was outstanding in military and political training, remained unanswered. Only after repeated appeals to the regimental commander and other organs did he receive

his recommendation. In certain places control over the processing of letters and the execution of decisions based on them has been weakened. The instructions concerning the procedures for examining proposals, statements, complaints, and reception of visitors in military units and institutions of the Soviet Army and Navy require that an internal check of the status of work with letters and the reception of visitors be conducted no less than once a quarter. Sometimes complaints and statements are transmitted to subordinate headquarters and institutions unnecessarily. Besides that, sometimes they fall into the hands of those officials about whose activity the writers are complaining.

As inspections have shown in a number of units, the reception of visitors is unsatisfactory. At times certain leaders for various reasons decline to personally receive servicemen, workers and members of their families, and transfer this important obligation to personnel who do not have the authority to solve the problem. Unfortunately, some political organs and party organizations do not properly censure such practice and do not place the proper demands on those who are inattentive to the needs of the troops.

There are still cases where letters are not processed within the required time limit. It would not be out of place to mention that letters, statements and complaints are required by order of the Minister of Defense, USSR, to be processed without delay, but no later than seven days from their receipt. In the headquarters of military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, they are to be processed within 15 days.

An analysis of the content of complaints, which was conducted in a number of units and major units, bears witness to the fact that their authors frequently do not know the rules and instructions which establish the rights and privileges for the various categories of military personnel and that the writers do not observe proper procedures for submitting complaints.

The written and oral appeals of the invalids of the Great Patriotic War and the members of the families of those servicemen and partisans who perished in the war require special attention. Unfortunately, in the editorial mail there are indications that these people are not always treated as required by moral norms and law.

2. General-Colonel V. Goncharov, First Deputy Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR, "Po-Leninski Rastit' i Vospitat' Kadry" (To Raise and Educate Cadres in the Leninist Style), pp. 24-32.

General Goncharov talks in general terms about the education

and development of the Soviet Army officer corps. When he speaks about the cadre policy of the Party in the Armed Forces, he has in mind primarily "the preparation, selection, placement, training and education of officers in the interest of the underlining growth of combat readiness of the troops, the strengthening of defense capability of our Motherland and of all the socialist brotherhood."

Speaking about the training of officer candidates, he states that deficiencies in the service and conduct of some officers, especially the young ones, are not infrequently the result of gaps and omissions in their training and education in the military schools. In some institutions insufficient attention is paid to the development in the cadets of a love for the military profession, and they do not always effectively use progressive troop experience. Even the selection of candidates for the military schools is not conducted carefully. From time to time officers are observed who are not sufficiently familiar with their weapons and who conduct field training unsystematically.

Commanders and other leaders do not always thoroughly consider the political and professional qualities of their subordinate officers. There are cases of hasty, inadvisable malassignments. At the time of nomination for promotion or reassignment some officers receive superficial efficiency reports in which their command qualities, professional preparation and organizational capabilities are not reflected.

It goes without saying that subjectivism in evaluating officers is intolerable. It is important to ensure that the candidate for promotion or reassignment has sufficiently proved himself and is capable of handling more responsible work. In one of the major units a certain senior lieutenant was reassigned to a more responsible position. Literally within several months he had to be reassigned to a less responsible position.

The experience of progressive officers is not always successfully disseminated. The individual work of educating young cadres has not become systematic everywhere. Instead of patiently working with an officer newly assigned to a higher position, senior officers tend more toward the use of administrative reprimand and punishment.

3. General-Lieutenant L. Vakhrushev, Executive Secretary of the Party Commission in the Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy, "Zabota O Partiinom Popolnenii" (Concern for Party Replenishment), pp. 50-57.

In this article General Vakhrushev discusses the recruitment,

preparation and training of candidates for Party membership in the Armed Forces.

In the Red Banner Siberian Military District there are some problems with reception and training of candidates for membership in the Party. Several political organs do not exercise sufficient control and do not direct the work of their Party organizations in this area and offer them little practical help.

There are still cases where Party organizations are not sufficiently objective and exacting in their appraisals of candidates for party membership. In one of the Party organizations of the Turkestan Military District a certain junior sergeant was accepted as a candidate for membership in the CPSU, but within five months he had to be expelled for unacceptable behavior. Among those who recommended him was his deputy commander for political affairs.

By regulation a service member who is a candidate for Party membership must be approved by two-thirds of the members present at a general meeting of the Party organization. Only if the candidate receives this approval can he be endorsed by the unit Party commission. However, in one unit the Party organization disapproved the membership of a certain lieutenant, but the Party commission illegally changed the decision and accepted him as a member of the Party.

In one of the military schools there was a gross violation of the CPSU regulation in the acceptance of a certain student as a candidate for Party membership. The Party organization disapproved the candidacy of this student because of his poor preparation. However, the Party committee, and after that the Party commission of the school, failing to sufficiently investigate the situation, accepted the student as a candidate for membership. And only after four months was the error corrected by the next higher Party organ.

Such problems occur where the Party commissions take a formalistic approach to examining the decisions of the primary Party organizations, limit themselves only to familiarization with the presented documents, do not delve into the essence of the question, do not burden themselves with concern about an in-depth study of the political, professional and moral qualities of the nominee, and do not strictly observe the principle of individual selection for membership in the CPSU.

Preparatory work with the candidates for membership is not always well-organized. Sometimes Party leaders do not take an interest in increasing the ideological-theoretical knowledge of the candidates, do not give them assignments, and do not listen to their reports about how they are using their period of candidacy to

prepare themselves for entry into the Party. As a result some candidates are unprepared for acceptance as Party members.

In one of the headquarters organizations of a unit a certain captain was refused membership in the CPSU on the basis of Article 16 of the Party regulations. He was not prepared to become a Communist. (Article 16 states that at the end of the one-year period of candidacy, if an individual has not proved himself worthy of membership in the CPSU, the Party organization passes a decision not to accept him as a full member, and after confirmation by the district or city committee, he is expelled from the group of candidates for Party membership.) The leaders here considered that the officer did not need their help and, therefore, quickly forgot about him. When the time came to accept this officer as a member of the Party, it was explained that he had not raised his ideological political level, had not fulfilled his assignments, and did not take part in Communist activities.

The political section of the Dzhezkazgan district military commissariat did not ensure that a certain candidate for Party membership was registered in the local Party organization. As a result, the requirements of the CPSU regulation that a condition for membership in the Party is work in one of the Party organizations and that "the Party organization must assist the candidate to prepare himself for entry into the membership of the CPSU and must verify his personal qualities," were not met.

Some Party organizations act incorrectly when in the presence of serious infractions committed by certain candidates, they do not counsel the candidate immediately, but rather wait for the expiration of the one-year period, after which they act in accordance with Article 16 of the CPSU regulations. This is frequently done deliberately in order not to "spoil" the statistics, and in order to have fewer Communists who are reprimanded for violations of Party and military discipline.

There are cases when certain members and candidate members of the CPSU do not serve as examples for others in training and discipline, who sometimes fail to comply with the requirements of the CPSU regulations, Soviet laws and the norms of Communist morality, and forgive the mistakes and omissions of those around them.

4. Captain N. Koshelev, "Vospitanie Pooshchreniem" (Training by Encouragement), pp. 58-62.

The author criticizes some military leaders for failing to properly use positive reinforcements as a means of encouraging

their troops toward better performance.

Two Komsomol members of a certain unit were awarded certificates of merit for fulfilling their socialist obligations. However, the process of awarding these certificates somewhat dampened the joy of receiving them. After a long time had passed the soldiers were summoned to the Komsomol committee. The secretary opened his desk drawer, dug for a long time among his papers, and finally found what he was looking for -- two gold-gilded sheets of paper with the vivid inscription, "Certificate of Merit." Attempting to assume a solemn air, he pronounced, "I congratulate you, comrades, with this great award. I hope that it will inspire you toward the achievement of new successes in military and political training." On the certificates stood an eight-month-old date, and there was a mistake in the spelling of the name of one of the soldiers.

One would wonder if the manner in which these awards were presented played a stimulating role for the awardees. Obviously not. It did not generate any enthusiasm or willingness to exert more effort on the part of the young people inasmuch as the presentation was reduced to empty formalism.

In using means of encouragement it is important to remember that every soldier, including those who succeed in everything, must constantly keep in mind the necessity to not rest on his successes, to move forward, to not weaken, and not to surrender to self-delusion.

This is what happened to a certain Komsomol member, Private Petr Lebedinskii. He caught the fancy of the Party activists -- he was industrious, competent, assiduous, proficient with military equipment, a real "right-flanker". This is how it began. Whom to reward with a certificate for success in the Lenin examination? Lebedinskii. About whom to write in the local newspaper? Lebedinskii. Who is to greet visiting dignitaries? Lebedinskii. And so it went from day to day. Petr himself was not happy with the situation. And, although in training he lost his first-place position, because of inertia his name continued to be mentioned in various reports and incentive lists for a long time. It never occurred to the activists that such practice was not helping but harming the development of the other young soldiers.

Recently in one of the Komsomol organizations fifteen soldiers were singled out in honor of the anniversary of the Revolution. Among them were many high-achievers, but there were also those who had not won this title and perhaps were selected for their active mass-cultural work or for achievements in sports. This situation, naturally, generated bewilderment and skeptical smiles among many soldiers. Even among several of those selected there remained a highly unpleasant aftertaste.

5. General-Lieutenant I. Ovcharenko, Chief of the Political Department of the Military Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Academy in the Name of M. V. Frunze, "Kul'tura Sovetskogo Ofitsera" (The Culture of the Soviet Officer), pp. 63-69.

General Ovcharenko defines the culture of the Soviet officer, which is based on "socialist culture", which, according to him, is synonymous with Communism. The author points out that there are some officers who are foul-mouthed, crude, boastful and self-satisfied. The decisive struggle with such behavior is an area of special concern for commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. While condemning crudeness and arrogance, it is necessary at the same time to decisively struggle with such character traits as unscrupulousness, weak wills, bigotry and narrowmindedness.

Volume 11

1. General-Lieutenant I. Blizniuk, Chief of the Political Directorate, Airborne Forces. "Vnedrenie Peredovogo Opyta -- Delo Partiinoe," (The Inculcation of Progressive Experience Is a Party Matter), pp. 26-32.

General Blizniuk discusses the ways in which the progressive experience of outstanding individuals and units should be disseminated. Unfortunately, there are still units which, although living and working under identical conditions, produce different results: one justifiably bears the title of excellence while others are located in the "middle", or worse yet, lag behind. To expose the laggards is not difficult, but to help them master firm habits and progressive work methods and to raise them to the level of outstanding units is a more complex problem. This, unfortunately, is not always achieved. The primary reason is that in the units young commanders and political workers are serving who have not yet mastered the ability to lead military collectives and have not developed the skill to conduct training and education. In a word, they are not yet completely competent.

For the dissemination of progressive experience, conferences, seminars and other means of discussion are organized, but they do not always achieve the desired goal. Instead of a detailed, business-like discussion of the sources and substance of progressive experience, frequently only the measures taken are listed; the achievements of the outstanding soldiers are not mentioned, nor are the reasons for deficiencies discussed. The entire discussion is handled very superficially.

Sometimes there is a great deal of summarized material, but

its content is very low. There are no clear, convincing examples or detailed indications of the achievements of the outstanding soldiers. There are even cases where commanders and political workers gather high-quality material, but they give it only a cursory review at conferences, and then forget about it.

In one unit there were some valuable lessons to be gained from the experience of certain officers in their work to improve the technical knowledge in their subunits, but this experience was not sufficiently exploited. It was disseminated to the officers and secretaries of Party organizations, but went no further than that.

2. Colonel V. Serdinov, Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Section, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Far East Military District, "Uchatsia Propagandisti" (The Propagandists Study), pp. 58-64.

Colonel Serdinov states that there are substantial shortcomings and unresolved problems in the organization and content of the work with political cadres. In a number of garrisons the quality of measures taken in training propagandists does not meet established requirements. The ideological level of certain political-educational measures is still low, and the speeches of propagandists do not inspire people. Sometimes insufficient attention is devoted to the education of the soldiers and sergeants in the course of their military training. Stabilization of propaganda cadres has not yet been achieved. Their selection and assignment needs to be improved. The style of work of the political organs in directing all ideological activity still needs to be developed.

Volume 12

1. Lead Editorial, "Letnei Uchebe -- Vysokoe Kachestvo" (To Summer Training -- High Quality), pp. 3-8.

This issue's lead editorial discusses the role of socialist competition in summer training. It also points out some of the general problems and shortcomings which have become apparent in the course of military and political training.

During the winter training period some units did not completely meet their training goals, and some of those who had previously been awarded marks of excellence slipped backwards. The authors state that the reasons for the shortfall should be analyzed, and the summer training period should be used to eliminate the deficiencies.

There are also shortcomings in Party-political work. All commanders and political workers have not yet met the demands of the 25th Party Congress and the October Plenum of the Central Committee to raise the effectiveness and quality of combat training. Certain Party organizations and political organs still do not actively develop in Communists and in command-political and engineer-technical cadres a feeling of personal responsibility for the work of the collectives entrusted to them and a self-critical attitude toward the results of their labor.

2. General-Major V. Glushchets, Senior Inspector of the Organizational-Party Work Directorate, Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy, "Partiinaya Informatsiya" (Party Information), pp. 51-59.

General Glushchets discusses the role of Party information in the Armed Forces. He states that the requirements of the CPSU regulations that the Party organizations and their committees keep higher Party organizations informed and answer for their work before them are not always observed. Several Party organs, on the other hand, rarely exchange information with their subordinate Party organizations. For example, one political section in the course of an entire year did not inform its subordinate organizations of its work, and did not demand such information from these organizations. In many cases Party actives are not informed of the course of work in fulfilling the decisions of Party conferences and meetings. Sometimes information received from political administrations by the Party organs is not disseminated to the Party organizations.

Failure to properly evaluate information, a lack of desire or a lack of ability to organize its regular flow, and a superficial analysis of informational materials can lead to subjectivism and blind leadership, and this negatively influences all organizational and political work of all political organs and organizations among the troops.

In one unit the information was frequently of too general a nature; it dealt with the surface issues but failed to delve into the depths of the problems. The political section was not familiar with the situation in their subunits, and was caught by surprise when several of them who had received excellent marks in past training tests not only did not reconfirm their status of excellence, but turned in a lower performance.

Many times subordinate units submit nonobjective, one-sided reports to their higher headquarters which do not reflect any analysis of how the high marks were achieved, what specific factors led to their success, and what types of difficulties had to be overcome. This lack of objectivity causes special harm when attempting to

evaluate combat training, combat readiness and military discipline.

In some places the term "information" is understood in a too narrow and simplified sense as an impassive reporting of facts and events. But Party information has the responsibility to help every person to correctly understand the meaning of events, to investigate them, and to evaluate them from a Marxist-Leninist position.

Sometimes the possibilities of information are not always considered, and it is not used sufficiently in deciding questions of Party cadre policy. As an example, in a number of places there have been mistakes in the selection and placement of cadres. In one unit two officers were assigned to some important work on the recommendation of the higher political organ, but in a short time this same political organ requested that these officers be removed from the work. As it turned out, these two officers had previously committed serious errors, but this fact had been overlooked in selecting them for the job.

Too often information is used, not to study a situation, but only as a source of convenient facts or examples for a report. The vast majority of valuable data remains untouched.

Volume 13

1. Captain of the 2d Rank (Navy) V. Alekseev, Captain-Lieutenant S. Bystrov, "Vekhi Stanovleniia" (Guideposts for Establishment), pp. 41-47.

This article discusses the problems associated with getting new lieutenants established as junior leaders in their units.

Some young officers have difficulties in assuming their new positions, especially those involving education and training. They seem to quickly master the technical aspects of their jobs, but have problems dealing with subordinates.

Unfortunately, some young officers do not take into account the fact that from the first day in the unit they begin to influence their subordinates. This occurs not only because they experience natural discomfort at first in dealing with unfamiliar people, but also because they mistakenly believe that the process of educating subordinates can be limited in time and can be isolated from daily life.

In their daily work young officers do not always set the desired example of conduct and devotion to duty.

Studying the experience of successful officer-educators is useful, but the blind copying of the experience of others does not always produce the desired effect. It seems that some young officers adhere to all the methodological rules learned in school, observe the principles of military pedagogy and psychology, and yet they do not achieve the necessary results. Their first failures then become a source of grief and sometimes even serious doubt about their competence. This problem is further compounded by some well-wishing but insufficiently mature officers and warrant officers who, instead of helping the young lieutenant, start him off in the wrong direction.

In one unit a young lieutenant had many problems because of his attitude toward his subordinates. He assumed a superior air and was very stern and strict with his soldiers. Soon the number of punishments in the unit rose, discipline grew worse, and many mistakes were made in training. When the unit commander offered his help, the lieutenant said that he could handle the situation himself. But, as it turned out, he could not. Soon he lost confidence in himself, and began to place fewer demands on himself and on others.

Too often senior commanders rely on "pep talks" to help young lieutenants out of such situations, instead of providing them with constructive help.

Volume 14

1. Lead Editorial. "Po Dolgu Pravoflangovykh" (The Duty of the Right-Flankers), pp. 3-8.

This lead editorial discusses the obligation of all Communists to participate actively in all aspects of social life. It chastises those who become complacent with their successes and those who avoid participation in political agitation and propaganda work, claiming that they are busy, or that they are not suited to that particular kind of work. There are some who consider themselves exceptions to the rule that all Communists are obligated to fulfill all assigned tasks in a disciplined manner. They issue calls for action, but then end up bringing up the rear. They are full of good ideas, but quickly cool down when the time comes to put those ideas into action.

Volume 15

1. General-Major V. Kozhvakhtsev, Chief of Staff, Central Group of Forces, "Shtab i Sorevnovanie" (The Staff and Competition), pp. 33-38.

General Kozhbakhteev discusses the use of socialist competition as a stimulating factor in training and the obligation of higher staff personnel to assist inexperienced commanders in organizing this competition.

In one unit the daily organizational work of attracting the troops to participate in socialist competition is replaced by loud, general calls to action and by the sterile numbers of schematics and graphics. The staff does not control the activities of the unit, and the staff officers are only passive observers.

The course of winter training indicated that things were not going well, but the headquarters did not take one of its subunits under serious control during the entire winter period.

In another unit, the beautifully designed charts and printed sheets indicating the obligations of each officer give one the impression that everything is in order. But under careful inspection it becomes apparent that all the obligations have been printed with carbon paper, and are absolutely identical. From these sheets it is impossible to determine which of the officers has achieved success in military competition, and who needs encouragement. Even more amazing is the fact that almost all of the officers received excellent marks in tactical, fire control, and technical training, while in the other disciplines they had only "good" marks. Could it really be that there was no desire among any of the officers to excel in combat and political training? Lines were drawn by the names of two officers, apparently indicating that they were not required to participate in the competition.

Among the Communists of the headquarters and administration of the regiment there is not one specialist of the highest class. However, none of them has demonstrated any desire to raise his class rating by even one grade during the current training year. And no one seems to have any convincing reasons for this lack of initiative. The whole problem is that they approached the organization of socialist competition in a very formalistic manner; they typed the sheets of obligations in advance and handed them out to the officers at the next meeting, proposing that they write in their own scores, and that was the end of the matter. It is strange that the Party bureau accepted these "liberties" and took no substantive actions to correct the situation.

And yet another fact. In one of the subunits training was planned under near-combat conditions. The training was conducted without enthusiasm, and the troops were not imbued with a sense of competition. On the evening before the training some officers of the headquarters conducted a briefing for the upcoming exercise,

but there was no competition organized during this briefing either. The explanation was that there were not sufficient experienced officers in this subunit who knew what was required.

Volume 16

1. Lead Editorial, "Distiplina i Organizovannost' - Zalog Nashikh Uspekhnv" (Discipline and Organization - the Guarantee of Our Successes), pp. 3-8.

In several Party organizations the efforts of Communists toward further strengthening of discipline are insufficiently directed. In one unit the political-educational work was conducted in a formalistic manner, the commanders and leaders participated poorly, too little attention was paid to individual development of the various categories of personnel and to analysis of disciplinary practice, and the violators of discipline were not punished with the required Party exactingness.

2. General-Lieutenant V. Mitropov, First Deputy (chief of the Political Directorate, Strategic Rocket Forces, "Sorevnovaniu - Vysokuiu Deistvennost'" (To Competition - High Effectiveness), pp. 37-44.

The increased demands for the organization of socialist competition are not sufficiently considered everywhere. In a number of subunits the elements of formalism have not been completely eradicated. There are cases where certain excellent soldiers fail to affirm their excellent status upon examination.

In a number of units the possibilities for ideological and spiritual improvement of the troops, which are inherent in socialist competition, are not sufficiently utilized. Certain commanders and political workers do not always deeply analyze the influence of competition on increasing the moral and cultural level of the troops.

In several subunits the elements of formalism have not yet been completely eliminated. Some commanders and political workers attempt to pass off the desired for the actual, do not set high standards for the determination of excellent soldiers and units, sometimes forget to give recognition to the leaders of competition or to send letters of appreciation to the parents of the soldier or to the institution from which he came, fail to present them with deserved awards, and fail to have their names entered into the Book of Honor in a timely fashion.

3. Colonel G. Serebriakov, Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department - Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Kiev Military District, Candidate of Historical Sciences, "Gluboko, V Tesnoi Sviazi s Zadachami Voinov" (Deeply, In Close Contact with the Missions of the Troops), pp. 51-56.

The content of studies in a number of groups does not yet meet the increased demands for political training. At times they have a didactic character and tend toward repetition of well-known truths.

There are cases where political training is conducted without the required preparation of the group leaders. The material at these sessions is not always closely tied to the missions assigned to the personnel and to the situation in the unit. The emotional effect of the training is not sufficiently considered. The speeches of the propagandists are sometimes insignificant and boring, and do not produce the required effect on the consciousness and feelings of the people.

4. Vice Admiral P. Medvedev, Member of the Military Council, Chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, "Partiinaiia Trebovatel'nost'" (Party Exactingness), pp. 59-67.

During inspections of subordinate units certain political organs and headquarters point out the shortcomings and issue recommendations and advice left and right, but care little about helping their comrades to put these recommendations into effect on the spot. About all they accomplish is to point out already obvious deficiencies, and tear responsible people away from important work.

In certain Party organizations insufficient demands are placed on Communists, there is a lack of objectivity in evaluating their work, and they do not exercise enough influence on the lives and training of their co-workers.

Evaluating the activity of his own political administration "in the spirit of self-criticism", Admiral Medvedev remarks that sometimes they do not get out to visit all of the primary Party organizations, do not analyze the processes taking place within them, and are not sufficiently effective or determined in generalizing and disseminating the leading experience of Party work.

On one ship the Party bureau seldom listened to the reports of Communist officers about their progress in raising their ideological-theoretical and professional levels, and tended to overlook the poor performance of some of them in work and training. Some Communists began to lose the feeling of responsibility for their own work and that of their comrades, and they stopped serving as

examples in work, training and discipline for those around them.

One particular ship was rated as excellent, the commander, political worker and secretary of the Party organization had all received awards. But with time the leaders began to feel complacent, which resulted in a decreased level of Party work, a lowering of effectiveness, and the loss of its earned position.

There are cases where some Communists substitute shouting and rudeness for daily Party demands. One lieutenant colonel, a Party member, is criticized for poor participation in political work, and because he used pressure and harsh demands on his subordinates.

5. Captain A. Storozhenko, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate, Central Group of Forces, responsible for Komsomol work, "Po Zakonom Kollektiva" (According to the Laws of the Collective), pp. 68-72.

Captain Storozhenko states that he has been present at Komsomol committee conferences where the discussion has been lively and where important questions were being addressed, but as soon as the decision is made, the passions seem to subside. And if one visits a company or battery of this regiment the next day and asks the Komsomol members what they have heard about the conference, they know nothing. It turns out that the Komsomol committee also knows little about the situation in the subunits, because the secretary and his assistants rarely get out to visit them, and when they do get out, they talk only to the company orderlies. They ask two or three questions and depart, considering that they have done their duty.

At one unit Komsomol meeting a junior sergeant gave a fiery speech calling for all Komsomol members to conduct a decisive struggle against violations of military discipline and to assist the commander and party organization in creating a strong collective in every subunit which would be capable of fulfilling any mission. The speech was right on the mark, but the problem was that the speaker himself was not an example of high self-discipline.

At another Komsomol meeting the offense of a certain private was being discussed. When the group organizer explained the offense and proposed punishment, several people defended the private, claiming that the incident was just an accident, and besides, this man was an excellent mechanic, with "golden hands". He was not punished, and, as a result, he decided that he was beyond the law of the collective and could do as he wished. As expected, he later committed another offense, and those who had defended him were asking themselves how such a thing could happen.

In another case a soldier who had a bad reputation - his service record indicated several punishments - was assigned to a unit. No one counseled him upon his arrival or even mentioned his past offenses, and so the soldier conducted himself as before. The secretary of the Komsomol bureau decided to have a talk with him, but the soldier did not admit his errors. And in a few days the soldier committed another offense. Then a Komsomol meeting was held which everyone remembered for a long time. At first the soldier was haughty and even challenged the authority of the collective, but gradually his bravado faded. His comrades told him the straight truth, and he then began to rethink the situation. He understood the strength of the collective, and feared that they would turn their backs on him. But his fears were groundless, for he was surrounded by true friends, and he became a good soldier.

In the last example, a soldier was assigned from a training subunit to a line unit. He arrived with excellent preparation and a burning desire to become an expert marksman. But soon it became known that this soldier tended to be haughty and conceited - he considered himself better than the others. However, at an important rifle match the soldier did not do as well as expected. The collective seized this opportunity to "pay him back" for his attitude by chastizing him for his failure. They thought they could fight fire with fire. Fortunately, the collective came to its senses in time, and extended the hand of comradeship to this soldier, with the result that the soldier slowly but surely achieved superior results.

Volume 17

1. General-Lieutenant B. Utkin, Chief of the Political Directorate, Volga Military District, "Zariad Aktivnosti" (A Charge of Activity), pp. 39-44.

This article describes and praises the various political programs being conducted in the Volga Military District in preparation for the 60th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution. After devoting approximately 90 percent of the article to such lavish praise, the author then states that there are still some unresolved questions and shortcomings within the district.

Some individual commanders and political organizations exercise inadequate leadership in preparing for the anniversary and fail to tie that action in with discussions on the new Soviet constitution. A large quantity of useful and interesting measures are taken, and with much variety in format, however they are held at installation, regimental and military academy level and never get down to the smaller units. Little attention is paid to individual efforts in this regard either. Elements of formalism and the use

of simple declarations have still not been eliminated from the socialist competition program. Persistent struggles to completely fulfill the established requirements are not being carried on everywhere. Not all staffs actively participate in the organization of such competition or in introducing advanced methods based upon experiences gained and lessons learned. Chiefs of various staff sections sometimes stand aside when it comes down to organizing activities to increase the proficiency of the leading specialists. This is particularly so in the case of officers.

In closing, the author states that the political administration is analyzing the causes of these shortcomings and is seeking to overcome them. In so doing, the main effort is being directed at the political cadre, since many of the deficiencies stem from their rather low level of professional knowledge, as well as from incompetence of individual political leaders suffering from a general lack of experience.

2. General-Lieutenant M. Ponomarev, Deputy Chief of Rear Services, Soviet Armed Forces. "Ekonomiia i Berezhlivost' - Cherty Kommunisticheskie" (Economy and Thrift - Communistic Traits), pp. 62-67.

The author of this article, in discussing the preparations for the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life, scheduled to be held in Moscow towards the end of 1977, describes some of the improvements made in the provision of rear area services in the recent past. He states that it would not be an exaggeration to profess that the absolute majority of units use the means devoted to improvement wisely and thriftily, and that the provision of material goods is getting better each year.

Nonetheless, he finds that there are still individual instances of waste and spoilage of various items, including foodstuffs, fuel and lubricants. An analysis of the problem more often than not reveals a lack of supervision on the part of the responsible individuals. Some chiefs of services fail to conduct their required checks of equipment, warehouse facilities, maintenance procedures, etc., as frequently as required by regulation (not less than once every two months), or else they do a haphazard job of it, simply to get the task over with. As a result, deficiencies are not discovered in time, inventories are not conducted, and shortages and losses become unavoidable.

Poor preparation on the part of responsible individuals in managing supplies, conducting inventory and providing for accountability also leads to serious deficiencies. Worse than poor preparation is the laissez-faire attitude on the part of some individuals towards the problem, says the author. As an example, he cites a

situation which was found aboard a Soviet Navy ship in which the supply officer let such matters take their own natural course. As a result, required inventories were missed, receipt and issue documents were not maintained, and many items of equipment simply turned up lost. The ship's captain also failed to check his subordinate's work, all of which, says the author, led to "sad consequences."

The author further states that there still are frequent instances of inadequate storage and security of equipment and materiel which lead to further losses. Facilities that are not suitable for storage are used for that purpose, and rules and instructions for securing goods are violated. Other units issue their fuel and lubricants with a "generous hand," failing to maintain necessary control over those items. When commanders are questioned about such shortcomings, they seek all sorts of excuses, but fail to recognize that the main problem lies with their own failure to exercise the necessary controls. This lack of personal responsibility, initiative and concern breeds the same traits among their subordinates and many individuals lose all concern for economy and thrift, as well as the increased expenditures that come about as a result.

Additionally, the author states that other units fail to provide protective facilities for expensive items of equipment, leaving them needlessly exposed to the elements. Much equipment is also held onto long after there is no further use for it in the unit, instead of sending it off elsewhere where it can be put to use.

Still other problems exist in the feeding of troops, such as poor meal planning, gross violations in the preparation of food and processing of produce, large, unjustified shortages of items, particularly potatoes and fresh vegetables, etc., all of which results in both inadequate amounts of food for the troops and very weak sanitary controls over food preparation. Similar problems are found with items of personal equipment. Yet when inspections are conducted by higher headquarters, a positive rating is still granted, despite all the deficiencies. There is no justification for such conclusions, says the author, and those types of inspections do nothing to develop a high degree of responsibility among the chiefs of the various services.

In short, the question returns to the responsibility of leaders, and to their ability and desire to act properly, seeing in every needlessly wasted ruble important economic and moral costs which could be avoided. Squandering of State-owned goods can be precluded, says the author.

Volume 18

1. General-Lieutenant M. Druzhinin, Chief of the Political Directorate, Far East Military District. "Do Soznaniia Kazhdogo" (To the Consciousness of Everyone), pp. 29-35.

This article deals with the need to further develop and reinforce the ideological-theoretical strength of the Soviet people and to create a Marxist-Leninist world outlook among them. One of the principal areas where this work is to be conducted, says the author, is in explaining the meaning and significance of the decisions of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as subsequently published in Party documents. He then goes on to describe how Party propagandists within the Far East Military District are going about that task, emphasizing that many units have had positive results with their program. He then states, however, that insufficient use is being made of the opportunity to improve propaganda efforts.

A study of the situation existing in a number of units revealed that individual commanders and political workers have not completely realized and accepted the spirit of the new increased demands of the 25th Party Congress, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy regarding the mastery by all officers of revolutionary theory and the Leninist style of troop-leading. The author states that activities within some groups studying Marxist-Leninist teachings are conducted on a low ideological-theoretical level, that individual work is not organized in the manner it should be, and that control over the course of such activities is weak.

It is not surprising then, says the author, that individual officers have not mastered the material very well. Such Communists do not, he says, have a flair for systematically working on political literature. Additionally, not all commanders, staff officers, chiefs of support services, engineers or technicians personally participate in political education activities. And to stand aside from that, in the author's view, is to weaken one's contacts with the troops and deprive oneself of important means of influence over them.

Volume 19

1. General of the Army E. Ivanovskii, Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). "Sila Partiinogo Vliiania" (The Strength of Party Influence), pp. 17-24.

This article underscores the role of the Communist Party and its representatives in influencing and controlling all facets of military service within the GSFG. General Ivanovskii (who is himself a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) states that secretaries of Party organizations, in performing their duties within troop units, should not wait for commanders to extend them an invitation to discuss matters, but should themselves go to the commanders with their own ideas and proposals. At the same time, Party activists must also support the commander's authority through close cooperation and insistence on exact fulfillment of his orders and directives. This is best accomplished, he says, through frequent discussions, meetings and Party gatherings, where experiences are exchanged, suggestions are made, and criticism and self-criticism are employed. Personal examples are also of utmost importance, says the author, since nothing undermines morale or creates a greater sense of disappointment among members of a troop unit than a Communist leader who is himself undisciplined and fails to conduct himself in accordance with his oath of service and as required by military regulations.

Unfortunately, says General Ivanovskii, one still encounters commanders and supervisors who fail to take a responsible approach to matters and thus undermine their own authority in the eyes of their subordinates. Such instances are, he says, exceptions, but that does not limit the harm that they inflict. In combatting such problems, the importance of criticism and self-criticism cannot be over-emphasized, and even though much is accomplished by these means, some Party collectives have still failed to grasp the significance of doing so. Criticism is sometimes channeled only from top to bottom, or criticism of superiors is made only timidly. This is unfortunate, says the author, since Party instructions call for all Communists to have the right to criticize any member or candidate members of the Party, regardless of their position. The only criticism that is not allowed is that pertaining to orders and directives issued by commanders and supervisors.

The same applies to self-criticism. It is done not for the mere sake of criticism, but to effect needed change. The value of self-criticism is determined by its sincerity, and by one's readiness to immediately strive to correct mistakes and inadequacies. These are the areas to which commanders and political organs of the GSFG must devote their energies in the future in order to strengthen the influence of the Party on all aspects of troop life and activities.

2. General-Lieutenant V. Dement'ev, Chief of the Political Directorate, Kiev Military District. "Mobilizuiia i siliia Voinov" (Mobilizing the Efforts of the Troops), pp. 2-31.

This article is devoted to a discussion of the means being employed within the Kiev Military District to improve the level of combat readiness and political-moral awareness among the troops. In examining the results already achieved, however, the author states that they serve only as the foundation for conquering new frontiers in military training.

The best way to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, says the author, is to concentrate all efforts on those tasks which remain unresolved. Among those, he notes weaknesses in the preparation of lessons by some leaders, including failure to properly use training aids in giving classes. A specific example of this is cited in which an officer assigned to a tank unit is listed by name as having been found to be poorly prepared. As a result, a special Party meeting was conducted, to which the officer was invited, for the purpose of discussing and resolving the problem. Some Party organizations, however, act much too slowly in implementing their decisions and taking the required actions, with individual representatives only putting on an appearance of activity, while in reality accomplishing very little.

Another example is cited where the Party activist led lively discussions on the need for implementing certain actions, but as soon as the meetings were completed, he did nothing further to accomplish the required tasks. Thus, there was no active control or checks on the actual accomplishment, resulting in reduced effectiveness. And since there still are imbalances in the levels of preparedness within units, it is clear to the author that commanders, political organs and staffs must concentrate their attention on these unresolved problems and deficiencies in order to overcome them in a decisive manner.

3. General-Major K. Fedorov, Deputy Chief for Political Affairs, Central Military Medical Directorate, Ministry of Defense of the USSR. "Vklad Voennykh Medikov" (The Contribution of Military Medics), pp. 59-62.

The author of this article discusses the contributions being made by Soviet military medical personnel in preparing for the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life. He states that the current capacity of Soviet hospitals has reached 3,012,000 beds, and that there are 5,500 sanatoriums and rest homes in the country. Numerous improvements have been made in military medicine as well, says the author, including the introduction of a wide range of prophylactic measures for the prevention of infectious diseases. Several other medical programs are then cited which have contributed significantly to the level of combat readiness of the troops and to a reduced level of medical problems.

An important element of that success is the socialist competition program, in which all medical units participate, together with the rest of the armed forces. In some places, however, there are still inadequacies in the program, and attention is sometimes paid only to the successful individuals, rather than to those who fall behind in the field. The competition is not looked upon by all elements as a means of raising the quality of medical care for military personnel, a fact which the author attributes to formalism on the part of responsible individuals. This formalistic approach, which basically pays only lip service to the program, must, says the author, be overcome and eliminated by Party activists, by Communists setting the example for youth, and by others. Only in this manner can the remaining weakness be resolved.

Volume 20

1. General-Colonel M. Sarokin, Commander, Leningrad Military District. "Traditsiiam VERNY" (True to Traditions), pp. 58-63.

This article describes the history and traditions of the Leningrad Military District, the oldest military district in the Soviet Union. The author devotes the bulk of the article to a review of the district's revolutionary exploits and its historical feats during the Great Patriotic War. He then goes on to review the results of this year's socialist competition within the district, stating that the overwhelming majority of all units and individuals under his command have achieved significant results in their combat and political training program.

Despite this fact, says the author, efforts must still be concentrated primarily on those problems which remain unresolved, rather than on flattery over results already accomplished. Not all unit commanders, political organs and staff members have made the struggle for effective, high-quality training a matter of daily concern. Some units do not always conduct their training on the level at which it should be conducted, nor do they fully exploit the morale and educational aspects of competition. These and other shortcomings are readily apparent to commanders and Party organizations, says the author, and Communists must take their comrades to task for half-hearted efforts and failure to serve as an example in both training and service.

Volume 21

1. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Ustinov, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

and Minister of Defense of the USSR. "Na Strazhe Revoliutsionnykh Zavoevanii" (Watching Over the Revolutionary Achievements), pp. 5-18.

This lead article is devoted almost exclusively to glowing praise of the armed forces of the USSR in conjunction with the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (on 7 November 1977). Marshal Ustinov first of all briefly reviews the history of the Soviet Armed Forces, utilizing all the standard political clichés to describe the role of the Party and V.I. Lenin in developing the forces. He then goes on to note the ever-increasing significance of the Party in all areas of military life.

After stating that the Soviet people have created a "bright life" for themselves in the "thirty-two peaceful years" since the end of the "Great Patriotic War," Marshal Ustinov then warns of the continuing threat of the "imperialist powers," citing the USA and other NATO members in particular. He says that NATO countries will increase their military expenditures during the 1976-1980 time frame by 60 percent, to a level of one billion dollars, and that the military-industrial complex of the USA is devoting increased efforts to development of new types of nuclear mass destruction weapons, such as the neutron bomb, cruise missiles and other weapons systems. In response to this, Marshal Ustinov states that "the economy, science and technology of the Soviet Union is now at such a high level that we are in a position to create within the shortest possible period of time any type of weapon upon which the enemies of peace and socialism might desire to place their stakes."

Marshal Ustinov then turns to a discussion of combat readiness, which he says encompasses all aspects of life and activity of the Armed Forces and which is at a high level in the Soviet Union. He states that the ability to "inflict damage upon the enemy from great distances, with the first round, launch or approach, utilizing all the speed, altitude, maneuver and defensive characteristics of the weapons is task number one." In this regard, realistic combat training, conducted under complicated and intensive conditions, must be strictly observed. Nothing has such a negative effect on the tactical training of troops, according to Marshal Ustinov, as lowering the standards of training or simplifying the training process. Such actions create inaccurate impressions about contemporary warfare among personnel, he says, and both hinder the development of the necessary combat qualities within the troops and limit their creativity. In perfecting the level of combat training, efforts must be devoted not only to training of the individual soldier, but also to a high level of training for the military "collectives": crews, subunits and larger units as a whole. Such qualities can only be developed, he says, by constant effort, creativity, ingenuity, and persistent, purposeful training.

1. Editorial. "Politicheskuiu Uchebu Sovetskikh Voinov - Na Uroven' Trebovaniy Partii (Political Training of Soviet Military Personnel - To the Level Demanded by the Party), pp. 26-31.

This unsigned editorial first reviews the major topics of political training conducted to date during 1977, the 60th anniversary year of the Bolshevik Revolution. It then outlines the principle subjects to be presented to members of the Armed Forces during the remainder of 1977 and in the beginning of the 1978 training year, providing the recommended number of hours for each subject.

In exhorting commanders and political organizations to conduct their political training on the high level demanded by the Party, the author points out some of the existing shortcomings in that training. The level at which officers are trained in the principles of Marxism-Leninism is, says the author, not as high as it should be in all instances, nor is such training always organized properly. Political instruction provided to warrant officers and ensigns is also lacking in effectiveness and the political activity programs designed for noncommissioned officers and enlisted men fail to meet the growing demands of the Party in some cases. Political training is still being conducted in isolation from everyday activities of troop units, and is not sufficiently integrated into combat readiness training, nor into areas involving troop discipline and adherence to regulations.

In addition, political training instructors sometimes fail to properly prepare for their classes, and in many locations there is inadequate insistence upon proper organization and content of political activities, including a lack of supervision over such programs. Some of the younger officers in particular have not developed the ability to transfer theoretical knowledge acquired by them during training into means for improving duty performance, political knowledgeability and combat training levels of assigned personnel.

Such deficiencies must, says the author, be carefully analyzed and overcome now that the new training year is approaching. Commanders, Party representatives, Komsomol and Party organizations must all take a more creative approach to instilling the proper level of political awareness in each member of the Armed Forces.

Volume 23

1. Editorial. "Glavnoe Sobranie Gode" (The Major Meeting of the Year), pp. 60-64.

This unsigned editorial addresses the importance of annual election and review meetings of Komsomol organizations in the Armed Forces. Local meetings of this sort are presently under way throughout the military services, in preparation for larger-scale conferences scheduled for early 1978.

Results of some of the first of these meetings are criticized in both general and specific terms by the author. Included in the general critical remarks are such items as continued undisciplined behavior by some Komsomol members; failure to suppress and renounce a phony sense of comradeship among some Komsomol organizations; failure to comply with regulations; complacency with violators; lack of a serious approach to Komsomol matters; and election of undeserving and unsuitable individuals to leadership positions in Komsomol organizations.

Specific, by-name criticism is levied against the leaders of three Komsomol organizations. One lieutenant is accused of being too soft on individuals who violate regulations and failing to demand exacting standards in combat and political training activities. A second lieutenant is chided for lack of depth and all-around analysis in his oral presentation to the group. This was caused by his failure to consult with other members of the organization in preparing for his speech. A third lieutenant simply read a list of activities, dates and statistics to his audience, without providing any analysis of his data whatsoever. He provided no basis for his facts, failed to respond properly to questions, did not indicate areas or individuals in need of improvement, stimulated no thought or interest, and did not state how difficulties could be overcome. This, says the author, must not be permitted to recur in the future if the annual Komsomol meetings are to accomplish their purposes in the proper manner.

Volume 24

1. Editorial. "Vsearmeiskoe Sotsialisticheskoe Sorevnovanie na Novom Etape" (All-Army Socialist Competition in a New Stage), pp. 3-8.

This unsigned lead editorial reviews the results of the 1977 socialist competition program among the Armed Forces and calls for improvements in the 1978 competition under the slogan: "Reliably defend the socialist fatherland, maintain constant military

readiness, persistently master arms and equipment and perfect combat skills."

The author states that some units failed to take proper advantage of the 1977 competition and simply listed routine tasks as their objectives, without setting firm goals to be accomplished. Such units merely posted lists of "outstanding" performers or those who were awarded various grades of specialist ratings or sports awards as their accomplishments in the competition. Meaningful programs, however, were not organized in the areas of combat training, establishment of norms, specialized training or servicing of equipment.

Many of these problems are, says the author, linked to poor leadership among commanders and political workers. Some staffs also fail to participate in the program to the degree necessary. Training of junior, newly assigned commanders and political officers is not given adequate attention to instill the proper attitude for the competition. Individual, Party, political and Komsomol organizations do not always set the example for fulfilling the obligations set for themselves in the competition. Organization of the activities "from above," with no involvement of unit personnel, further contributes to the problem. The actual results of training programs are taken as the "obligations" imposed upon the unit, completely ignoring the essence of the competitive concept. Overcoming these shortcomings is, in the author's view, a task that will require considerable organizational and political effort.

2. Colonel V. Arkhipov and Lieutenant Colonel I. Moshkovskii. "Do Uma i Serdtsa Kazhdogo" (To the Mind and Heart of Everyone), pp. 29-34.

This article highlights the Chernigov Red Banner Guards Airborne Division (located in Byelorussia, north of Kiev), which is described in the article as the best airborne division in the Soviet Army. After devoting the bulk of the article to praise of the unit and its personnel for their accomplishments in socialist competition, the authors then describe several shortcomings which still exist in the division.

Included among items of general criticism are hastily prepared, ineffective training exercises among some subunits, poor use of graphic training aids, unimaginative propaganda materials, insufficient attention to suggestions made by unit personnel, shortcomings in Party-political activities and extensive periods of inattention to political education. Specific criticism was

directed against one group of six officers, headed by a lieutenant colonel (listed by name), which received only average or below average marks in Marxist-Leninist training. Also cited by name were one senior lieutenant and one warrant officer who "violated regulations." This instance was particularly bad since both individuals were Party members. The article concludes by stating that commanders, political workers and leaders of Party and Komsomol organizations of the division are not deluding themselves with the successes they have achieved thus far, but are striving to insure improved political development of the troops, rather than a weakening of that condition.

3. Colonel V. Chernov. "Nagliadnaya Agitatsiia v Leninskikh Komnatakh" (Graphic Propaganda in Unit Dayrooms). pp. 47-50.

(Soviet unit dayrooms, or "Lenin rooms" are designed not only to provide a place for rest and recreation for the troops, but also as a central location for displaying and disseminating Party propaganda information and conducting political training.) This article concentrates attention on some of the shortcomings found by the author in a recent tour of several unit dayrooms in one unspecified garrison. His visit was made in conjunction with an on-going campaign to improve these facilities.

Much of the decorating of dayrooms is done by unit personnel, some of whom have greater artistic talents than others, resulting in vast differences in the esthetic qualities of the facilities. Some senior officers complain that the layout for dayrooms is outdated and does not meet contemporary needs. The political officers, on the other hand, who are responsible for the dayrooms, complain of the difficulties associated with obtaining materials to brighten up the facilities.

Specific criticism is made of the form and content of political-propaganda materials displayed in the dayrooms. Some political officers are content to merely display newspaper or magazine clippings pertaining to Party activities and expect the soldiers to study such items carefully, record them in their political training notebooks and use them for discussion material during scheduled political training sessions. A similar lack of imagination is shown in displaying the accomplishments of unit personnel on day-room bulletin boards. Rather than describe the efforts involved in achieving the status of "outstanding" or "qualified specialist," some units simply post a list of names of individuals awarded those designations. In some instances, even these lists were long out of date and of no real meaning to unit personnel.

Another complaint noted was the general failure to highlight

branch of service activities in dayrooms. Facilities for tankers, infantrymen, signal troops and reconnaissance units all lacked materials emphasizing their own traditions and specific characteristics, even though this is a major element of unit propaganda.

The primary reason for such problems is, according to the author, insufficient interest on the part of commanders and political workers. If some facilities can be clean, well-maintained, nicely painted and covered with interesting graphic propaganda materials, there is no reason why others cannot do the same. The unit which provides no place for the soldier to sit down and relax, read a newspaper, play a game of chess or write a letter is not meeting its obligations. Failure to improve dayroom facilities is particularly bad at the present time of transition to the new training year, since delays will force continuation of the work into the period in which training activities must take precedence.

In conclusion, the author states that the problems outlined in the article represent only a portion of the "unused opportunities for improvement." Meeting this challenge would represent an important element in raising the effectiveness of graphic propaganda materials for both political and military development of the troops in the future.

4. Rear Admiral N. Deviatnikov, Chief of the Political Department, Rear Services, Northern Fleet. "S Dumoi o Voin?" (With a Thought About the Serviceman), pp. 57-60.

This article, written in conjunction with the All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life, is devoted primarily to praising the programs of the rear service units of the Northern Fleet which are designed to raise troop morale. After describing several positive efforts of specific units, the author then turns to the negative side, stating that there are numerous examples of a different nature in which good initial intentions failed to be followed up. Failure to follow through on construction of tea rooms for sailors or coffee rooms for officers is cited specifically as being a problem. The blame for such deficiencies is placed on commanders who consider the resolution of morale-related problems to be of only secondary importance. These commanders fail to realize, however, that the results of daily activities could be even higher if the leaders would pay greater attention to the welfare of their personnel and would resolve their problems in a more timely fashion. This, says the author, is the task remaining to be resolved by the Northern Fleet.

TYL I SNABZHENIE

Volume 1

1. Lead Editorial. "Vsearmeiskoe Soveshchanie po Uluchsheniiu Byta Voisk" (The All-Army Conference on Improvement of the Life of the Soldier), pp. 3-7.

This issue's lead editorial addresses the upcoming (end of 1977) All-Army Conference on Improvement of the Life of the Soldier. It encourages commanders, political officers and logistics personnel to prepare for this conference by working even harder to eliminate deficiencies and to improve combat readiness by paying special attention to efficient logistics management.

Commanders and NCO's are criticized for not paying more attention to the appearance of their soldiers. Some soldiers have been noted wearing wornout, threadbare uniforms, or have been wearing the uniform improperly.

The medical service receives some criticism for not being active enough in the area of preventive medicine. Although the number of illnesses has been decreasing, much still remains to be done in the areas of curing illnesses and preventive medicine, supplying clinics with new equipment, and in assisting in the control of food service operations and inspections, and control of troop living conditions.

In the area of military living quarters, although more than 95 per cent of troop billets are in satisfactory condition, this figure could be raised even higher if responsible personnel paid more attention to the repair and maintenance of assigned buildings. In the Volga and Turkestan Military Districts the per cent of automation is still low, and where automatic means are available, they are not used in a timely manner.

The system of exchange and commissary sales stores is criticized primarily for lack of organization of the sales personnel. There are indications also that the remote garrisons suffer shortages in construction of warehouses, refrigerators, and fruit and vegetable coolers.

The article concludes by encouraging all personnel to work harder to eliminate deficiencies and overcome shortages prior to the All-Army Conference.

2. Captain (Navy) of the 1st rank V. Chechulin. "Partiinaiia Organizatsiia i Sorevnovaniia" (Party Organization and Competition), pp. 22-24.

As the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution approaches, Captain Chechulin encourages all commanders, political officers and Party organizations to intensify their efforts at organizing socialist competition. He states that socialist competition, the educational work of the Party organizations, the examples set by individual Communists, and the concentration of attention of the personnel on the basic, key questions of production have a positive influence on the activity of rear-service institutions.

However, there are units and institutions of the rear in which competition is not carried out in an active, creative manner. On some of the rescue vessels, for example the "Zhiguli", the secretary of the Party organization tends toward excessive "standardization" in his fulfillment of socialist obligations. These obligations are not considered individually, and the plan for their fulfillment does not take into account the specialized background, job experience and educational level of the personnel.

In several units of the Naval engineer service, there is no perseverance or promptitude in developing the competition into concrete missions to be fulfilled by units under field conditions. Work directed at developing in military personnel a sense of responsibility for the preservation of military and State property, and for the skillful maintenance and efficient use of engineer and auto-transport equipment is conducted weakly.

There are individual cases where Party organizations of warehouses insufficiently direct their personnel toward shortening the time of delivery of weapons and various types of supplies to ships and units.

In some factories, socialist competition is not being used for improvement of production, for more complete use of reserve forces, or for raising the quality of produced goods. In one institution, only 55-60 per cent of the products receive a good or excellent evaluation.

These and other failures in organization of socialist competition, which lower its effectiveness, negatively influence the fulfillment of combat training missions and production plans. Captain Chechulin states that the high command and political department, commanders and Party organizations of the units of the fleet rear services must take active measures toward elimination of these shortcomings.

3. General-Lieutenant I. Kolomiitsev, Deputy Commander of Rear Services of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District. "V Chast' Pribyl Molodoi Ofitser" (A Young Officer Arrived in the Unit), pp. 25-29.

General Kolomiitsev discusses the problems involved in integrating newly-commissioned young officers into their units. Rapid and efficient integration of new officers does not always occur smoothly, and the fault, it seems, is sometimes with the young officer, and sometimes with the commanders and other more senior officers of the unit.

The young officers experience difficulty and sometimes tend to become confused in their new positions because of their lack of practical knowledge, failure to listen to the advice of senior officers, and inability to effectively plan and organize their work. For example, one newly-commissioned lieutenant paid more attention to the advantages of his new position in comparison with that of an officer candidate than to his job. Personal interests and entertainment were predominant in his life, and this inevitably influenced his performance. The question was even raised about his dismissal from the service. General Kolomiitsev states that only the determined work of the senior officers of his unit and a sincere desire to help him saved this young officer.

There are also cases where senior commanders and chiefs show little feeling of responsibility for establishing newly-arrived officers in their positions, fail to offer the required help in mastering functional duties, and do not seem to care about satisfying the new officers' basic living and working requirements. The "education" of the new officer in such circumstances consists of reproaches and reprimands, and this approach frequently produces in the young officer a feeling of indifference toward his work.

Volume 2

1. General of the Army E. Ivanovskii, Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. "V Interesakh Boegotovosti" (In the Interests of Combat Readiness), pp. 18-23.

General Ivanovskii assesses the situation in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, in preparation for the upcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of the Life of the Soldier. The article is overwhelmingly positive in tone; however, he does note several deficiencies in the organization of troop support and morale and welfare programs.

For example, in a number of places too little care is taken in

arranging the barracks for comfort, supplying the rooms for daily repairs and services, providing necessary comforts in the tearooms (dayroom), and in some cases the buildings and grounds of the military garrisons are poorly maintained. Some troop dining facilities operate poorly and the food service personnel display a careless and callous attitude toward the troops. The selection of goods in some of the exchange and commissary sales stores is very limited, the availability of goods is unstable, and the stocks are not renewed on time. There are cases of violations of the laws of Soviet trade. Young officers, in particular, frequently fail to provide for the daily support and welfare of their subordinates, considering that these tasks are the exclusive responsibility of rear-services personnel.

2. General-Lieutenant I. Isaenko, Chief of the Central Food Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Zabotias' o Pitanii Voinov" (Concerned About the Feeding of the Troops), pp. 24-29.

General Isaenko discusses problems in the organization of food service for military personnel. In some dining facilities there is insufficient area for vegetable gardens, washing areas for pots and pans are either not provided or are so small that it is impossible to equip them with modern machinery, there is no hot water, the sewage system frequently becomes obstructed, and ventilation systems frequently break down. Sometimes dishes and prepared food are delivered to the dining hall by hand instead of on special carts, since the entrances are not equipped with sliding doors.

There are cases of poor sanitary practices and hygiene in some dining facilities. Cooks and KP personnel work in dirty clothing, fail to wash their hands before handling food, and violate the rules for preservation and serving of prepared dishes. The medical personnel of these units are especially reprimanded for failing to exercise proper control over food service operations.

There are also cases where machinery and refrigeration equipment break down prematurely because of abuse by the personnel. The basic requirement is that cooks be taught how to use the machinery prior to allowing them to work independently. Every kitchen must have charts explaining the function and use of the machinery, materials for repair and maintenance must be provided, and a sense of respect and care for the equipment must be developed.

Dining tables should be set every day with the required dishes and eating utensils, not only on holidays and other special days.

Commanders fail to supervise the apportionment of food and the planning of menus, as required by the regulation on internal service,

which leads to serious omissions in the feeding of personnel. Inspections of the books for control of food preparation have revealed that in some units these books are never signed by either the commander or his deputy.

Selection of personnel to attend cooking school is poorly managed. In some cases soldiers are selected who have absolutely no interest in cooking. The schools themselves are reprimanded for poor instructional methods and for being equipped with only the most primitive utensils and other equipment.

In the field, commanders sometimes fail to plan for the feeding of hot meals to the troops. Field kitchens are sometimes poorly equipped, and mess personnel do not even know how to light the stoves.

One unit is held out as an example of excellence because in the past year every soldier of that unit received 35 kilograms of meat and 50 kilograms of vegetables.

3. Colonel of Engineers I. Vasilev. "Chto Pokazal Smotr-konkurs Chainykh" (What the Inspection-Competition of Tearooms Showed), pp. 29-32.

Colonel Vasilev writes about the results of the All-Army inspection to determine the best tearoom in the Army and the Navy. It is interesting to note that the winners of the competition received cash awards (in addition to written citations). Six tearooms received 1st prizes consisting of 200 rubles each, 14 received 2d prizes of 150 rubles each, and 15 received 3d prizes of 100 rubles each. Even more interesting is the statement that individual commanders, political workers, representatives of various soldier and sailor societies, and others received individual cash prizes and valuable gifts.

The deficiencies noted during the competition were as follows. First, not all of the tearooms participated -- 5 per cent did not. Thirty-eight per cent of the tearooms received scores of 80 (out of 100) because of unsatisfactory locations and furnishings, and also for failing to comply with modern requirements. A significant number of these occurred in the Baltic, Volga, Turkestan, Odessa and Carpathian Military Districts, in the Northern and Central Groups of Forces, and an especially large number in the Pacific and Northern Fleets.

In several districts the quantity of tearooms has decreased in comparison with the All-Army Competition of 1973 (the Volga and

Transbaikal Military Districts and the Northern Group of Forces). In a number of units of the Pacific Fleet, sailors' tearooms so far have not been created and of those existing, more than 80 per cent are located in buildings requiring major repairs.

In a number of tearooms the efficiency of service to visitors is not sufficiently high. Certain units do not always allocate transportation for the delivery of goods and do not ensure uninterrupted work.

4. Colonel M. Mariichev. "Znaniia voennoi Pedagogiki i Psikhologii -- v Praktiku" (The Knowledge of Military Pedagogy and Psychology -- into Practice), pp. 38-41.

Colonel Mariichev discusses the need for teaching junior officers the basic principles of pedagogy and psychology so that they will be more effective in training their subordinates. In those places where insufficient attention is paid to the pedagogical preparation of officers, warrant officers and sergeants, things go poorly. In one unit, the planned studies with officers and warrant officers on the themes of pedagogy and psychology are not conducted progressively and continuously, and the studies themselves are poorly prepared. Supplementary measures for the political and military education of subordinates are not organized. Little attention is devoted to the individual pedagogical training of young officers; the senior commanders and political workers do not share their experience with them. The directorate of the military collective does not concern itself enough with increasing the knowledge of the warrant officers, and the mastery by them of the methods of training and developing subordinates. Consequently, in the unit mentioned, the socialist obligations of the past year were not fulfilled, and there are disciplinary problems.

5. Colonel M. Chuguriaev, Chief of the Political Section, Ulianovskii Higher Military-Technical School in the Name of Bogdan Khmel'nitskii. "Resheniia XXV S"ezda KPSS -- v Osnove Ideologicheskoi Rabote" (The Decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU -- the Basis of Ideological Work), pp. 52-56.

Colonel Chuguriaev discusses the indoctrination of officer-students of the above military institute in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and especially in the resolutions of the 25th Party Congress. Although the article is overwhelmingly positive in nature, several minor problems are addressed. In several of the subunits, individual ideological work with the students is weak. As a result,

there are violations of discipline, and in some places the necessary persistence is not exercised in propaganda activities and in complying with the general troop regulations. He states that there is still much serious work to be done in raising the quality and effectiveness of ideological work.

6. General-Major of Quartermaster V. Kikhtenko. "V Tsentre Vnimaniia -- Effektivnost'" (In the Center of Attention -- Effectiveness), pp. 70-72.

General Kikhtenko discusses the control, accounting, conservation, and economizing of State property and materiel. Inspections by the finance service have disclosed cases of expenditure of funds for other than designated purposes. For example, in one unit, control of funds was weak. As a result, some unauthorized construction was done, costing more than 14,000 rubles. In another unit, the accounting of materiel for training was neglected. A significant quantity of materiel was credited to the sub-units for a long time but not written off of the books of the major unit.

Another important question is the selection and assignment of personnel. Sometimes in the assignment of personnel to positions of responsibility for materiel, their business and moral attributes are not considered. For example, a certain warrant officer Andriukevich was assigned as chief of a warehouse. A commission for receipt of warehouse goods was not formed, and Andriukevich, upon assuming his new position, did not conduct an inventory. Neither his superiors nor the internal inspection commission checked the warehouse during the entire period of his work there. When a complete inventory was conducted, significant shortages were discovered.

Inspections of units are not always conducted as they should be. Some inspectors go about their work in a superficial manner. The trade directorate of one district organized an inspection of a certain military exchange store. The inspection team concluded after their inspection that everything was in order. Several days later, the finance service conducted an inspection of the same store, and in one of the warehouses, shortages in the amount of 24,000 rubles were uncovered.

A check of units engaged in crop harvesting revealed an unjustifiable growth in consumption of POL products. Further analysis showed that several commanders were not accounting for fuel, which resulted in a significant overexpenditure.

In construction work, estimates are sometimes poorly prepared, arithmetic errors are made, incorrect prices and rates are used, and

unauthorized construction is permitted.

Finally, one reason for waste and shortages in State property and materiel is insufficient knowledge among commanders and rear-service officers of the legal questions and economy in troop unit management.

Volume 3

1. Lead Editorial. "Vyshe Kachestvo Doevoi Uchoby" (To Raise the Quality of Military Training), pp. 3-6.

This issue's lead editorial points out that at times training is overly simplified and that some support organizations fail to train under tactical conditions. In one unit, the refueling of vehicles was poorly coordinated with the tactical plan. As a result, the tactical vehicles were forced to wait for the fuel truck, and training was consequently interrupted. In classes visual aids are poorly prepared, and certain leaders prepare inadequately for the conduct of classes.

Sometimes plans for training are well-prepared, but the execution is poor. Not all officers of the rear services have mastered the parallel requirements of planning and organizing logistical combat support.

2. General-Lieutenant A. Lizichev, Chief of the Political Directorate, Transbaikalian Military District. "Zabota o Byte Voinov -- Delo Partiinoe" (Concern About the Life of the Soldiers Is a Party Matter), pp. 34-39.

General Lizichev addresses several deficiencies in support of the troops in the Transbaikalian Military District. In one of the garrisons the responsible personnel delayed the preparation of the barracks until the onset of winter, and as a result the water pipes and sewage system froze. In the area of food service, certain commanders and party workers and organizations have tended to accept deficiencies and have failed to demand from their subordinates the required level of service. As a result there have been complaints from the soldiers about the quality of the food. In some places there has been an irresponsible attitude toward the preservation of potatoes and vegetables. In certain dining facilities there is a shortage of dishes, primarily because many are broken in handling.

There are some responsible officials who do not concern themselves about supplying of troops with clothing and about strict compliance with uniform regulations. In one unit the accounting

and storage of clothing is done poorly.

A serious deficiency in the daily care of personnel is the lack of familiarity among certain commanders and senior NCO's with the controlling regulations on expenditure of means allocated for the daily needs of the troops. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct instruction periods for the responsible officials in this area.

In the medical service field, certain medical personnel display a negligent attitude toward their duties. In one unit the medical specialists did not exercise hygienic control over food service and irregularly conducted sanitary-hygienic inspections of dining facilities.

At a recent conference of the district military council, the daily care and support of troops was discussed at length, and several officers were severely criticized for a lack of economy and an absence of concern for their people. Concrete measures were outlined for improvement of the situation.

3. General-Lieutenant of Engineers A. Fedorov, Chief of the Main Directorate for Utilities Service, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Blagoustraivat' Voennye Gorodki" (To Arrange Military Garrisons Comfortably), pp. 40-43.

General Fedorov points out several deficiencies in the arrangement and equipping of military garrisons. Certain commanders poorly organize the content and use of their buildings and living quarters. For example, the garrisons of the Central Asian Military District have defective medical-technical instruments, neglected boiler-rooms, and broken walkways by many buildings.

Senior officers of certain garrisons of the Transbaikal and several other military districts have taken insufficient care in arranging for the daily support of officers and warrant officers living in BOQ's and hotels, and do not take adequate measures for improvement of their living conditions.

Not everywhere are military garrisons properly prepared for winter. In one unit the barracks, dining hall and warehouses were not put in order, the facades of buildings have an unsightly appearance, the walls of structures are damaged, windows broken, entrance doors do not close, and roofs leak in many places. The insides of the barracks appeared untidy, mirrors in latrines were broken, waterpipes did not work, clothes dryers were not provided, and storage rooms were cluttered. Even the boiler was not prepared for winter use.

Certain common service areas for the troops are of low quality. The areas designated for linen rooms, storage rooms for personal property and dishwashing areas in dining facilities need to be enlarged.

Structures built by the troops for their own use and service (self-help construction) are poorly planned and are built without technical supervision, which leads to a low quality of work and raises doubts about their durability.

Volume 4

1. Lead Editorial, "Masterski Vladet' Tekhnikoi Tyla" (To Skillfully Master the Equipment of the Rear), pp. 5-9

This issue's lead editorial addresses the problem of maintenance of equipment, especially vehicles in the rear-service units. Some officers have not acquired sufficient knowledge in the area of maintenance, display little initiative, and make no attempt to increase their maintenance skills. One officer is chastised for having insufficient knowledge of the new models of vehicles, and for being unable to organize their use, repair and maintenance.

In several units visual aids for maintenance training are in a neglected state; diagrams, chart stands, and mock-ups are not repaired or kept up-to-date, and the programs of instruction themselves are either obsolete or inapplicable.

On days set aside especially for maintenance, little benefit is derived because the maintenance activity is poorly planned, and most of the time is spent in cleaning up the shops and surrounding area, while maintenance is put off "till later".

In warehouses, on-loading and off-loading equipment sometimes quickly breaks down because the personnel do not know how to operate it. At times the equipment stands idle when only a minor repair is required. This occurs most frequently because the personnel are poorly trained, and the use, repair and maintenance of the equipment are poorly supervised.

In several instances transfer of supplies from warehouses is slowed by the inadequacies of the facilities themselves. Storehouses are small and badly overloaded, the floors are weak, hard-surfaced roads do not exist, the area is poorly organized, there are insufficient loading platforms, etc. In one unit only 40 per cent of the work is mechanized.

2. Colonel M. Timofeechev. "Leninskii Stil' v Rabote Voennykh Kadrov" (The Leninist Style in the Work of Military Cadres), pp. 10-13.

In this basically political article Colonel Timofeechev encourages military cadres to employ the Leninist style in their work. The "Leninist style" is defined as a "creative style, alien to subjectivism, imbued with a scientific approach to all social processes. It assumes high demands on itself and others, excludes complacency, and opposes any manifestation of bureaucratism and formalism."

He states that not infrequently individuals complain that there is not enough time to do everything. Another officer actually bustles about a great deal and expends much energy, but in the final analysis he fails to see the most important factor; he undertakes much, but fails to follow the problem through to a conclusion. This frequently happens with those who are not able to plan their work and do not organize harmonious, joint work of the collective.

It is apparent that certain commanders do not succeed in supporting in their units the required military order and self-discipline. This occurs most frequently because they themselves do not always set the example of exact fulfillment of the requirements of regulations, orders and decrees.

3. Colonel Iu. Orlov, Commander, Antiaircraft Regiment, Red Banner Baku Air Defense District, PVO Strany. "Na Strazhe Neba Rodiny" (On Guard of the Sky of the Motherland), pp. 14-17.

Colonel Orlov discusses the accomplishments and some of the shortcomings of his antiaircraft regiment. Among the accomplishments is the honor of being selected as the leader of Socialist Competition in the PVO Strany.

Adhering to the Communist principle of self-criticism, he also points out some of his shortcomings. He states that at times training is conducted at a low methodological level, and there are violations of military discipline and order. There are deficiencies in POL supply, for example. The units were supplied with the required types of fuel on time, but the officers in charge of POL supply did not properly supervise the issue of POL products and failed to keep accurate inventories, which caused them to overdraw their fuel allocation for the past training year.

In another sub-unit, the soldiers do not present a neat, soldierly appearance, and the soldiers' room for clothing repairs and services is maintained in poor condition.

4. General-Colonel V. Govorov, Commander, Moscow Military District. "Ucheba i byt Nerazdelimy" (Training and Troop Welfare Are Indivisible), pp. 24-28.

General Govorov discusses the need for more attention to troop care and welfare during field training. In one particular unit the troops were forced to do without a field kitchen for several days and had to eat dry rations because the mess truck broke down and was not repaired in a timely fashion.

It sometimes happens that soldiers on extended field training get tired and slow down not because of the difficulty of the training, but because they do not receive hot meals on time, and do not have an opportunity to rest and get warmed up.

In some cases training efficiency is lost because commanders fail to check the personal equipment of their personnel prior to departure for the field. As a result some soldiers end up without their mess kits or canteens, razors, towels or soap.

Not infrequently, rear-service units go to the field without their full complements of personnel and equipment, which causes difficulties in effective support of the line units.

The mobile canteens which are supposed to visit units in the field do not always have those items which are most desired by troops during field training, and do not always show up where they are most needed.

There are not a few cases where soldiers must miss field training because of sickness. One reason is because they wait too long before reporting for sick call. In one case, a soldier received a scratch, to which he paid little attention. The scratch later became infected, and he was required to miss training. Not only was the soldier to blame, but also the medical personnel and the soldier's supervisor.

5. General-Colonel of Quartermaster V. Dutov, Chief, Central Finance Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Polnee Ispol'zovat' Vnutrennie Reservy" (To More Fully Utilize Internal Reserves), pp. 29-33.

In this article General Dutov discusses the efficient expenditure of funds and effective budget management. He states that simply adhering to the estimated budget as prepared by the Ministry of Defense is not enough. Each expenditure must be weighed in light of its economic expediency. Otherwise funds are expended on extra, unnecessary, or excessively expensive items.

In some cases, commanders, in an attempt to improve the external appearance of their garrisons, expend much labor and money painting the foundations of buildings, fences, borders of roads and sidewalks, the outsides of doors and facades, when the roofs are leaking, the plumbing doesn't work in the barracks, and the roads need repair.

Frequently for interior decoration of the barracks they use expensive materials and dyes, polished shields made from expensive woods, and in the windows hang blinds of silk fabric, at the same time when the clothing repair and service rooms do not have the necessary items.

Several troop units of the Leningrad Military District, for example, purchased outside of supply channels rugs, rug runners and other items for office decoration costing more than 10,000 rubles.

Much harm is caused by the efforts of several responsible individuals to completely expend all allocated funds by the end of the year. In this way much unnecessary equipment and materials are acquired. In one unit, out of the funds allocated for normal repair of the buildings, in December 1975 more than 2,000 rubles were spent on electrical equipment, which was not received from the supplier until 20 February 1976. A check conducted in June of that year found that more than half of it was still in the warehouse, unused and not needed. At times excessive items are bought for spares which under conditions of long-term storage become spoiled and are no longer fit for use. Sometimes they try to justify such lack of economy by the necessity to acquire the needed materials whenever they are available because of certain shortages in the civilian market.

Another big problem is the care and preservation of dishes and plates in dining facilities. They are lost both in garrison and in the field, and for replacement of broken china some units illegally spend significant sums out of their budget. In one unit alone in the course of two years several thousand rubles were spent to replace broken china.

The same situation occurs in the area of building repair funds. One billeting unit in the period 1975-76 spent more than 34,000 rubles which were allocated for normal building repair. With this money roads were built, electrical transmission lines were installed, a fence was erected around the work superintendent's area, an unloading platform was constructed at the warehouse, and so forth.

There are cases where separate living quarters and other buildings which do not belong directly to the military unit are constructed on the territory of the garrison, and the cost of supplying them

with heat and electricity are included in the declared budget of the unit. These costs are thus illegally paid by the Ministry of Defense without subsequent compensation by the users.

6. Colonel Iu. Dubynin. "Zabota o Kursantakh Voenno-Morskikh Uchilishch" (Caring for the Students of the Naval Schools), pp. 33-34.

Colonel Dubynin discusses some deficiencies and shortcomings in the daily support and welfare of naval school students. He states that in several installations, the rooms for daily clothing repairs and services are poorly equipped, as are the clothing drying rooms. Unit property and the personal property of the students are stored improperly. Uniforms are worn too long without changing, which spoils the appearance of the students.

These deficiencies are connected to the fact that morning inspections are frequently conducted superficially, and the monthly inspections to determine the presence and condition of clothing and equipment are conducted irregularly and incompletely.

There are also omissions in food service. Place settings at tables are sometimes incomplete, prepared food is improperly served, and too little attention is paid to creating a pleasant atmosphere for eating. Some responsible personnel do not effectively control the organization of food service and the quality of prepared foods.

Volume 5

1. Editorial. "Shire Razmakh Agitatsionno-Massovoi Raboty" (A Broader Scope for Mass Propaganda Work), pp. 4-8.

This unsigned lead editorial calls upon political organs and Party organizations to broaden and improve their mass propaganda program among the Soviet Armed Forces in order to "Mobilize the troops for successful realization of the decisions of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." The author complains that mass propaganda work is conducted poorly, and that interesting means of presenting the propaganda, such as connecting it with the nation's history, or with the achievements of the revolutionaries and heroes of the "Great Patriotic War" are seldom employed. Some of the propaganda programs are conducted in a boring manner, without touching on the innermost thoughts and feelings of the people, or without making appropriate references to contemporary life or to the tasks of the group. Those leaders who fail to reinforce mass propaganda measures by individual efforts are said to be making a mistake, particularly since troops in rear

area units are frequently dispersed and it is difficult to gather the entire unit together at one time.

2. General of the Army V. Tolubko, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense, USSR. "Dyt -- Zabota Obshchaia" (Daily Life - A Matter of General Concern), pp. 25-30.

This article is one of a series of seven such articles in the May issue of Tyl i Snabzhenie devoted to the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life. General Tolubko first cites the general improvements made over the past several years in the quality and variety of foodstuffs served in some unit dining facilities and tearooms, and then switches to criticism of remaining deficiencies in other units. He states that there are still dining facilities where food is prepared in a monotonous fashion and is not sufficiently tasty, where established hygienic and sanitary standards are not followed, where modern equipment is not adequately used, and where the methods of food preparation are still at a low level. The quality of dining facilities varies widely even within units, with some activities doing excellent work in food preparation and serving, while others close by fail to meet the requisite standards. Food service officers, commanders and political workers are charged by the author with eliminating the existing shortcomings in the dining facilities in order to improve troop welfare and morale.

3. General-Major of Quartermaster, F. Petrov. "Za Obratstsovyi Vneshnii Vid Voinov" (For Immaculate Personal Appearance of the Troops), pp. 31-36.

Citing the preparations for the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life as the impetus for his article, General Petrov states that both quantitative and qualitative improvements have been made over the past few years in the uniforms issued to Soviet military personnel of all services, and that they are provided with everything necessary to maintain a sharp military appearance. Despite this fact, however, he finds several factors which sometimes prevent the individual soldier from attaining or maintaining the required standards of dress.

There are occasional unjustified delays in the issuance of uniforms and equipment to new conscripts, and inadequate or improper alterations are sometimes made by quartermaster specialists unfamiliar with proper tailoring procedures. Instead of maintaining special purpose clothing, such as overalls or flight suits in the areas where they are utilized, they are sometimes simply thrown into

a pile in unit storerooms. Since no mobile clothes drying equipment is currently available, some units are forced to dry their clothing next to campfires during field training exercises. Tailors and shoemakers are frequently assigned other jobs, while clothing and footgear go unrepaired. In other areas, unqualified individuals are designated to repair footgear. Not every unit maintains the required float of 5-7 sets of ready-to-wear uniforms, thus often delaying repair of items by unit personnel. Mobile quartermaster dry cleaning plants do not always pay adequate attention to proper operation of their equipment. Uniforms are not retinted and pile caps are not blocked, resulting in soldiers walking around in faded uniforms and crumpled, deformed headgear. Whereas some units have provided excellent facilities for personnel to maintain their clothing and equipment, as well as to take care of personal grooming, other units either keep their facilities locked up or fail to organize a program.

Another cause of poor appearance is failure by unit commanders to correct their personnel for what are frequently flagrant uniform violations, including unauthorized alterations. Other units require officers to wear their trousers tucked into their boots instead of either over the boots or with low quarter shoes as prescribed by regulation. This results in earlier wear out of the trousers than is normal. In conclusion, General Petrov states that maintenance, care and economy of clothing and equipment deserve the requisite attention in a "decisive struggle" against loss and damage of such items.

4. Colonel V. Koyrshin, Medical Service Corps, and Lieutenant Colonel G. Liubomudrov, Medical Service Corps. "V Interesakh Zdorov'ia" (In the Interests of Health), pp. 39-41.

In this article on preventive medicine, the authors describe the system used in preparing and serving special dietetic meals to servicemen suffering gastro-intestinal disorders, kidney problems and metabolic difficulties. After stating that dietetic meals are normally prepared in strict accordance with existing requirements, thereby producing positive results, the authors then lament the fact that this is not done adequately everywhere.

The absence of such special dietetic food is sometimes explained by simply claiming that no one in the unit requires it, even though this is not always the case. At other times, the preparation of such foodstuffs is inadequately or carelessly done, thus sharply reducing its effectiveness. Diet modifications are sometimes limited, for example, to merely replacing black bread with white and substituting butter for animal fat or vegetable oil. The remainder of the rations are the same as those served to everyone else.

Additionally, not all dining facilities have the required utensils for preparing special meals, nor do they have the foods in stock, separate tables where special diets are consumed, etc. All these violations are seen by the authors as the result of inattention to the problem on the part of responsible individuals, who underestimate the therapeutic value of dietetic foods.

5. Ia. Kotov, Chief of the Central Department Store, Main Directorate of Trade, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "S lchetom Trebovani Vremeni" (With Consideration for the Demands of Time), pp. 42-45.

The Central Department Store in Moscow was recently recognized as the winner of the 1976 "All-Union Socialist Competition" for the first year of the ninth five year plan. In this article, the head of that store explains how he and his employees were able to fulfill the requirements of the plan and meet all their objectives ahead of time, thus leading to special recognition by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other State organs.

Although filled with self-praise and political cliches, the article also points out that the store does have its difficulties and shortcomings, even in those areas where its strengths are found. There is inadequate space for both warehousing and sales area, and space that is available is not always utilized rationally. Progress on introducing a containerized system for transferring goods from warehouses to the sales departments is moving very slowly. Some goods go stale from simply lying around too long, when more efficient operations would permit their sale. Complaints of rudeness, miscalculating and inaccurate measuring on the part of employees are occasionally made by customers. Instances of mismanagement, careless handling of State property and similar derelictions are also encountered, although the author states that action is taken to eliminate such deficiencies, resulting in constant progress and improvements.

6. Colonel A. Solov'ev. "Byt Voinov i Okruzhnaya Pechat'" (Troop Life and the Local Press), pp. 46-49.

Colonel Solov'ev's article begins with a description of a local military newspaper in the Transcaucasus Military District (Leninskoe Znamia - The Leninist Banner), which provides excellent coverage of all aspects of troop life. The author then names two Military Districts (Ural and Baltic) whose newspapers provide only shallow, periodic coverage of matters related to routine troop services. While occasional articles of high quality may be found in those publications, the overall amount of coverage is said to be inadequate. Few articles are written on such subjects as training

of rear service specialists, political training, or educational programs in rear service units. The author concludes that the reason for this inadequate news coverage lies in a lack of understanding of and appreciation for the role of these units in modern times and states that the reader expects new initiatives on the part of the newspapers to cover the day-to-day problems and questions affecting rear area service personnel.

7. Colonel A. Iaremchenko, "Kompetentnost' Ofitsera" (Officer Competence), pp. 53-57.

This article begins with a glowing description of a Soviet Transportation Corps officer whose competence and erudition leave absolutely nothing to desire. It soon switches, however, to the opposite extreme, citing (by name) a captain in charge of POL services for a motorized rifle regiment who neither concerns himself adequately with improving his own level of military and specialized knowledge, nor gets into the essence of the tasks he is charged with performing. His organizational abilities are inadequate and his performance even below his own capabilities. His regimental commander had to ask higher headquarters to send an officer down to plan and implement POL resupply to regimental units, as well as to set up a warehouse operation. The captain is also described as taking no part in the struggle for fuel economy.

Further on, the author discusses the need for rear service officers to consider not only their own specialized areas, but also those having tactical significance. This he does because he finds that some rear service small unit commanders or logisticians on the staffs of larger units train their subordinates to perform and themselves act without considering the tactical situation, as though the two aspects could be considered independently of one another. The author further emphasizes that to consider the head of any aspect of support services as a narrow specialist is a serious mistake, since mere knowledge of one's own specialty is insufficient for an officer. Younger officers who begin their careers as rear area specialists eventually become deputy commanders for support and cannot properly run support operations without an understanding of the entire nature of modern warfare, the principles of tactics, control and management of troops, communications, engineer and similar combat support matters. Without constant study and hard work, rear area service officers will stagnate and become ineffective, as was the case with the individuals cited by the author.

Volume 6

1. Editorial. "Byt' Vsegda Nachekul" (Always Be on Guard), pp. 3-5.

The requirement for constant vigilance on the part of all rear service personnel is the subject of this unsigned lead editorial. After exhorting the reader to be ever alert and prepared to repel any ground or air attack by the enemy, the author praises the alert plans, procedures and training of an unidentified separate airfield technical support battalion, said to be particularly effective in all aspects of internal security. However, the author then states that a problem still exists among rear service troops in that the importance of vigilance is sometimes underrated. Examples of this include violation of guard orders, problems with unit, depot and motor park duty personnel, as well as the occasional conduct of unnecessary conversations over radio and telephone. Such actions cannot be condoned, states the author, since the enemy is "sly" and "insidious," and takes advantage of every false step and every instance of carelessness or complacency.

2. General of the Army I. Tret'iak, Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District. "V Osnove - Tvorcheskii Podkhod" (At the Basis - A Creative Approach), pp. 21-27.

This is one of four such articles in the June issue of Tyl i Snabzhenie devoted to the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life. General Tret'iak first states that it is no easy task to create favorable conditions for life and service in the Far East Military District, with its vast territorial expanses and severe climate. Such conditions depend not only upon the day-by-day fulfillment of requirements on the part of the State, but also demand a significant amount of creativity, initiative and imagination on the part of commanders, political workers and other responsible individuals. And while the author claims that the "overwhelming majority" of his personnel bearing leadership responsibilities do in fact possess such traits, he presents several examples where deficiencies in living standards can be traced to disinterest and lack of concern on the part of unit leaders.

Even where sufficient materials are available to provide modern facilities, individual officers fail to adopt an attitude of concern towards their soldiers. The result is poorly laid-out and run-down installations, serious deficiencies in installation maintenance funds, inadequate communal construction projects, boilers that frequently break down, and poor preparation of barracks for winter weather. Additionally, there are insufficient numbers of qualified installation maintenance personnel in the Far East Military District to care for the modern equipment and technology being employed. In

the area of food service, some commanders fail to take advantage of existing means for augmenting the daily rations issued for the troops, such as the use of hot houses, vegetable gardens, livestock raising, etc. This is seen by the author as a lack of creativity on the part of those commanders, and an indication of a formalistic approach to their duties. Another area where lack of initiative and creativity can be seen is that of maintenance of personal clothing and equipment. Some units fail to adequately utilize existing facilities for cleaning, pressing and repair of uniforms, and assign tailors and shoemakers to other duties, resulting in slovenly appearance of their personnel.

Due to extreme distances between garrisons, lack of adequate road networks, and other factors peculiar to the Far East Military District, retail sales outlets serving troops and their families play an extremely important role in improving living conditions. Problems also exist in this area, including inadequate service, insufficient quantity, and poor quality of merchandise. Shortcomings in the field of medical service include inadequate efforts to reduce upper respiratory, gastrointestinal and infectious diseases, reduce trauma, and provide regular preventive medical examinations for officers and warrant officers. In conclusion, General Tret'iak states that despite many successes in training, on the job performance, and "socialist competition," there are still no small number of gaps, many of which are tied to a formalistic approach to duties on the part of responsible individuals, and an inability to exercise imaginative initiative.

3. General-Major of Quartermaster V. Bondarenko. "Bol'she Ovoshchei i Fruktov Pokupateliam" (More Fruit and Vegetables to the Consumers), pp. 28-30.

General Bondarenko reminds the employees of military retail stores that it is their task to get sufficient high-quality food-stuffs to the consumers, in the widest possible assortment, at the time needed. While much has been accomplished in this regard, says the author, many deficiencies still remain.

Among these deficiencies is inadequate provision of potatoes, fruits and vegetables, particularly early crop varieties, to the consumers of many installations. There are also interruptions or stoppages in delivery, based upon poor evaluation of consumer demand, errors in determining the real rates of consumption of such goods, weaknesses in the organizational methods of store operators, and even an absence of controls and checks over their activities on the part of unit commanders. Trends vary within the military districts, with some of them realizing more than their planned capacity, but

others, such as the Turkestan and Transcaucasus Military Districts under-achieving, despite excellent possibilities for success. The same disparity is noted within the retail stores of the same military districts, all having approximately similar conditions under which to operate. An increase of at least 100% is required in the system as a whole, and some military districts and installations require even more. Despite this fact, some commanders are reducing their requests for funds to purchase such items, and are even attempting to lower sales in comparison with previous levels. The author sees this as the result of underevaluating the significance of those products in the diets of their personnel, as a lack of knowledge of consumer demands, and as an attempt to fulfill the plan without having to exercise any special effort.

Retail stores are also said to be insufficiently demanding in their efforts to obtain canned fruit and vegetable products from local producers. In some cases they have even been reducing their requests for such items. Other store managers make insufficient efforts at increasing the variety of processed vegetables, resulting in continuous shortage of many items. Inadequate storage facilities for food products further complicate matters. Warehouse facilities were left uncompleted in the Central Asian, Far East and Moscow Military Districts in 1976 due to failure on the part of various responsible individuals to persistently follow through projects through to the end. Inadequate use of containerization technology and refrigerated trucking is further cited as a deficiency in the system.

Finally, the author calls for an increase in the quality of produce, and for the reprocessing of overripe fruits and vegetables into juices, jams, etc. as a means for reducing losses and waste. All of this is considered possible, in General Bndarenko's view, particularly in light of unlimited credits available for construction of food processing facilities. In a word, says the author, the workers on the "vegetable front" are faced with large and important tasks which must be resolved to satisfy the vital needs of Soviet soldiers and their families.

4. Editorial. "Glavnoe - Polevaya Vyuchka" (The Main Thing Is Field Training), pp. 34-38.

This unsigned editorial reviews the successes and failures of rear area service units in the conduct of annual field training exercises. After praising the performance of one separate airfield technical support battalion which managed to obtain an "outstanding" rating in its field training evaluation for two consecutive years, the author then points out that some support units performed at a level significantly lower than they were capable of during the last winter exercises. This testifies to the lack of professionalism on the part of some officers of the rear services, who have not yet

mastered the methods of organizing combat support in regard to the requirements of modern warfare. These officers sometimes failed to consider the dynamics involved in developing the tactical situation, and did not take full advantage of technical capabilities. Several exercises were conducted under simplified conditions, using poor procedures.

An example of poor preparation is cited, wherein the commander of a transportation company, in conducting a tactical road march, failed to organize the march properly and did not maintain control of his platoons. As a result, the column got split up, and several drivers got lost, thus failing to reach their designated area. Other flaws in convoy training of transportation units include artificially lowering the speed of movement under the guise of coping with incidents along the road, thus shortening the length of march routes and simplifying the conditions under which the troops must operate. Once the march has been completed, and preparations for other actions are being made, additional problems occur. Some officers waste too much time evaluating the combat situation and the status of support elements. Calculations on amounts of supplies to be brought forward take too long, computer technology is inadequately used in planning and implementing support, and coordination is not properly effected. Some support elements are careless in setting up in their areas, failing to camouflage or properly set up defensive and security measures. Another problem seen by the author is the failure of some commanders and chiefs of services to provide their warrant officers and sergeants with the opportunity to act independently. Many of them simply do the work of their subordinates themselves, becoming the "guardians of minutiae."

5. General-Lieutenant F. Ishchenko, Chief of the Political Directorate, Southern Group of Forces. "Preduprezhdaya Prestupki" (Preventing Violations), pp. 38-45.

This article discusses means of educating unit personnel, through various troop information programs, on the requirements of various regulations, Party programs, standards of conduct, etc. Stressing the art of persuasion as the most effective means of instilling the desired conduct, the author cites several examples where this has been successful in maintaining a trouble-free disciplinary record within the units. He then goes on to state that there are still serious deficiencies in several units, resulting from inattention to troop education and failure to strictly follow regulations.

Analysis of the violations indicates that the reasons for the offenses are not looked into and preventive measures are not

taken. Instead of working with individual soldiers in need of special training, group meetings and discussions are held where general comments are made on the need to improve discipline. These efforts are ineffective and lack the well-considered analysis needed to be of any use. Further derelictions of duty then occur, requiring the intervention of higher level political organs to correct. The author points out that some individuals become violators because they are unable to see their way out of a developing situation and because no one ever told them how to take care of their problems in time to prevent an incident. Failure to properly organize leisure time activities for the soldier is seen as another source of potential trouble among the troops, since a part of all disciplinary infractions occur on days where no intense training activities are held. Some units fail to utilize the many available leisure time educational facilities, such as movies, television, literature, art, meetings with other individuals, etc. Finally, the author states that similar problems occur with civilian workers and employees of the Soviet Army, whose desires, problems and morale are sometimes not adequately considered.

Volume 7

1. General-Lieutenant of Medical Services I. Iur'v. "V Interesakh Okhrany Zdorov'ia Voinov" (In the Interests of Guarding the Troops' Health), pp. 24-29.

Preventive medicine is the subject of this article, one of two in the July issue of Tyl i Snabzhenie devoted to the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life. The author, in discussing means to reduce accidents, injury and disease among members of the Armed Forces, states that careless disregard of safety requirements by individual service members during training exercises, in the repair and maintenance of military equipment, and in the conduct of housekeeping and construction duties is the primary cause of traumatic injury. Such injuries occur where troop and safety regulations are violated, where imprecise instruction is given, and where inadequate attention is paid to explaining sanitation procedures.

The author goes on to say that medical personnel themselves fail to take an active part in preventive medicine programs. One medical unit commander is admonished by name for failing to give serious consideration to the reasons for the rise in serious injuries among the troops he was supporting. Sanitary inspections to check on hygiene conditions are not conducted on a regular basis either, adding to the problem. Infectious diseases are found in many instances to be caused by failure to follow hygiene and sanitation rules in the preparation, storage and serving of food. Additionally, ineffective

preventive medicine inspections of all aspects of troop daily life, conducted by health services personnel, coupled with the lack of an uncompromising approach on the part of some unit surgeons to deficiencies in food service programs, and failure to place adequate demands on the individuals responsible for insuring that sanitary norms are met, all aggravate the situation.

One of the constant areas of concern for medical personnel is the purity of drinking water, even though some doctors are said to have no real system for maintaining checks on the water. Irregular samples are taken for laboratory analysis without due consideration for the scope and the peculiarities of the specific water supply system. Test results are not always summarized and analyzed, and frequently no attempt is made to determine why the water quality is getting worse, or to take counter-measures. Finally, the author cites lack of space in many aid stations, dispensaries and hospitals as precluding the use of the latest medical equipment. This makes it impossible to take full advantage of existing means for medical and prophylactic care. Overcoming these obstacles would, says the author, be a worthy contribution to future improvement of the defensive capability of the Soviet Union.

2. General-Lieutenant G. Belogrudov, Deputy Commander for Rear Services, Odessa Military District. "Chuvstvo Otvetstvennosti" (A Sense of Responsibility), pp. 30-32.

This is the second of two articles in the July issue of Tyl i Snabzhenie relating to the forthcoming All-Army Conference on Improvement of Troop Daily Life. The author, in calling for an increased sense of responsibility among all military personnel, first describes conditions in one unit where the deputy commander for rear services (a lieutenant colonel) sets a flawless example for everyone else to follow, resulting in a totally smooth operation in every regard. Having expended roughly 80% of the article on praise of that individual (by name) and his unit (not mentioned), the author then states that although the majority of the rear service units in the Odessa Military District conduct their operations in a professional manner, there are still some elements who fail to perform efficiently.

The main reason for these shortcomings, says the author, is failure on the part of responsible individuals to follow regulations. This failure stems from an inadequate sense of responsibility on their part towards the fulfillment of their tasks. As an example, General Belogrudov cites a recent regimental exercise wherein the mess personnel were not given firm instructions on what they were to do. As a result, they arrived at their designated locations late and completely disorganized. This obviously also had an impact

on their subsequent performance, as the food was prepared hurriedly and poorly. Several units were not fed on time, and although the responsible individuals were called to account for the deficiencies and the situation was soon corrected, the fact remains, states the author, that a serious situation was permitted to develop. Other shortcomings, not specifically mentioned in the article, are also said to exist, requiring analysis, review and corrective action. All this is emphasized in an attempt to instill a high sense of responsibility among rear service officers, since any shortcomings in their activities have a negative effect on the quality of combat and political training of the troops, and thus on the combat readiness of their units.

3. General-Lieutenant of Quartermaster E. Gol'dberg, Chief of the Main Trade Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Za Vysokuiu Kul'turu Torgovli" (For a High Level of Efficiency in Commerce), pp. 33-37.

This article first describes the achievements made in the area of retail military sales during the year 1976, and during the first half of 1977. The author states that the planned sales were fulfilled ahead of time and at a slightly higher level than programmed. Sales for 1976 increased more than 10 percent over 1975, and sales during the first six months of 1977 reached 60 percent of the total planned for the entire year.

After further discussing qualitative and other improvements in military retail sales, General Gol'dberg then goes on to point out some of the deficiencies still remaining to be overcome. Among these are inconveniently located, undersized sales facilities at several installations, where long lines form for purchase of the basic essentials, resulting in the loss of much valuable time for the customers. Periodic shortages of basic essentials are also still being encountered, and customers sometimes wait for hours for such items to be delivered. The workers of military sales outlets are said to be primarily at fault for such shortages, since it is their responsibility to insure uninterrupted sales of items in adequate variety.

The question of variety is also one that needs to be addressed, states the author. Rather than continue to rely on the outmoded concept of a "minimum assortment," a mandatory assortment list should be developed for each commercial enterprise. Administration of military retail stores at the military district, group of forces, and fleet levels also came in for criticism. Those authorities are required to conduct checks of each retail sales outlet at least twice each quarter, and where shortages of goods are noted, are

required to record that fact and take corrective action.

Another factor contributing to the problem is a poorly organized system for centralized delivery of goods, frequently complicated by shortage of transportation, undue delays at warehouses, decentralized purchase of goods, etc. Control of managerial personnel is also encouraged, to the extent that the author recommends they not be permitted to leave the store premises during working hours except under exceptional circumstances and with the personal permission of the chief of the retail store. Self-service is another area in need of improvement at several facilities. Sales in self-service grocery stores are running 14.6 percent lower than those in controlled sales stores. For non-grocery outlets, the difference amounts to a 35.5 percent reduction. The reasons given include reduced variety of goods, poor use of floor space and equipment, inadequate check-out facilities, poor organization of work forces, and violations of the "principles of collective material responsibility and rules of work."

Volume 8

1. The "Raider's Brigade," "Idet Smotr-Konkurs...Kak Vypolniauitsia ego Usloviia?" (Unit Competition Is Underway...How Are Its Provisions Being Fulfilled?), pp. 37-40.

In conjunction with the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, an All-Army competition has been underway for several months to find the rear services unit with the best troop and financial programs, the best medical unit, and the best supply and services unit. The "Raider's Brigade," consisting of Colonel G. Ivanov, Secretary to the Party Committee of the Byelorussian Military District Rear Services Directorate; Captain N. Sherstobitov, Chief of Food Services; and Lieutenant Colonel/Engineer K. Pushtkarev, a correspondent of Tyl I Snabzhenie Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil, visited a number of regimental and smaller sized units in the Byelorussian Military District to see how the units were doing in improving their operations as a result of the competition.

While many improvements were noted, problems still existed in some subunits with the personal appearance of the troops. Some privates and sergeants were wearing worn-out, unrepaired uniforms, and some had on unauthorized uniform items. Supply rooms were found to be in disarray, with dirty items being mixed in with clean uniforms. Tunics were found with no collars on them at all, and some unit clothing maintenance rooms did not measure up to standards set for the competition. In one of the dining facilities, not all of the tables were set, and while the dishes were clean, they were dull in appearance

and several pieces were deformed. Another dining facility failed to keep its kitchen equipment in a state of proper repair and its dining room was also in need of work. That same unit was found lacking in the area of specialized training for its personnel.

The team found that a number of rear area specialists, particularly the junior members, were weak in their knowledge of the provisions of the competition and had no plans for preparing their personnel for the program. This indicated that not everything had yet been done to improve things for the troops and that more effort will still be needed to gain more effective use of unit assets. Since relatively little time remains before the formal evaluations take place, the authors encourage everyone not to put off even the smallest detail and to totally fulfill the requirements set forth by the competition.

2. General-Major of Quartermaster E. Burs. "Dostigat' Postavlennoi Tseli" (Accomplish the Goal Set), pp. 41-43.

This article deals with problems encountered in funding, budgeting and expenditures in various military districts in conjunction with the forthcoming All-Army competition discussed in the preceding article. After describing positive programs existing in some areas, the author states that an active, systematic approach to financial matters is not being taken in some units, and that instances have been embellished to make things look better than they really are.

Some military districts have made unjustified expenditures to decorate service areas, including the acquisition of valuable items when quarters and other facilities do not ever meet required standards. In one troop barracks of the Kiev Military District, quarters and dayroom facilities for the unit on the first floor, where visitors are normally taken, were of excellent quality whereas those on the second floor of the same building, not normally shown to visitors, were substandard. One unit had a brand new building for its dining facility, but sanitary conditions in the kitchen were inadequate.

In the Kiev Higher Military Engineering Academy of Communications, an unauthorized color television set and several unauthorized expensive vases had been purchased for the students' tea room, whereas the Kiev Higher Tank Engineering Academy did not even have the items authorized for daily maintenance. Expensive furniture, including office equipment, toilet tables, divans and other items, none of which were authorized, were purchased by the Northcaucasus Military District. In the Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command Academy, good furniture which had not served out its established period of wear was exchanged for new items, resulting in large numbers of tables, chairs, weapons racks, etc. being stored in the

academy's warehouse, whereas other units within the district were short such items. Considerable funds were spent by one unit in that same district for polished wooden slabs to decorate walls in the headquarters, the dining facilities and the staircases.

A number of units in the North Caucasus, Kiev and the Volga Military Districts exceeded the limits of their expenditures for water and electricity due to lack of required measuring devices, faulty faucets, unjustified use of high wattage electrical lights, failure to turn off electrical lighting at the proper time, etc., all of which led to large supplementary expenditures on common-use items. Bookkeeping by some unit finance officers was also found to be lacking, with late entries, inadequate controls and irregular reconciliations of financial statements being noted. All of this indicates a lack of responsibility towards one's duties, says the author, and further points up the inadequacy of checks made by finance personnel in the troop units where funds are handled. This further indicates a lack of assistance being provided to the units in their attempts to prepare for the competition, thus hampering those efforts and making them less likely to succeed.

3. General-Major of Veterinary Service O. Belen'kii. "Vse Reservy - V Deistvie" (All Reserves - Into Operation), pp. 43-45.

This article concerns the role of veterinary service personnel in protecting Soviet Armed Forces personnel and livestock from disease. The author first cites examples of how veterinary personnel have prevented illness in the past through detection of defective canned goods, checks of kitchen facilities, agricultural activities, etc., and then points out some of the problems currently being encountered.

Some warehouse and cold storage facilities fail to maintain proper temperature and humidity controls, violate procedures for separating foodstuffs of different types, disregard time limitations on storage of items, ignore requirements for periodic laboratory analysis of goods, and fail to maintain warehouse facilities and means of transport in accordance with sanitation regulations. Veterinary personnel are sometimes forced to place sanctions against violators, including the temporary cut-off of deliveries to troop units from some commercial suppliers, such as recently occurred in the Odessa Military District when one poultry combine was found to be seriously violating existing sanitation rules. Weaknesses are also found within the troop units themselves, where supplemental means of feeding the troops, such as pig farming, poultry raising, vegetable gardens, etc. are common. Cases of infectious and parasitic diseases are sometimes encountered, and non-contagious sickness and loss

of cattle are still found at military-agricultural enterprises, with the Transbaikal and Turkestan Military Districts having the largest such losses during 1976.

The basic cause for such problems, says the author, is violation of veterinary regulations in the care and feeding of livestock. Another source of trouble is the slaughtering of livestock directly by troop units rather than at designated facilities supervised by veterinary personnel. Meat obtained from those animals is then used in feeding troops, even though it has not been checked for freedom from disease. Similar problems are encountered with milk and milk products. A great many dairy farms are found deficient on a regular basis. This led to a removal in 1976 of many tons of milk products from service members and their families in a number of remote installations of the Transbaikal, Far East and Turkestan Military Districts. Such instances cannot, says the author, be permitted to continue, and veterinary personnel must take every step necessary to eliminate the problem as rapidly as possible.

4. General-Major V. Zaitsev, Chief of the Rear Services Personnel Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Molodym Ofitseram - Vnimanie i Pomoshch'" (Attention and Assistance to Young Officers), pp. 46-50.

This article is directed towards commanders receiving newly commissioned graduates from the various rear service military academies. The author first gives examples of how some commanders, through proper guidance, counseling and handling of young officers, were able to develop them into competent, self-reliant individuals with bright futures and much potential. He then points out, however, that in some areas, young officers are met with indifference, as was the case with a lieutenant assigned to the Odesa Military District.

The lieutenant stated that he was met with coolness and formality, was not even asked what specialty he received upon completion of the military academy, and was simply taken and assigned to the first existing vacancy. His comrades were welcomed in like manner. Some commanders leave their junior officers assigned to their initial duties for years at a time, figuring that as long as the work is being accomplished, nothing else matters. One example is given of a captain who was kept in the same job for nine years. Initially, he took a positive approach to his duties, but when nothing happened with his plans for advancement through increased responsibilities, he lost his perspective on matters.

Some commanders and senior staff officers still look upon young officers with mistrust, and end up over-supervising them or perform their duties for them, without allowing them to prove their own worth. Other senior officers seem to enjoy reproaching the young leaders

for the slightest mistakes, and instead of providing painstaking educational training, some commanders simply take administrative action against them. All of this has a negative effect on the outlook of the officers towards military service.

Instead of taking the time to correct and teach the junior leaders, some commanders just submit documentation encouraging dismissal of the officer from the ranks of the Soviet Army. Even when senior commanders sometimes sense the need to sit down with the officer and calmly discuss his problems, time for the meeting never seems to be found and soon the matter takes on less significance. When a discussion finally is held, it is less effective after the passage of much time than it would have been when the incident occurred. In closing, the author reminds senior commanders and staff officers, as well as Party organizations, that it is their responsibility to assist young officers in overcoming their initial weaknesses in order that they might become highly qualified rear area services specialists.

5. General-Major A. Zhukov, Chief of Staff for Rear Services, Transbaikalian Military District. "Ustavnoi Poriadok - Osnova Uspekha" (Procedures Laid Down by Regulation - The Basis for Success), pp. 54-56.

The author emphasizes the importance of following procedures laid down by regulations for all aspects of rear area services and reminds officers assigned to such duties that they also bear full responsibility, along with the commanders of troop units, for the maintenance of good order and discipline within those units. He further states that some service support officers avoid their responsibilities in this regard, even though it is only possible to provide such order through the mutual efforts of all involved.

Failure to exercise these responsibilities is reflected in poor security procedures, slipshod performance of guard duty, classrooms and training areas in unsatisfactory condition, inadequate preparation of personnel to perform their duties, and generally poor results in performance as a whole. Weaknesses in security procedures are sometimes permitted to go uncorrected, due to careless checks by officers who are not sufficiently qualified to discover discrepancies. In other instances, deficiencies are divided into "major" and "minor" categories, which tends to permit continuation of the less serious shortcomings. Finally, some units fail to provide for the full day of maintenance required by regulations, substituting instead a half day's maintenance followed by an afternoon of poorly organized care and cleaning of personal equipment, in which little attention is actually paid to what is supposed to

to be accomplished. Such instances cannot, says the author, be permitted to continue. Regulations must be followed if there is to be good order and discipline within the units.

6. Rear Admiral N. Deviatnikov. "Primer Kommunistov" (The Example of Communists), pp. 57-60.

This article deals with "socialist competition," as practiced within the rear area services elements of the Northern Fleet. The author states that half of the members of the fleet have been awarded the title of "outstanding" in the areas of combat and political training, and more than 90% of assigned personnel are considered to be "qualified specialists." Several examples of well-organized programs of "socialist competition" are then cited among the Party and Komsomol agencies of the fleet.

Nonetheless, says the author, instances are encountered where individual Communists and Komsomol members do not serve as models for their comrades in performing their duties and fail to support the competition with the fervor required. Some of them, who have stated their intention to obtain the title of "master of military affairs" fail to follow up their intentions with the requisite effort. Others fail to apply the principles of "socialist competition" to all aspects of their duties, resulting in weaknesses disclosed during periodic training and testing. This is considered as a sign of frivolity towards the accomplishment of the designated objectives and indicates a lack of exactingness towards one's subordinates. Senior officers are then required to intervene to restore the situation to its proper level and reinstate a full sense of "socialist competition."

Volume 9

1. Admiral N. Khovrin, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. "V More Kak Doma" (On the Sea As at Home), pp. 23-27.

Admiral Khovrin discusses work in the Soviet Navy in the fields of medicine, provisioning and other aspects of life at sea designed to make cruises as physically comfortable for the sailors as possible. He states that most ships are provisioned in such a way as to give the sailors balanced, attractive meals, but he follows with the opinion that there are still many commanders and quartermaster personnel still not properly concerned about the quality of food in the navy. He feels that the food served on many ships is below the acceptable level.

Admiral Khovrin continues with supply deficiencies, stating that on many ships, sailors are not outfitted with the necessary clothing. Initial issues wear out and are not replaced on time. Clothes are not cleaned properly, and many ships even lack washing machines. Commanders are failing to evaluate the effects of poor food and shoddy clothing on the morale of the men.

Rear supply sections don't coordinate deliveries to individual ships, and supply control at high levels is weak. Unnecessary losses of time and ship resources often accompany the transfer of supplies. These improperly controlled aspects of naval supply hinder the smooth operation of many Soviet first line ships, and, according to Admiral Khovrin, must be eliminated.

2. General-Lieutenant of Technical Troops A. Klemm, Chief of the Central Military Transportation Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "S Zabotoi o Voinakh v Puti S'edovaniya" (Concern for the Troops throughout their Journey), pp. 30-35.

General Klemm discusses measures taken to insure that transient personnel are properly taken care of during their movement. He cites numerous policies instigated in the past such as the formation of USO-type establishments at major railroad stations and air terminals. Here the soldier can rest, watch television or movies, listen to political lectures or sign up for tours of the city. Containerized crates are available for the shipment of personal property, and the transfer of men and their families is designed to create as little hardship in the individuals as possible.

There are still numerous problems, however. The author states that there is still a serious lack of attention paid the traveling military man. He is not advised of the necessity of procuring tickets prior to departure or of the procedures for ordering the packing containers for the shipment of his property. General Klemm also cites the Eastern-Siberian, Northern, Kuibyshev, Dneper, South-Eastern and other railroads for chronic late departures of military personnel. The inability of officers of the VOSO (Central Military Transportation Directorate) to organize movements of men and material has created many justified complaints of passengers. These complaints have been directed to the VOSO and to newspaper editors.

3. General-Lieutenant A. Tkachev, Assistant Commander of Logistic Troops, Baltic Military District. "Vazhnyi Faktor Boevoi Gotovnosti" (An Important Factor of Military Preparation), pp. 78-81.

General Tkachev states that a prime factor for military preparedness is properly trained technical specialists. He discusses the academic year and the goals for academic achievement among

various types of specialists, stating that officers are responsible for their training. Commanders must set up well-organized classes, under conditions closely approaching combat so as to develop the abilities of these specialists. Theoretical knowledge must be solid and practical experience extensive. He cites several units for successful accomplishment of this mission.

As usual, however, there are units not measuring up to standards. He states that many units do not show proper concern for the quality of equipment and pay little attention to its care and upkeep. These units would find it difficult to fulfill their missions.

The author also discusses specific problems with refueling by tanker drivers. He considers these drivers specially trained to quickly refuel vehicles - a type of military specialist. Yet, these drivers are for no apparent reason doing other jobs, leaving untrained personnel to take their place. This lowers the effectiveness of the technical equipment and also leads to a higher deadline rate because of improper handling of the special equipment. General Tkachev considers this but one example of improper usage of military specialists.

Volume 10

1. General-Colonel P. Sysoev, First Deputy Chief of Rear Services, Armed Forces, USSR. "Vsegda v Boevoi Gotovnosti" (Always in a Posture of Military Preparedness), pp. 47-52.

General Sysoev is writing about aspects of rear services affecting transportation. He mentions the advantages of containerized shipping for ease of handling and fast storage, and also mentions the necessity of high moral-political levels in each soldier. He considers a high level of preparedness among transportation units a prime factor in overall military preparedness. The author states that these units must be ready to move day or night, in any type of weather and with a minimum of mechanical problems. He does state that numerous deficiencies have become apparent in several transportation units. Vehicles are cluttered up with extraneous material, tools are not all accounted for in some vehicles, while others have excess tools. In inspecting a unit commander's vehicle, the general noted that the radio did not work, the first aid kit was missing, and the driver did not know how to use the radio. There were other deficiencies also noted. Another officer stated that although there was a high demand for cleanliness, surplus material always had to be thrown out of the trucks before they were inspected. Vehicles were definitely not prepared to move out on operations on short notice.

Volume 11

1. General of the Army S. Kurkotkin, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Rear Services, Armed Forces USSR. "Nepremennoe Uslovie Boesposobnosti Voisk" (The Indispensable Condition of Military Preparedness), pp. 12-19.

General Kurkotkin in the capacity of Chief of Rear Services states that the everyday life of soldiers and sailors, and especially their off-duty living conditions must continue to improve. He feels that food, medical facilities and housing conditions for both enlisted and officer families must receive command attention. Even field conditions must be improved. Much, he states, has been accomplished, but there are still severe problems. General Kurkotkin enumerates those problems he feels must be overcome.

He states that all troops are not yet housed in well-lighted, warm, well-built barracks. There are still military communities without the full complex of necessary buildings and structures. Standard construction projects are of outdated design, and general repairs of common-use facilities are lacking.

Housing for families of officers and warrant officers is another major problem area. There are insufficient living quarters available, and those that are available are not given to those families with the greatest need.

A recent All-Army inspection-competition uncovered major problems in the area of food handling. In some units, food was still prepared over open fires. This typifies the overall lack of modernization in food processing. Official attention must be stressed in this area.

The appearance of soldiers and sailors points out deficiencies in uniform issue. There is a shortage of high quality material and dye for uniforms. This is due to a weakness in the procurement agencies and an underestimation of the importance of equipment for young replacements. What equipment there is available is hurriedly fitted, and cleaning and repair facilities are nonexistent in many units.

Medical facilities are not working as well as expected. Preventive medicine is still underdeveloped, even for officers. Sanitariums, rest homes and tourist areas are not properly utilized for medical recovery of seriously ill patients.

Military trade is still not fully developed and tied to the civilian economic base. Demand exceeds reserves, yet, because of

shortages in storage space, there are losses due to spoilage. The loading and unloading of vehicles is still done manually.

Separate units and small garrisons are still not receiving their required supplies. There are interruptions in the supply of necessities, such as potatoes and vegetables, children's and military goods.

Commanders are not critically analyzing the problem in order to find solutions to the existing supply shortages. Even field conditions must be re-evaluated. Some commanders, because of their own inability to organize or because of a lack of concern for their men, cover up by stating that the men must experience the harsh realities of battle conditions. The author feels that this is an invalid judgement, and that better conditions would be conducive to accomplishing the training mission.

All of these supply problems are affecting the morale of the Soviet army, as well as lowering its battle readiness. The illumination of these numerous problems shows the emphasis at the top, an emphasis that is apparently lacking at the lower levels.

2. General-Colonel G. Sredin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy. "Byt. Voinov - Partiinuyu Zabotu (Daily Life of Troops - A Party Concern), pp. 20-25.

General Sredin discusses in general terms the effects of the new constitution and its application in the armed forces. It calls for all services to be ready to repel aggressors at any time or place. General Sredin states that the army has always been an educational institution and will continue to be one, looking after the daily needs of the individual soldier while training him in some carry-over profession, when possible. The soldier's daily life, food, medicine and entertainment have always been important, but great strides have been made recently so that the soldier "feels no difficulty because he is out of his home surroundings."

Yet, many political organizations are not giving proper attention to the plight of the soldier and are not reacting to the poor, mundane work of many rear service personnel. Unit dining facilities are in disarray, food is improperly prepared, general purpose rooms are not correctly set up and washers and dryers don't work. In some military communities, electricity, heat and water service is often interrupted.

In many units, the political organizations do not get involved enough. In construction units people have less living space than required by regulations. Furniture is of poor quality and there are


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insufficient beds available. Food is of poor quality.

In separate garrisons, required provisions are sometimes not available, and stores are difficult to get to. Goods are not well displayed.

General Sredin holds the political organizations and commanders responsible for these deficiencies which cannot but affect troop morale.

Volume 12

1. Editorial. "Sovershenstvovat' Podgotovku Spetsialistov Tyla" (Improve the Training of Specialists of Rear Services), pp. 21-24.

The editorial enumerates various areas of rear service support, lauding the advancements made in each field. The author states that timely, coordinated resupply of front-line troops is imperative and feels that rear services officers must understand tactics both to defend themselves if the need arises and to anticipate changes in situations and demands so as to react more quickly and fulfill their resupply missions. Yet, according to the author, many officers know neither modern tactics nor the particulars of their own weapons. Some cannot even read a map. Also, many show little concern for military security. One captain set up camp in a new area without establishing a guard system or camouflaging his position.

Military instruction is critical so as to pass on to subordinates the information required to fulfill the technical intricacies of modern warfare. The author feels that hands-on training is a must, and states that the formal training so prevalent must be lessened.

Troop movements are essential to modern warfare, and constant training is required to attain and maintain the high proficiency needed on today's battlefield. However, practice has shown that in preparing for long marches, officers are letting many deficiencies slip through. For example, many units are departing during daylight hours, eliminating any hope for secrecy. At night, speeds are allowed to decrease and vehicles move with headlights burning. Both of these cause numerous problems under wartime conditions.

2. Colonel K. Kleshchinov. "Sbory Spetsialistov Tyla Nado Gotovit'" (It's Necessary to Prepare Meetings of Rear Service Specialists), pp. 35-37.

Colonel Kleshchinov writes about seminars and meetings of rear service personnel to exchange information and learn new techniques in the various aspects of supply management. He states that the organizers of these seminars must be well-prepared and have a schedule which must be strictly followed. They are also responsible for the preparation of seminar leaders. It is this preparation that makes the seminar run smoothly.

The author then recounts stories of seminars that did not succeed. Some failures were due to poor organization of available time. There was time wastage and the seminars became useless. Officers with great experience and vast stores of knowledge carelessly and unconscientiously prepared for their seminar. This lessened the effect of the seminar. A study of the failures of meetings and seminars of rear service personnel is being conducted to analyze errors made in the past year.

3. General-Colonel of Medical Services F. Komarov, Chief of the Central Military-Medical Directorate, Ministry of Defense, USSR, and Member-correspondent of AMN (Akademiya Meditsinskikh Nauk - Academy of Medical Sciences), USSR. "Meditsinskuyu Sluzhbu - na Uroven' Sovremennykh Zadach" (The Medical Service - on the Level of Modern Missions), pp. 57-62.

General Komarov writes about advances in the medical field in the Soviet Union, then concentrates on the Armed Forces and their medical facilities. He states that modern technology and equipment, combined with increased medical abilities and knowledge among doctors, is lowering both the illness and mortality rate, and he offers numerous statistics on the decrease of illnesses and the increased number of medical facilities, sanitariums and medical equipment. The fulfillment of planned increases will improve the situation even more. Improvements are planned in both preventive medicine and treatment techniques.

Major problems still exist in the medical field, however. General Komarov states that many questions must still be answered. There is still a large amount of time loss in both the army and navy due to illness and injury. Many first aid stations have not yet achieved a high standard of diagnostic service. The diagnostic process is excessively long and equipment is not properly utilized. Modern techniques are not applied to patients recovering from major surgery, and medical errors are still frequent. Lack of attention and callousness among medical personnel is a frequent problem. These areas are not receiving the necessary attention from above.

Regimental and lower unit aid stations are behind the times in

the medical field, are still lacking modern equipment and trained doctors. They are often located in buildings not conducive to good medical service.

4. Colonel G. Kovalenko, Chief of the Book Trade Directorate of GUT (Glavnoe Upravlenie Torgovli - Main Trade Directorate), Ministry of Defense. "Chtoby Kniga Nashla Chitatelya" (So That A Book Finds a Reader), pp. 62-65.

Col. Kovalenko writes about book sales in the Soviet Union, stating that Soviet citizens read more than the citizens of any other country. He feels that it is of prime importance that citizens are aware of new books as they come out. This is done by advertising, properly displaying books so that prospective readers can find them while browsing, having personal appearances of authors and having knowledgeable sales personnel.

As always, the author covers problem areas. Bookstores are not properly laid out or are in old buildings that were not designed to be book stores. Many of these buildings are in need of repair. Supplies of books such as memoirs and military journals do not meet the demand. Books on subjects such as those on very specialized fields are ordered in large amounts, and are left sitting on the shelves, their contents outdated. Sales personnel must consult with specialists to learn when and what amounts to order.

5. General-Major of Technical Troops V. Petrov. "Avtomobil' Vykhodit v Reis" (The Automobile Goes out on a Trip), pp. 71-74.

General Petrov begins his article with a full-page description of a single-vehicle accident. He recounts the causes, which were numerous. The driver was not licensed to operate that type of vehicle. The trailer was filled with a load not properly secured and the trailer brake system was not hooked to the truck system. The driver, unfamiliar with the characteristics of the vehicle and its load, took a sharp curve at excess speed, causing the trailer load to shift and topple both vehicles. The author offers as contributory factors the fact that the vehicle was dispatched without the technical personnel checking the load or brake system. Also, the unit commander had not authorized the dispatch, a breach of existing regulations. All of these facts led to the accident.

The author states that drivers of military vehicles are often seen standing on the side of roads, shouting for passers-by to lend them forgotten tools. This inattention is also true for the attitude of drivers and motor pool personnel toward maintenance. Vehicles are judged by their external appearances, with no attention being paid to the motor, brake system, etc. This results in a

premature failure of these systems, leading to the deadlining of the vehicle.

General Petrov calls for increased emphasis on vehicle maintenance, operator training and command influence on the fulfillment of all aspects of existing regulations.

VOENNYI VESTNIK

Volume 1

1. General of the Army I. Pavlovskii, Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Ground Forces. "Povyshat' Otvetstvennost' i Ispolnitel'nost'" (Improve Responsibility and Performance), pp. 2-3.

In this lead article of the 1977 series, General of the Army Pavlovskii appeals to the leadership of all levels of the Soviet Ground Forces for improvement in their personal leadership techniques in order to achieve similar improvement in performance at troop level. Ranging across the entire spectrum of leadership characteristics, he cites several examples of how deficiencies in individual commanders impact upon unit effectiveness.

In the area of training, he maligns the fact that there are individual officers who fail to exercise the necessary concern for high-quality, effective training, and conduct their exercises and instructions under simplified conditions, with limited preparation and poor instructional techniques. Instead of working intensely at this task, some commanders are content to simply paint a rosy picture of the situation in their subordinate units and look only for the external indicators.

Other commanders take the easy way out in attempting to establish authority over their subordinates by making things easy for them or permitting familiarity. By so doing, they are inflicting great damage upon their units. Such blunders are made not infrequently by young officers, and particularly by sergeants. Some are needlessly shy or timid, and unable to place firm demands upon their subordinates, as required.

Still other commanders get carried away when inflicting punishment and allow themselves to be rude with their troops. While senior commanders are encouraged to educate their junior leaders in the proper method of disciplining troops, not all commanders do so. An example is cited in which one commander, after hearing about violations of troop discipline in a unit dining facility, ordered his company commanders to personally lead their subordinates into the dining facility. The result of this action was infringement upon the unit first sergeant's duties and removal of responsibility from junior officers.

In some units, attempts are made to circumvent regulations by employing various forms of recommendations, instructions, and written rules of behavior containing inaccurate interpretations of the laws governing army life. Additionally, the staffs of some units

are criticized for not completely fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to insuring accomplishment of the unit mission. Inadequate knowledge of troop regulations by staff members results in incomplete checks on subordinate units, lack of concern for compliance with regulations, and inability to provide effective assistance in the planning of daily activities. The impact of such "supervision" remains even after the staff officer departs, resulting in continued violations of regulations, orders of the day, and SOP's by unit personnel.

2. General of the Army S. Vasiagin, Chief of the Political Directorate, Ground Forces. "Partiino-Politicheskoi Rabota - Vysokuiu Effektivnost'" (High Effectiveness to Party-Political Work), pp. 8-13.

In calling upon commanders, political cadre and political organizations to improve the effectiveness of party-political activities in troop units, General of the Army Vasiagin points out that Party directives pertaining to the use of a total approach to political education are not always fulfilled in a sufficiently effective manner. Failure to properly combine various methods of political, military and moral instruction into a unified system of political studies results in such problems as reduced readiness levels, inadequate assimilation of new technology and weaponry, an over-simplified approach to the organization of Party-political work in military studies, inadequate Party influence on officer training, elements of formalism in the conduct of "socialist competition," inadequately thought-through methods for stimulating personnel to greater accomplishments, delayed improvements in military discipline, a two-faced approach to implementation of military regulations, lack of principle in evaluating violations of regulations, cover-up of deficiencies, failure to combat drunkenness, shortcomings in the operation of military associations, and an indifferent attitude toward the military way of life.

3. Colonel V. Savel'ev. "Prikaz Otдан - Neiaslostei Net" (The Order Has Been Issued - There Are No Vague Areas), pp. 28-30.

Citing historical examples of how vague orders have led to defeat both in combat and in training, Colonel Savel'ev states that carelessness in preparation and incompleteness of combat orders and directives are among the most widespread deficiencies found in Soviet commanders. He finds that some commanders assign missions to their subordinates without bothering to evaluate the enemy situation. As a result, some units receive impossible tasks to perform, while others have too little to do. He also complains about a widespread tendency for junior leaders not to request clarification of obscure

details in their orders. Afraid of showing their weakness or inexperience, some young commanders prefer not to "bother" their seniors with trivial questions. Such "modesty" then brings about irreversible damage on the field of battle. Additionally, the author finds that verbal orders frequently contain such empty, superfluous phrases as "so to speak," "if possible," "if the situation permits," "act without undue delay," "you may increase, or in other circumstances decrease," etc., leading to uncertainty and indecisiveness on the part of subordinates.

4. Colonel I. Dynin and Lieutenant Colonel Iu. Protasov. "Chto Obespechilo Uspekhi Ucheniia" (What Ensured the Success of the Exercise), pp. 42-46.

In discussing the factors which ensured the success of a recent regimental-level airborne night training exercise conducted under difficult weather and terrain conditions, the authors point out several problem areas which detracted from the overall favorable outcome of the operation. One of the regiment's battalion commanders points out the fact that almost every third man in his unit is a new recruit participating in such training exercises for the first time. These younger soldiers frequently get lost during a jump, are unable to determine their location on the ground, and are unable to orient themselves properly. This creates additional difficulties for the officers in controlling their troops.

Radio communication procedures by junior officers are considered a major problem, resulting in serious deficiencies in command and control. Frequencies are tied up by excessively long and confused transmissions, which are difficult to understand and require re-questioning and clarification of data, despite the fact that the majority of the traffic is transmitted with the assistance of code books.

Another weakness was found in river crossing procedures by the point element of the assaulting regiment. Although reconnaissance and engineer elements attached to the point platoon had located and properly prepared designated approaches to the river, when the combat vehicles reached the opposite shore they were unable to exit the water up a narrow grade due to a slippery sandy river bottom, in which the vehicles could not get any traction. This forced them to turn around and swim along the bank until they found a more suitable exit point, thus necessitating a last minute change in the assault position for the main forces.

A senior lieutenant in charge of a reconnaissance element

informed the authors of his problems with lack of close cooperation between members of a BMD airborne assault gun crew. The driver-mechanic of one of his vehicles, in a moment of distraction, drove off into a deep crater. It took more than ten minutes to get the vehicle out of the hole, causing the crew to be late in arriving at the collection point where they were to relay the intelligence they had collected. Both the driver and the vehicle commander were considered at fault in the incident for failure to work closely together, a condition which is said to be all too common among crews of combat vehicles. Commanders of BMD's are also lacking in communications training, to the extent of being unable to select proper frequencies or perform basic troubleshooting procedures in the event of a problem. The lack of teamwork among crew members is seen here as possibly endangering success in combat.

5. Guards Captain L. Shturmak and Guards Lieutenant A. Oleinik. "V Tsentre Vnimaniiia - Serzhanty" (At the Center of Attention - The Sergeants), pp. 47-52.

"Guards" Captain Shturmak provides an interesting insight into the problems he encounters as commander of a tank battalion with his young, inexperienced sergeants, assigned to the unit directly out of leadership training academies. While many of them become excellent tank commanders who are able to mold their fellow crewmen into close-knit, cohesive teams, others are totally incapable of developing such relationships, apparently through lack of self-confidence.

Despite their satisfactory technical abilities in tank operations, these young sergeants quickly alienate their subordinates by constantly hollering at them, showing obvious dissatisfaction with everything they do, making snide remarks at every available opportunity, avoiding them during leisure hours, and by keeping to themselves. They take no time to carry on friendly conversations with the soldiers or get to know them better, and show no concern for their background or their interests. Compounding the problems these young tank commanders face by virtue of their inexperience is the equally poor treatment they receive at the hands of individual officers of the battalion. The author laments the fact that he and his deputies are at times forced to put a stop to instances wherein officers treat the sergeants with total disrespect, hollering at them and generally dressing them down in a rude, contemptible manner, both in private and in front of their subordinates.

The second section of this article describes a general lack of confidence in the noncommissioned officer by young commissioned officers. This feeling is caused by two factors: inadequate preparation

of the sergeants at some of the training units, and excessive supervision of the sergeants by the officers themselves, even to the point of actually taking over their duties from them. The officers frequently lose sight of the fact that the sergeant is the soldier's immediate superior. By being physically present around the troops from reveille until recall, the officers cause the sergeants to lose their sense of responsibility for the training and education of their subordinates, resulting in a loss of initiative, a feeling of being watched too closely, and sometimes cold indifference. The officers fail to see that lack of trust in their sergeants only leads to further difficulties within the unit.

5. Colonel V. Kalinin. "Uchebnyi Kinofil'm: Znatiye ili Razvlecheniye?" (The Training Film: Instruction or Entertainment?), pp. 94-97.

In this article, the author provides a blistering indictment of the lack of usage made of available military training films and slide shows in numerous units and training centers. Citing his recent experience as an evaluator of tactical and specialty training presented at a communications training center, Colonel Kalinin finds that no use whatsoever is being made of existing training films whose subject matter coincides exactly with the instruction the students are supposed to be receiving.

Specifically, the students were evaluated on their selection and establishment of a field radio site for a medium range radio station. Each of the principles involved in such an operation is clearly demonstrated in an existing training film, however, since no one in the training unit has seen the film, and no other source of similar information is apparently available, the principles are not adhered to and the selected sites are all rated as unsatisfactory. When asked why such films are not used, neither the unit commander, nor the training staff were able to provide a satisfactory answer.

The author finds a similar lack of interest in the use of training films at several of the military academies. At the Riazanskoe Communications Academy, the training films were shown to cadets only in the evening, after supper, and on their own time. As a result, many of the films were not even seen by a number of the cadets, and those that did see them tended to look on them as "entertainment," by virtue of the circumstances under which they were shown.

Not all the deficiencies are, however, explained in this manner. According to existing procedures, each unit is supposed to prepare a requisition for training films twice a year and send it forward

for consolidation by the next higher headquarters. Nonetheless, many units either ignore this requirement or simply submit an extremely limited requisition. And although the staff of the next higher headquarters should, in principle, note this failure and cause corrective action to be taken, this does not occur. Additionally, it is said to be difficult to determine the content of films from the descriptions contained in catalogues available in every unit.

These and many other similar unresolved problems also apply to the use of slide shows which units are authorized to retain and do not have to return to the issuing agency. Some units are not even aware that such packets exist, others are unable to obtain projectors to show the slides with, and still others simply do not want to be bothered, due to their previous experiences in which the sets they received had nothing whatsoever to do with their type of training. The author places the blame for all such deficiencies directly upon the individuals responsible for planning and using training films within any given unit, and states that improvements must be made if modern day developments are to be kept up with.

Volume 2

1. General-Lieutenant V. Dement'ev, Chief of the Political Directorate, Kiev Military District. "Partiinye Organizatsii v Bor'be za Voinskuiu Distsiplinu" (Party Organizations in the Struggle for Troop Discipline), pp. 6-9.

In calling upon party cadre and organizations to assist commanders in raising the level of troop discipline General Dement'ev cites examples where individuals have been called on the carpet for permitting laxity in matters of discipline. He states that there are clear indicators of a low level of discipline in some units of his military district, as demonstrated by problems in both military and political areas. A superficial approach is taken to the problem by some individuals, limited to the establishment of a plan and discussion of measures to be taken, without the needed followup. Party organizations on the staffs of several units fail to exercise adequate influence over the Communists responsible for implementation of the established programs in the lower units. Failure to evaluate the reasons for each and every case of misconduct, misbehavior, or careless performance of guard duty or other internal services is also seen as a major factor in the equation. Additionally, there is insufficient use of criticism and self-criticism and a lack of an uncompromising approach to anything that interferes with the attainment of a high level of discipline. Finally, several Party

organizations do not provide adequate assistance to commanders in their dealings with unit personnel, indicating either a lack of interest in the problem or possibly even interference in the commander's efforts to correct the situation.

2. General of the Army V. Petrov, First Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces. "Dyt' Blizhe k Liudiam" (Be Closer to People), pp. 16-20.

General of the Army Petrov discusses the results of numerous letters to the editor of *Voennyi Vestnik* received in response to a recent article entitled "Kak Zavoevat' Avtoritet" (How to Gain Authority?). Emphasizing the need to be close to one's own people, General Petrov points out that although cadets and young officers are given some training in psychology and human relations, many of them are still not prepared for dealing with their leadership responsibilities. Those who are themselves slovenly, unable to issue clear orders and insure that they are carried out, or ignore deficiencies in the unit can never expect to gain the respect of their subordinates. Failure to follow the letter and the spirit of regulations is seen as a major factor in the problem, leading to disciplinary infractions, lack of mission accomplishment, and other matters which reduce the commander's authority. This general weakness in knowledge of regulations by officers is considered as a major contributing factor to the problem.

3. Captain G. Goroshchenko. "Effektivnost' - Deviz Kazhdogo Zaniatiia" (Effectiveness - Motto for Every Activity), pp. 21-23.

Captain Goroshchenko, deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment in the Carpathian Military District, considered to be the foremost regiment in the Soviet Ground Forces, discusses the reasons for his unit's successes, together with some of their remaining deficiencies. Although considerable initiative and ingenuity is shown in the development of new and improved training methods among unit personnel, some deficiencies still remain in the area of field training, particularly in regard to rigidity in mechanically implementing plans for the conduct of field exercises. Commanders still are not requiring independent evaluations of given circumstances and independent action on the part of their subordinates, but continue to rely on fixed patterns of action. Additionally, the authority of the sergeants is still being usurped by individual officers who fail to permit the noncommissioned officers to show any initiative or independence whatsoever. This then reflects on their effectiveness in teaching and training their subordinates.

4. General-Colonel V. Govorov, Commander of the Moscow Military District. "Splav Molodosti i Opyta" (The Fusion of Youth and Experience), pp. 24-28.

General Govorov directs this appeal for improved training and education of battalion and company commanders, as well as other officers to regimental commanders and other senior leaders. Citing the example of one battalion in a tank regiment, the author states that there were many deficiencies in the methods used to control and check on the training being performed by that unit. Neither the regimental staff nor the battalion commander had made any provisions in their monthly training plans for conducting evaluations.

During one tactical exercise which was checked by a senior commander, several of the company commanders and platoon leaders were found to be poorly prepared themselves, and the actions of their personnel were also subjected to severe censure. General Govorov further cites the example of one regimental commander who is considered to be an experienced, strict and demanding commander, but who cannot "find time" to work with his young commanders, provide a detailed analysis of their mistakes and blunders, or advise them on how to resolve their problems. Instead, he is quick to take disciplinary action against them for their shortcomings. He does not value the traits of independence, initiative, or originality on the part of his young leaders. This has the natural effect of stifling them and forcing them to simply adopt his style.

Another instance involving a battalion commander who was recently relieved for his actions portrays the indifference shown to young officers. A lieutenant who had recently graduated from a military academy reported in to the battalion, where the commander simply told him to report to his company, check out the training schedule, and be prepared for the next day's activities, adding that they would have time to talk later on. However, no time for that discussion "later on" was ever found, and a month later, the battalion commander visited a training exercise being conducted by the new platoon leader. Dissatisfied with the exercise, the battalion commander brusquely reproached the lieutenant in front of his subordinates for poor preparation, without even stating what the problem was.

Such instances where young officers left alone with their troubles simply compound their errors due to a lack of control or monitoring of their activities are said to occur frequently. An additional reason for senior commanders to keep their eyes on young officers is the fact that there are lieutenants who themselves are not distinguished by their own personal sense of discipline or diligence towards duty. Only through the efforts of senior officers does the author see a possible resolution of such problems.

5. Senior Lieutenant S. Iatush. "Taktika ili Paradnost'?" (Tactics or Show?), pp. 57-58.

Senior Lieutenant Iatush, commander of a BTR (armored personnel carrier) platoon, complains that his company is required to perform their tactical exercises in a manner designed more for show than for training realism. He cites several specific examples of this. The first is a restriction on implementing any orders such as "mount your vehicles," "start your engines," etc., until the subsequent code word "222" comes over the radio. This is done to insure that all actions appear to be taking place simultaneously and with extreme accuracy. In other words, it is done for "eyewash" purposes. In so doing, much valuable time is lost, as is any sense of realism.

Another example is the use of the code word "Volga" for even-numbered vehicles and "Don" for odd-numbered vehicles. Vehicles are then moved forward on command of "Volga" or "Don," giving the impression of parade-like precision in their movements. However, in so doing, vehicle drivers forget about their requirements for selecting a good firing position for the BTR's and simply stop when the command "stop" comes over the radio. The vehicles are also ordered back into movement regardless of whether the gunner has completed his fire mission. All initiative and responsibility for performing their duties is thus removed from the crew, resulting, in the author's opinion, in totally useless training.

6. Captain N. Kikeshev. "Kogda Vzaimodeistvie Tol'ko Oboznachaetsia" (When Coordinated Action is Merely Designated), pp. 82-83.

This article concerns the lack of coordinated action between motorized rifle companies and battalions and their attached artillery sub-units during field training exercises. The author cites a recent maneuver in which the attached artillery support was simply ignored during the critical phase of a meeting engagement, resulting in "defeat" for the unit.

Coordinated use of artillery support during maneuvers is said to be rarely exercised. One motorized rifle company commander stated he received an attachment of an artillery platoon only once during his four years in command, and other officers have experienced the same problem. Even when artillery support is provided, the supported units sometimes are unaware of how to properly employ it. This lack of knowledge of artillery employment is caused by separate training for infantry and artillery units at training centers. Mutual coordination is simply designed, but not exercised, resulting in lack of experience in artillery employment and inattention to the capabilities of artillery.

When artillery finally is attached, it is ignored even to the

extent of not posting the artillery positions on the map, nor employing it during the course of battle. The author states that active artillery support must become a regular part of training exercises if the rift between theoretical knowledge and practical application is to be closed at the company and battalion levels.

7. General-Colonel of Artillery P. Levchenko, Chief, Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces. "Boevaia Ucheba Ofitserov" (Combat Training of Officers), pp. 86-90.

In this article, General Levchenko establishes his priorities for the current training year. One of these priorities is to raise the level of training of officers of the Air Defense Forces, first of all in their capacity as commanders and senior staff officers responsible for organization of combat, and secondly, as specialists responsible for training their subordinates. Emphasis is placed on improving knowledge of the "probable enemy" and his air forces through persistent, directed, independent study by officers.

Little interest in such studies is said to exist at the present time, resulting in a haphazard, unplanned approach to the problem, and only marginal results. Another problem seen by the author is the tendency for some senior air defense officers to shy away from their responsibilities as instructors, due to their inability to keep up with technological developments in the field. This results in decreased emphasis on high quality training, a false picture of training levels, inability to objectively evaluate training, reduction of time allowed for adequate preparation of instruction, and a general lowering of unit effectiveness. Such problems are said not to exist, however, in the Air Defense Forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and the author encourages all Air Defense Forces of the Soviet Ground Forces to follow the GSFG example.

Volume 3

1. Editorial. "V Osnove Takticheskoi Podgotovki - Kompleksny Podkhod" (At the Basis of Tactical Training - A Comprehensive Approach), pp. 7-10.

This unsigned lead editorial calls upon all commanders and staffs, as well as political, Party, and Komsomol (Young Communist League) organizations to seek out and utilize progressive forms and methods of training in order to improve field training and combat readiness of units through regimental level. The author states that tactical training and exercises in some areas are not being

thoroughly planned in advance, but are conducted on a "conveyor belt" basis, one unit after the other, as briefly as possible, lacking the required materials, and under simplified conditions. Such procedures fail to prepare the units for operations on a modern, complex battlefield and result in such problems as failure to begin the attack on time, failure to follow the designated direction of advance, late departures for designated areas, etc.

Some commanders conduct their field training right next to their track parks, thus depriving their subordinates of the opportunity for training in breaching of realistic obstacles and barriers. Company tactical training kits for simulating enemy fire are frequently not used. One seldom sees a platoon- or company-sized unit where tactical maneuvers are worked out for complex situations involving the fires of supporting arms. The author encourages greater use of targets and mockups for evaluating live-fire exercises, and bemoans the fact that too many exercises are conducted with either no simulated enemy, or simply by using the most primitive type of simulators or even verbal simulation. In the latter instance, a situation develops wherein two officers get together to discuss a tactical situation, and simply end up drawing something on their maps, while the rest of the unit, sometimes up to company level, sits around doing nothing. This is the type of problem that the author feels cannot be tolerated and must be eliminated.

2. General-Major of Tank Forces I. A. Skorodumov, Chief Editor of *Voennyi Vestnik*, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Rudoi. "Glavkom Sukhoputnykh Voisk Na Takticheskoy Uchenii" (The Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces at a Tactical Exercise), pp. 20-26.

This article describes a recent two-day motorized rifle battalion training exercise which was observed from start to finish by the CINC, Soviet Ground Forces, General of the Army I. G. Pavlovskii. This combined-arms exercise, which required the battalion to conduct an assault upon defending enemy forces, also included requirements for defeat of enemy heliborne antitank defenses, repulsing of a counterattack by superior enemy forces, forcing of a hasty river crossing, completion of a night march, and conduct of a meeting engagement.

All phases of the exercise were conducted in one (unnamed) training area which, according to General Pavlovskii, is too rarely done by many commanders. He complains that too many units conduct various aspects of their training in several different locations, sometimes considerably distant from each other, and all at the same time. As a result, they do not receive practice in conducting continuous and active operations, and unit personnel are unable to perform under realistic conditions. The author states that quality training may be conducted in relatively small training areas, using

a limited supply of munitions and simulator devices. The exercise observed by General Pavlovskii was considered as an overall success, with deficiencies noted in the following areas:

After the infantrymen had dismounted from their BMPs during an attack, all BMPs were simultaneously called back to the rear, rather than being left in covered firing positions in the forward area to support the ground assault element. Additionally, fresh replacements were brought up to the forward areas in full view of the enemy, making their destruction likely before they could be introduced into battle.

In the river crossing exercise, two serious deficiencies were noted. First of all, there was too large a time gap between the amphibious crossing of the obstacle by infantrymen in their BMPs and the underwater crossing by tanks, resulting in inadequate support of the bridgehead element. Secondly, and considered to be the more serious of the two deficiencies, was the failure to use the on-board "thermo-smoke generating" devices with which contemporary tanks and combat vehicles are equipped.

Finally, the battalion, in conducting its meeting engagement, failed to take advantage of its potential in firepower and equipment for conducting flanking or rear area attacks on the enemy, and simply engaged in frontal combat. The same reason was cited for delayed movement of the advance guard to the march security element at the time of the initial engagement.

3. Lieutenant Colonel V. Lisovskii. "Pervoe Slovo - Razvedke" (The First Word - To Reconnaissance), pp. 51-54.

In citing the importance of timely and effective reconnaissance and intelligence efforts to insure the success of offensive operations, the author notes that there are officers who disregard the value of intelligence, or who place impossible demands on collection agencies through ignorance of their capabilities. As a result, artillery is frequently wasted on locations where no enemy is to be found, motorized riflemen attack abandoned trenches, run into unexpected resistance, etc. Additionally, the author claims that far too little attention is paid to developing intelligence on the enemy rear areas during the conduct of tactical training exercises, a factor which has particular significance in the event nuclear weapons are being employed.

4. Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Glotov and Guards Lieutenant A. Oleinik. "Trebovaniia Distsipliny - Zakon" (The Requirements of Discipline Are Law), pp. 60-61.

The authors of this article attribute specific deficiencies in the conduct of field training exercises at unit level to a lack of discipline, beginning with the unit commander and going all the way down to the lowest ranking individual in the company. One company commander allegedly failed to insure that his unit's combat vehicles were prepared for firing prior to setting off on their maneuvers, as his battalion commander had instructed him to do. Sights were not adjusted, electrical systems on antitank guided missiles broke down, machineguns were not properly employed, etc. The commander had merely issued general directions to his personnel without requiring specific action by anyone, and took no steps to insure that necessary preparations had in fact been made.

In a second example, a sergeant had to order one of his subordinates three times to bring him a shovel so he could demonstrate how an entrenchment is laid out. Instead of simply going after the shovel, the soldier first questioned the need for it and then complained about how difficult it would be for him to do so. Only after the sergeant gave him a direct order the third time did he leave to get the shovel.

The third example involved a long-haired soldier who was ordered to get a haircut by his lieutenant. Two days went by and the soldier still had not had his hair cut, nor was the lieutenant able to bring himself to say anything to him about it. Only when the company commander noticed the soldier and ordered him to get his hair cut within a certain period of time was the problem resolved. In another instance, a lieutenant was reprimanding a sergeant for failure to insure that his troops brought their abstracts on political instruction to class with them. When the lieutenant noticed that the sergeant was blushing, he patted him on the shoulder and offered him a cigarette, dropping the matter right there. The authors cite other instances where officers play the role of "good guy" in an effort to gain cheap popularity with their troops, try to be "one of the boys," use vulgar language, joke around excessively, etc., resulting in a total lack of discipline and inevitable problems within the unit.

Finally, other commanders, instead of issuing firm orders and requiring compliance on their own authority, attempt to persuade their troops that something or other must be done because a higher-level commander ordered it. The article concludes with a call for elimination of persuasion and exhortation as means of accomplishing action. Instead, it advocates creation of an atmosphere of total intolerance of any departure from Frunze's basic tenet that "an order is an order." This, together with the commander's personal example in carrying out his orders, is in the opinion of the authors, the only way to preclude violations of disciplinary order.

5. General-Lieutenant A. Matveenko. "Metodicheskoe Masterstvo Ofitsera" (Methodological Skills of the Officer), pp. 62-65.

General Matveenko's article is directed at battalion-level commanders whom he charges with primary responsibility for assisting young officers, platoon leaders and company commanders in the development of their ability to determine where primary emphasis is required in the conduct of various activities. First citing examples of battalions which have successfully carried out such developmental training programs for their junior officers, the author then describes two battalions suffering from serious deficiencies in their tactical and political training.

He attributes this problem to poorly thought-out, planned and implemented methodological work by the battalion commanders with their junior officers. Officer training is conducted haphazardly, making little use of the previous training they have received and sometimes even resulting in decreased levels of efficiency. Several examples are presented. In one company, tactical firing exercises are conducted regularly in the same area, where there are insufficient targets and simulators. The battalion commander made it a practice of informing his officers in advance where they were to engage the enemy armor and infantry, and even indicated where their counter-attack positions should be and what their important objectives were. No effort was made to develop the principles of operating in unfamiliar terrain, nor were they instructed on employment of attached and supporting elements. As a result, platoon leaders and company commanders received insufficient practice in realistically evaluating the enemy, making sound decisions, providing clear guidance to their subordinates, and maneuvering personnel and fires to inflict a decisive blow on the enemy. Platoon and squad leaders in such units were particularly weak in these areas, and their deficiencies were further reflected in the unsatisfactory ratings received during their annual training evaluations. Several other examples of similar poor performance caused by inadequately prepared officers are presented, leading the author to conclude that such a slipshod approach to developing the skills of junior officers by battalion commanders leads only to serious deficiencies in combat effectiveness and must be overcome.

Volume 4

1. Editorial. "Komandir i Sorevnovanie" (The Commander and Competition), pp. 2-5.

This unsigned lead editorial exhorts commanders, political workers, staff officers, Party and Komsomol organizations to better implement the concept of "socialist competition" in the conduct of individual and unit education and training programs. Without citing specific examples, the article states that some commanders simply pay lip service to the concept at the beginning of the training year, but then fail to follow up their words with actions to insure that a sense of competitiveness permeates the entire training process. Thus, a strong competitive spirit lasts only for a few days, gradually weakens, and finally disappears entirely, resulting in reduced levels of effectiveness and a total absence of rivalry among individuals and units. Additionally, some commanders fail to use available means for publicizing the results of individual and collective competitions, such as critique sessions, group discussions, distribution of leaflets, bulletin board notices, and local radio announcements.

The results of field exercises, training sessions and weapons firing are frequently given only a cursory review, and individual participants are unable to evaluate their contributions or determine what went well and what they need to work on during their personal study time. The troops are also not always kept informed on the status of competition between squads, platoons, and companies or batteries. Much time is wasted on the construction of huge, unwieldy stands for posting summary tables, where, as a rule, outdated information is maintained. Such efforts are made at the expense of operations and have only limited impact.

Some battalion- and company-level commanders also fail to disseminate the results of lessons learned during the course of competitive events, considering that such results should only be made available at the end of the training period or the end of the training year when the names of individuals and unit winners are announced. Additionally, inadequate controls over competitive events are exercised, resulting in limited demands on participants and awarding of the "outstanding" title to individuals and units who should not have been so honored. Finally, some units consider only the results of training exercises in their evaluations, without taking into account such matters as the soldier's attitude toward service, troop discipline and internal order within the companies and batteries.

2. General-Colonel V. Iakushin, Chief of Staff and First Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces. "Sluzhbe Voisk - Neoslabnoe Vnimanie" (Unremitting Attention to Troop Service), pp. 6-10.

General Iakushin calls for increased emphasis on matters relating to "troop service" (a term which encompasses a broad range of subjects

dealing with the daily life of the soldier, his education, training, discipline, combat readiness, adherence to regulations, etc.). Stressing the need for adherence to the requirements set forth in specific regulations on domestic (peacetime) service, the author states that some units fail to pay adequate attention to such matters. As a result, incidents involving violations of troop order and discipline have not been eliminated in several units; arms and equipment are improperly stored and utilized; and mutual relationships between military personnel are not as they should be.

Failure to address the more mundane aspects of everyday troop life is seen as a sure path towards failure in other areas, such as troop training and education and combat readiness of units. On the one hand, the author chides unit commanders for failure to exercise sufficient initiative and creativity in determining means of filling each day in the life of their troops with activities relevant to the specific conditions of each unit. On the other hand, he criticizes those commanders who dare to modify any of the rigid requirements set forth in general troop regulations.

As an example, some units conduct morning inspections only four days a week, instead of every morning; as called for by regulations. Others modify their maintenance schedule, and instead of setting aside a specific time period for vehicle and equipment maintenance each day, they alternate maintenance periods with sports or political education classes. Not all commanders set aside time for general roll-calls at battalion- and regimental-level, or arrange for a band to send off troops on exercises and welcome them back. Other units fail to establish firm control over the issue of ignition keys for military vehicles, resulting in their unauthorized usage. Finally, there are deficiencies in the performance of sentry duties, including inadequate guard facilities and equipment, and serious omissions in the training and supervision of guard personnel. The author sees all such problems in routine matters as a serious reflection on the commanders and the units involved, and admonishes the reader never to forget about them.

3. General-Colonel I. Gerasimov, Commander of the Kiev Military District. "Vazhnoe Slagaemoe Boesposobnosti Voisk" (An Important Item in the Combat Efficiency of Troops), pp. 38-42.

General Gerasimov, in describing the maintenance training and performance system employed in his military district, points out that while much progress has been made in this area, deficiencies still remain. There are insufficient numbers of highly qualified specialists, including maintenance officers, and some units fail to devote the requisite amount of attention to improving the level of mainten-

ance training. A number of commanders and specialists in the technical services are listed by name as being deficient in this area. The percentage of officers and warrant officers who have the "1st class" or "master" qualification in the maintenance field is also considered to be too small. Shortcomings are further noted in the methods of training employed. In some places classes are held only infrequently and are primarily limited to classroom lectures with no practical exercises. Finally, there are also some officers and warrant officers who come to their training sessions without having prepared for them. The author states, however, that commanders, political organs and Party organizations note these deficiencies and take the necessary measures to eliminate them.

4. Lieutenant Colonel A. Gorkin. "Maskirovka Pozitsii" (Camouflage of Positions), pp. 104-107.

In assigning subordinates the mission of reinforcing their combat positions, young officers are said by the author to frequently "forget" about camouflage procedures. This he considers a "serious mistake" which is further complicated by the general belief that large masses of troops and the signs of their activity cannot be concealed from contemporary reconnaissance means.

Lieutenant Colonel Gorkin cites some of the successful camouflage experiences of the Second World War in refutation of this claim, and then goes on to describe how two battalions had varying degrees of success in utilizing available resources, equipment and imagination in concealing their positions from "enemy" observation during a recent winter maneuver. One of the battalions made excellent use of the terrain, natural cover, and organic camouflage equipment, while the other unit failed to do so. Improper explosive charges were used to blast holes in the frozen soil, ditch digging machines were used in open areas where there was little snow and where the level of frozen soil went deeper than in sheltered areas, and unit personnel made many mistakes in applying the principles of camouflage, even though they worked hard at the task.

Mockups of armored personnel carriers and wheeled vehicles were set up in areas of actual troop deployment, rather than being placed into false positions in areas where they should have been portraying the disposition or build-up of troop concentrations. Available organic camouflage materials were used to conceal troop shelters and dugouts, while combat equipment in trenches was left uncovered, even though there were adequate means for providing natural concealment for the troops (such as snow, fir tree groves and brushwood). Platoon leaders also failed to employ their "metallic corner reflectors" (radio security devices) and no one apparently even thought about them during the entire exercise. During the course of the

"battle," many weapons emplacements, troop shelters and covered positions for equipment were set up without regard for the principles of camouflage, resulting in discovery by ground and aerial reconnaissance means of the "enemy" and subsequent damage or destruction of most of them. Artillery fire inflicted particularly heavy losses on emplacements, requiring the replacement of troops and equipment over a wide sector of the defensive front from the rear.

Volume 5

1. General-Colonel V. Merimskii, Deputy Chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate, Ground Forces. "Sovershenstvovat' Ognovuiu Podgotovku Voisk" (Complete the Marksmanship Training of Troops), pp. 2-6.

General Merimskii discusses various aspects of ground forces training. He feels that too few officers are innovative in developing training schedules and training techniques, but instead are re-running the same canned problems. This allows the troops to anticipate missions and react according to preconceived concepts, and eliminates the need to respond and to be decisive. To compound the problem, commanders are not monitoring training, and inefficiency is costing valuable time.

While actually on firing ranges, the troops are involved in other types of crew drill, such as assembly and disassembly of weapons, crew emergency exiting or other drills not involving actual firing. These necessary drills could better be practiced somewhere other than on the firing line, using it for other than its designed purpose. Firing-related drills, such as target acquisition and range finding, receive insufficient emphasis, and their weaknesses detract from the fire capability of the individual crews.

Some officers feel that the lack of firing skills can be overcome by mass volleys, thereby wasting valuable ammunition and eliminating initiative and decisive target acquisition and destruction. Many units also conduct all training at the same range, with each problem identical to the preceding one. This creates an obvious lack of interest and a lowering of morale as well as combat capability.

2. Colonel V. Makarov and Colonel V. Bystrov. "Neissiakaemyi Istochnik Boevogo Dukha" (A Perpetual Source of Combat Spirit), pp. 35-38.

Colonels Makarov and Bystrov emphasize the necessity of moral-

political and psychological indoctrination of Soviet troops. This is based on Leninist principles and leads to an over-riding desire for victory and complete confidence in the Soviet system and equipment. The majority of the article lists means of developing the necessary traits in soldiers, including intense study of Soviet regulations, visits to war memorials and museums and discussions with heroes of the last World War. After almost four pages of 'how to develop the proper mental and emotional preparation,' the article concludes with the statement that most commanders and political officers in sub-units still do not recognize the need for such training. The psychological/morale problems of WW II are not properly studied, and post-war experience is ignored. Officers do not use all possibilities to develop the proper mental conditioning of Soviet troops toward contemporary war-time stresses. The authors feel that these shortcomings in the psychological and moral-political tempering of soldiers must be overcome.

3. General-Colonel V. Belikov, Commander of the Northern Caucasus Military District. "Komandirskoi Podgotovke - 'ysokoe Kachestvo'" (Towards Commander's Preparation - High Quality), pp. 64-68.

General Belikov writes about the rigid demands in the training of officers and illuminates various problems arising in that field. He begins by stating that officer training demands the center of attention, and that each officer must be psychologically tempered to meet the stresses of warfare. A thorough knowledge of modern tactics, technology and fire means is a prerequisite, and theory must be tied in with practical experience. The author lists short meetings, pamphlets and individual study as means of developing and maintaining this knowledge. Yet the author feels that many officers aren't broadening their tactical knowledge at the required pace and are falling behind the norm. Training time isn't fully utilized, and the attendance level at training functions is low, with, at times, only 50% of the required officers present. An excessive amount of training is done in a classroom environment, in violation of General Belikov's concept of in-the-field training. Field training combines tactics with the natural factors of terrain, weather, etc., all of which will affect war-time missions. Party activists are not thoroughly involved in officer training, and don't seem to realize that officer training is time-consuming and perpetual. General Belikov states that "today's successes cannot satisfy us tomorrow."

4. Captain Second Class P. Gorodov, candidate of pedagogical sciences. "Znat' i Uchityvat' Individual'no-psikhologicheskie Osobennosti Voinov" (Know and Take Into Account the Individual-psychological Peculiarities of Fighting Men), pp. 68-72.

CAPT Gorodov feels that many of the problems in Soviet units are the result of officers not knowing their subordinates. Commanders don't know the psychological make-up of their men, and consequently cannot take these peculiarities into account when planning or assigning missions. Many commanders are unable to utilize information gained from testing, and are therefore unable to arrange educational programs for their men. Misuse of information gained in interviews has caused the enlisted men to withhold information from their commanders. In one unit, the commander, having been told by one of his soldiers that the soldier was having problems with his girl friend, and that the problem was affecting his work, brought that individual and his problem up as a topic of discussion at the next Komsomol meeting. The soldier was totally unprepared for the fact that his personal problem was general knowledge. This certainly caused him to hold back at his next commander's interview. The author states that over 50% of the soldiers tested had no special areas of interest or outstanding psychological features. These are the ones that he feels must be studied to find out their hidden talents, so as to fully utilize them. If commanders are unable to find and develop these "hidden talents," these soldiers will lag behind the rest of the men in educational growth or will become disciplinary problems. Most commanders are not fully applying themselves to the problem of knowing and understanding their subordinates.

Volume 6

1. Editorial. "Povyshat' Distsiplinu i Organizatsionost'" (To Raise Discipline and Organization), pp. 2-5.

This editorial analyzes the need for strict discipline in the Ground Forces. The author states that, because of the constant threat of imperialist aggression, Soviet forces must be ready at all times to defend the Motherland, and only through strict discipline can this readiness be maintained. He alludes to one motorized regiment that has perfect discipline, with everyone attuned to mission completion and adherence to standing regulations. But the author then generalizes and states that many units still have disciplinary problems. There is absenteeism at lectures and training. Orders aren't followed, guard duty regulations are being ignored, and general disciplinary violations are numerous. Many commanders don't recognize the need for military education. Soldiers violating regulations are disciplined without any obvious system, and young officers especially seem unable to analyze reasons for violations of regulations. They have a tendency to allow minor violations to go unpunished, thus creating conditions favorable for more serious violations.

2. General-Colonel Goncharov, First Assistant to the Chief of the Main Administration of Cadre, Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Ieninskii Stil' V Deiatel'nosti Voennykh Kadrov" (Leninist Style in the Effectiveness of Military Cadre), pp. 6-10.

General Goncharov enumerates the Leninist traits necessary for "correct" Soviet officers. They are: 1) an untiring concern for the ideo-political level of cadre; 2) a scientific approach to work and extreme competence; 3) a high degree of organization and efficiency and the ability to discern that which is major; 4) the ability to continually develop in oneself a deep Party relationship to criticism and self-criticism; 5) a skillful selection, preparation, arrangement, instruction and education of military cadre; and 6) the ability to control and verify the fulfillment of the assigned mission.

Under the heading of the sixth trait, General Goncharov lists problem areas that have recently become obvious. There are many people who tend to embellish the accomplishments of units and tend to be non-objective in their evaluations. Test scores are elevated and unit shortcomings are glossed over. Others look only for the negative areas and become enmeshed in the shortcomings themselves, without trying to find the underlying causes. They then attempt to eliminate the effects without going after its cause.

3. Colonel L. Riazanov. "Dobivat'sia Pobedy Men'shimi Silami" (To Gain Victory with Smaller Forces), pp. 31-34.

COL Riazanov explains how solid tactics, in combination with modern military equipment, such as the BMP, can bring about the defeat of armored units larger than the attacker's. He cites one example of how a motorized battalion ambushed a tank unit and "destroyed" it through the application of solid tactics. His second example, however, points out numerous shortcomings. A lieutenant was given a mission, the completion of which required tactical knowledge beyond his ability. He wasted time on secondary problems to such an extent that the primary mission, the establishment of a hasty defensive position, was not completed. NCO's were overly supervised, and were unable to use personal initiative. One platoon used twice as much time as normally required to set up its defensive position. All units were on line, giving the company no depth. Available mortars were not integrated into the overall fire plan, but were used haphazardly. The company commander lacked even the most basic knowledge of a modern defensive position; no fields of fire were established, no secondary positions were designated and fire was not concentrated on primary targets. Only one platoon was able to mass its fire on properly selected targets. The other two simply sprayed the area, wasting ammunition and missing vital targets. The success of one of the three platoons did not accomplish the company's

mission, and the unit was rated as unsatisfactory in the establishment of a hasty defensive position.

4. Lieutenant Colonel B. Gadalin. "Tol'ko 'Udovletvoritel'no.' Pochemu?" (Only "Satisfactory." Why?), pp. 40-43.

LTC Gadalin explains the circumstances leading up to one unit's scoring only a "satisfactory" during a training exercise. The unit had previously been rated "excellent," but had fallen remarkably. At the start of the exercise, the commander appeared nervous and somewhat shaky. The unit disregarded most of the march regulations enroute to the firing range, and at one point had to retrace its steps because the weather would not permit continuation along that route. A previous map reconnaissance would have foreseen that problem.

The unit had apparently stressed only firing during its training cycle, as there was no adherence to tactics or march regulations throughout the movement phase. After receiving the attack mission, the commander failed to integrate mortars into his fire plan. Nor did he show any creativity in his solution of the mission. The unit dismounted and put on skis in front of the APC's, in plain view of the enemy. The author stated that in actual battle conditions, both the stationary vehicles and the personnel would have been destroyed. All personnel crossed an intermediate stream at one ford, then redeployed for the attack, again in sight of the enemy. One platoon attacked lackadaisically, all bunched up. After the unit "took" the objective, they set up a defense that was a complete farce. The enemy counterattack was engaged by one platoon while the other two watched without maneuvering to engage. The engaging unit maneuvered, deployed and opened fire beyond the maximum effective range. Insufficient forces were deployed to actually repel the counterattack.

According to the author, all training time had been dedicated to firing, with tactics being overlooked. This inability to combine fire and maneuver resulted in a unit unable to fulfill its primary combat mission.

5. Colonel V. Ivanov. "Uroki Odnogo Ucheniia : Boevoi Strel'boi (The Lessons from One Exercise with Battle Firing), pp. 43-46.

COL Ivanov begins his article by discussing the requirements for good artillery support, such as the necessity for a high level of moral-psychological development and deep knowledge of contemporary artillery means. He then congratulates, on one paragraph, a unit that successfully completed its mission. The rest of the four-page article discusses problems in regimental artillery support. Out of six fire direction problems, two were inaccurately and exceptionally

slowly computed, three received "good" ratings, and the last, a "satisfactory" rating. The reasons listed for the low ratings include insufficient training and poor coordination between the artillery and maneuver units. Fire plans were not developed, fire missions were not checked for accuracy and firing procedures were violated. There were misunderstandings as to where and when to fire, and incorrect coordinates were passed from the maneuver unit without being verified. There apparently exists no training system designed to upgrade the unit's level. Maneuver tactics weren't taken into account during any phase of the artillery training, and consequently there was no familiarity or ability to anticipate maneuvers. The fire direction center was weak in firing data computation, and little was done to increase firing accuracy. Fire control equipment was poorly understood, and so not properly utilized. Gross errors were allowed to slip by and were fired by the guns. Gun crews were not mentally prepared for the demands of their jobs, and apparently were insufficiently trained.

6. Colonel V. Kriukov. "A Esli Boi Budet Nastoiashchim?" (And If the Battle Should Be Real?), pp. 54-56.

COL Kriukov contrasts a Soviet training exercise with actual combat conditions. He first discusses a unit that properly fulfilled its mission, devoting less than one page to this successful unit. The remainder of the article is a discussion of a unit unable to complete its mission, with the author's appraisals of why they were unable to complete it.

This unit was given an objective to attack. All reconnaissance was done in clear view of the enemy, without the use of camouflage. All armored vehicles were green, in clear contrast to the whiteness of the snow. Again in plain sight, stakes were stuck in the ground to mark prospective firing positions. Noise discipline was totally absent, even during the recon. The main direction of attack was made obvious, so the defenders, in sight of the attackers, placed mine fields and obstacles.

Offensive preparations continued throughout the night, and meters were run all night to keep people warm. The attack was preceded by an artillery preparation, but the artillery forgot to remove the muzzle cover of the one piece used. The only reason the author could find for only one piece firing was that it was easier to clean only the one.

The attackers maintained a good combat interval, facilitated by the fact that the hatches were open until after the defender's first volley. Muzzle covers were left on the main guns. Again there

was no attempt made at camouflaging the tanks.

The attacking tanks ran right over simulated mines, but ignored them. No mine clearing was done. The bridge used to ford a water obstacle was precut two weeks in advance, allowing it to be constructed in record time.

After the attack, the tanks were refuelled, as the fuel had been burned up the night before, keeping everyone warm. Stoves were set up on the objective to serve a hot meal. No reconnaissance was sent out to find the retreating enemy, and no security was established. The unit reformed in battle formation for a night attack, using main lights to illuminate the target. Light discipline was ignored and night vision devices were not used.

7. General-Major of Engineers B. Galov. "Sberezhenie Tekhniki i Vooruzheniia - Delo Partiinoe" (Economy of Technical Equipment and Weapons - A Party Affair), pp. 94-96.

General Galov states that because of the billions of dollars spent by the West to increase its military might, the Soviet Union has been forced to produce more and more modern equipment of its own. Tube antiaircraft weapons have been replaced by missiles with highly technical target acquisition equipment. He states that not all commanders place enough attention on the training of personnel with the new equipment, and cites one commander by name for not bringing his unit up to expected standards. In other units, personnel were unable to properly care for the equipment, primarily because of a lack of understanding of the modern technology. Officers gave orders, but never verified their execution, and some of the expensive and complicated equipment was out of action because of neglect and improper care.

Volume 7

1. General of the Army S. Kurkotkin, Assistant Minister of Defense and Chief of Rear Services of the Armed Forces, USSR. "Byt Voinov - Zabota Obshchaia" (The Life of Soldiers - A General Concern), pp. 7-10.

General Kurkotkin enumerates those factors, such as food and recreation facilities, that affect soldier's morale. The article is basically positive in nature, listing the advances made in food improvement, messhall beautification and the creation of recreation rooms. These are, he states, a prime area of command emphasis in the Soviet Armed Forces. Yet the author comments that there still are

many units with poor dining facilities, where food is improperly prepared, and whose personnel live in barracks where there are still problems with electricity, water and heat. General Kurlotkin feels that this is usually because the commander, political officer, and rear service commander are not concerned with troop morale. He states that there are many units that have no regard for thrift or conservation and care of existing facilities.

2. General-Major N. Cherednichenko, Chief of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and Assistant Chief of the Political Administration, Ground Forces. "Vazhnyi Uchastok Ideologicheskoi Raboty" (An Important Part of Ideological Work), pp. 11-16.

In this article, General Cherednichenko condemns the West, imperialism and bourgeois influences. He states that Western aggression and interference in Soviet internal affairs has created the necessity of maintaining a high level of emotional readiness and dedication to repelling this aggression. He names Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as systems for spreading lies and disinformation. The Soviet Union, for purely defensive reasons, must propagandize to maintain the level of hatred and irreconcilability towards the West. The General states that meetings, the dissemination of pamphlets, speeches by high ranking officials, and other means must be constantly used to keep the soldier aware that the West is threatening. Yet he states that there are problem areas within the propaganda field.

Dissemination of anti-Western propaganda is often carried out without proper planning, and is not systematic or goal-oriented. The theoretical and methodological levels are often low, and the content is not always pertinent to the listening audience. The current East-West tension is not explained in a practical manner as a product of different social systems in conflict. Detente will not alter the basic ideological struggle. The General further states that there are insufficient meetings and discussions directed at developing hatred of the West. Many world events with negative connotations towards the West are either not published at all, or are published too late to be of any practical value.

3. General-Colonel F. Krivda, Commander of Southern Group of Forces. "Za Vysokuiu Ognovuiu Vyuchku" (Towards a High Level of Marksmanship Training), pp. 34-39.

General Krivda discusses training and the need for realism and creativity while conducting training. He commends units and commanders for training under conditions closely approaching actual combat, and states that this is a must for beneficial training. Units must vary their training, plan it to derive the maximum benefit, and continue

to develop all soldierly skills.

He states, though, that many units are not getting the required return from their training. Officers are not taking into consideration the higher demands of modern technology, and continue to conduct training as they did formerly. Firing ranges are simple and non-demanding. Instead of presenting multiple targets at varying ranges, they present the same target repeatedly. This sets a pattern that quickly makes the training non-productive.

The General also feels that many officers are apparently not ready to accept full responsibility for upgrading training. They rely on the same tried-and-tested training cycle and material.

4. Lieutenant Colonel N. Ermol'ev. "Zakryvaia Bresh'" (Closing the Gap), pp. 49-52.

LTC Ermol'ev explains a method used to neutralize the effects of an enemy nuclear blast. He states that by knowing the enemy's nuclear capabilities and most likely avenues of approach, a Soviet officer can predict a nuclear strike and prepare for it by echeloning his defensive forces. After the strike, the commander can pin-point the epicenter and estimate the kilotonnage. This is done by timing the nuclear flash. Flash duration cubed equals kilotonnage (a 5 second flash is created by a 125 kiloton nuclear weapon). With this information, the commander can estimate his losses and maneuver accordingly.

In the exercise discussed by LTC Ermol'ev, the commander underestimated the enemy's capability. The enemy had retreated from the point of contact without attracting any attention to this fact. He then employed a larger nuclear weapon. The commander had expected the blast on his flank, based on his evaluation of avenues of approach. Instead, the enemy hit in the center of his defensive formation. The commander's failure to "worst case" the anticipated nuclear blast caused more losses than he had planned for, resulting in his unit losing its combat effectiveness.

Volume 8

1. Editorial. "Marshovaia Podgotovka Voisk" (The March Training of Troops), pp. 2-5.

This editorial states that the ability to successfully complete a road march is a prime indicator of the combat level of a unit. The

author states that organization, vehicle preparation and planning are all factors effecting the march. In the modern fluid battlefield, a unit must be able to move from place to place, change direction, and fight if necessary from its march formation, and the author commends one unit for its high degree of proficiency.

The author then generalizes and under the heading of "in several units" discusses problem areas. He states that any obstacle met enroute causes the units to slow or stop. Night marches are forbidden in many units, unless headlights are used, and then the marches must be short. Units are not checking vehicles prior to road marches, and navigational and communications equipment is assumed to be in working order. These are lost in the mass of details supposedly checked.

Many units, due to a lack of training, are simply not ready to even prepare for a march of any significant length. Undertaking the march is totally out of the question.

2. Colonel V. Kozachkov. "V Interesakh Taktiki" (In the Interests of Tactics), pp. 39-43.

Col Kozachkov discusses training from the point of view that every exercise must be conducted with a tactical backdrop, approaching as closely as possible actual combat conditions. To practice advanced crew gunnery in a classroom environment, without simulated air raids, explosions and enemy attacks, is a waste of time. The author cites one unit that received good scores in CBR training, but during a tactical exercise, this unit could not adapt to nuclear conditions. Vehicles and personnel were prepared too slowly and valuable time was lost.

In another unit, the commander placed his unit in a defensive position, with his tanks on top of a hill. This position was visible to the enemy and consequently was overrun. The commander's inability to react to field conditions and properly utilize the terrain was due to his lack of field training.

The author feels that too much training is conducted without tying it into a tactical situation and without introducing enemy interference. Commanders are forced to go to higher headquarters and beg necessary tactical equipment. Many officers, especially the younger ones, don't have the experience to conduct tactical exercises, and many senior officers are not directing sufficient attention to the tactical development of junior officers.

3. General-Major K. Kurenkov. "Polnee Ispol'zovat' Uchebnye Ob'ekty i Trenazhery" (To Utilize More Fully Training Objectives and Training Aids), pp. 75-78.

General Kurenkov stresses the need for training under simulated combat conditions, with simulators, training aids and well-defined training objectives. He feels that there is insufficient attention placed on this area, and he blames commanders, political officers, and Party and Komsomol activists for not realizing the importance of field training. According to the author, the Central Asian, Transbaikalian, Transcaucasian and other military districts are all having major training problems.

Training centers are equipped to handle only small numbers of units annually, and they keep training aids in the warehouses, to be put out during inspections. They are rarely used on the ranges. Other training aids are in need of repair, and cannot be used. Senior officers have yet to introduce measures to eliminate this problem.

Many units have not mastered the highly technical equipment prior to arriving at training centers, and valuable time is lost going over the basics. Clearly defined training objectives are nonexistent, so there is no specific goal for each training cycle. Soldiers are forced to stand around waiting for training aids to be prepared, and insufficient demands are placed on the individual soldier, who in fact doesn't even fulfill these demands.

4. Editorial. "Molodye Ofitsery Stanoviatsia v Stroi" (Young Officers Enter the Ranks), pp. 78-82.

This article was written to analyze letters received in answer to one of six questions printed in Voennyi Vestnik in May, 1976. Young officers wrote in answer to the question "How is your command structure developing, what problems are there in training and educating soldiers, how did you overcome these problems, and what forms of command training do you consider most effective?" In analyzing the answers, the author came up with the following problems. In several military schools, cadets were given practical experience in problem solving, but were expected to react as if they had already been in the army for several years and were sergeants. None of the special individual capabilities were taken into account. Many new officers were unable to establish rapport with their units, but instead tried to lead by flattery. Many lacked basic knowledge in the fields of military pedagogy and psychology. They couldn't lead group discussions or conduct classes. Many could neither teach nor work with people, and some, in trying to teach by example, proved only that they hadn't mastered the skill in question.

Many of these new officers were assigned as commanders, and, in the first few months of their command, received numerous penalty citations (there is no further explanation of the penalty system and its ramifications). These didn't motivate the young officers, but did create excitement among senior officers, none of whom had bothered to visit the units or monitor the development of the units or officers in question.

5. Lieutenant Colonel A. Ogandzhanian, candidate of military science. "Psikhologicheskaya Zakalka Voinov-Khimikov" (Psychological Tempering of Chemical Corps Soldiers), pp. 111-114.

LTC Ogandzhanian goes into some detail to describe training in chemical units. They have to develop confidence in themselves, their comrades, and their equipment. Otherwise they would be unable to enter the contaminated areas in which they must work. They must be instilled with the importance of their prime mission, the reconnaissance of chemically, biologically and radioactively contaminated areas, and must be trained under conditions closely approximating actual combat. This is the only way to develop the confidence and mental and physical conditioning necessary in their work.

Yet many units train only in a classroom environment, or in one or two training areas, without intense emotional or physical demands. In many cases the men were able to precompute the data before deploying to the training areas. Problem repetition made it a rote drill, adding little to their technical proficiency.

Other units paid no attention to the psychological aspects of training. In others, the work became so routine that on major exercises, dosimeters were left behind. These problem areas are lowering the combat effectiveness of the CBR troop units, according to the author.

Volume 9

1. General of the Army I. Tret'iak, Commander of Forces of the Red Banner Far East Military District, Hero of the Soviet Union. "V Boiu s Komandira Sproso Osobyi" (In Battle Special Demands Are Placed on the Commander), pp. 33-37.

General Tret'iak criticizes some commanders for failing to apply themselves fully to their tasks and for failing to acquire the necessary detailed knowledge to perform effectively. He says that

as a rule those units which fail to achieve high marks in training are led by officers who have not fully prepared themselves in the tactical sense, who are not methodical and are poor organizers.

There are some officers who all too often give their subordinates instructions such as: "Prepare my decision (!?)", "Place this on my map (!?)", "Calculate...", "Evaluate...", and so forth. He does not take any part in the organization of the forthcoming battle himself, hoping that his assistants and deputies will do everything for him. And not infrequently, when he alone must make a difficult decision, he turns out to be helpless, disorganized and confused.

Another great harm is caused by a tendency toward conventionality and oversimplification. Any departure from the demands of modern combat, any indulgence, every fact of primitivism, especially in the preparation of commanders, causes double harm. If they, the commanders, do not study intensely enough, then their subordinates will be listless about their training.

General Tret'iak says that he has sometimes observed during training that some commanders who find themselves in a complex situation have difficulty in finding a solution to the problem. Yet he recalls that in a relatively wellknown book an analogous situation is described with an analysis of the action, conclusions and recommendations. The implication is that if the commander had read this book and thought about it seriously, he would have found the correct solution to his problem more quickly.

During one exercise a regimental commander's order was not precise and clear, it abounded in wordy but not very understandable formulations, and even contained contradictions. As a result, there were problems from the very start of the battle. The action of the subunits was not coordinated, and the artillery was late in opening fire. With each passing minute the situation grew worse, with the result that the regiment did not accomplish its mission. It turned out that the chief of staff was responsible for many of the deficiencies. He was a sluggish individual, without initiative, who had done little to improve himself, and he had not ensured that the various services of the headquarters worked smoothly and with maximum precision. No control over the subunits had been established. This officer was transferred to other duties and the commander was severely reprimanded.

Although it is generally recognized that the staff is the primary assistant to the commander, some staff officers seem indifferent to their roles in the development of the battle plan. It sometimes happens that ten or more officers will go out on reconnaissance, but only the commander and the chiefs of reconnaissance and artillery participate actively, while the others simply stand to the side and

watch. They do not participate even when the conversation concerns them. Such a situation is usually caused by a lack of experience and failure to be more demanding on the part of the commander.

2. General-Lieutenant M. Druzhinin, member of the Military Council - Chief of the Political Administration, Red Banner Far East Military District, Hero of the Soviet Union. "Otvetstvennost' Ofitsera" (The Responsibility of the Officer), pp. 38-42.

General Druzhinin criticizes officers who do not place sufficiently stringent demands upon themselves and who have not adopted the proper attitude toward their duties. He cites the example of one lieutenant who for two years in a row has promised to raise his class qualification, but so far has failed to do so. There are also no soldiers with high qualifications among his subordinates.

There are still cases of violations of military discipline, which General Druzhinin blames on deficiencies in educational work. For example, commanders are not demanding enough, there is too much forgiving of shortcomings and liberalism bordering on a lack of principles. Although there is much talk about the need to strengthen discipline, little is done to organize the effort or to take decisive measures for preventing violations.

Individual educational work by some officers is not effective because they do not know their people well: what are their habits, inclinations, who are they, where are they from, where did they work before entering military service, with whom did they associate? The officer who does not seek the answers to these questions cannot count on success.

3. Lieutenant Colonel G. Iakovlev. "V Interesakh Tekhnicheskoi Podgotovki" (In the Interests of Technical Training), pp. 47-48.

LTC Iakovlev, who serves in the Far East Military District, points out that some officers are not sufficiently proficient in the operation of their assigned equipment. He cites the example of one lieutenant, a commander of a motorized rifle platoon, who, during a practical examination, was not able to operate the BMP properly. He drove well on a level road, but when he had to cross obstacles he sharply reduced the engine rpm, with the result that the engine stalled. Then he could not restart the engine, because he forgot that the transmission must be in neutral before the engine can be started. LTC Iakovlev asserts that this lieutenant failed the driving test because he had not taken steps to properly prepare himself for the operation of his assigned equipment.

The other problem which the author mentions is the failure of some officers to use their imagination and initiative in improving and expanding the material training base (training aids and equipment).

4. Colonel V. Smirnov. "Pomen'she Neopravdannyykh Pauz" (Less Unwarranted Delays), pp. 58-60.

Colonel Smirnov describes the actions of a tank battalion during a field training exercise. In his retreat, the "enemy" had laid an antitank minefield and covered his retreat with a smoke screen. Fearing that the tanks would run up on the mines in the smoke, the battalion commander ordered them to halt and wait for the smoke to clear.

The decision of the commander helped the enemy considerably. Taking advantage of the attackers' inactivity, he retreated to his next position without losses. When the smoke cleared and the companies again began to move, they were met by the organized fire of ATGM's, and later by other antitank weapons. The battalion's attack was stopped. Colonel Smirnov says that in this case, as soon as it was determined that the enemy was retreating, the battalion should have begun a pursuit.

The battalion was able finally to penetrate this line of defense, and the enemy retreated across a river. The battalion again developed an offensive and reached the river. The engineer-reconnaissance element found a weakly defended spot for snorkeling the tanks and the attached motorized rifle company, supported by direct fire from the tanks, forced the river and seized a section of the opposite bank.

The only obstacle in the way of the snorkeling operation was a small precipice on the opposite shore. It was only necessary to remove this small obstacle to make a smooth area for exit from the water. But the engineer unit did not have the required quantity of explosives to remove this precipice.

In the meantime the battalion commander learned that the enemy had begun moving his reserves toward the crossing point. In this case he should have immediately snorkeled one tank with a dozer blade across and with its help prepared the exit point on the opposite bank. At the same time the pressurizing of the other tanks could have proceeded, so that they would be ready for immediate crossing.

But the battalion commander did not consider this possibility, and instead started trying to have explosives sent up to him. (His next higher commander, by the way, found nothing wrong with this.)

The explosives finally arrived and the engineers prepared the

crossing site. But when the first platoon moved to the control-technical point it was discovered that the tanks were not properly prepared for snorkeling. The battalion commander ordered that all tanks be checked, which occupied valuable time. As a result, the enemy succeeded in moving up his reserves and dislodged the motorized rifle company on the opposite shore. Thus the forcing of the river from the march did not succeed.

Analyzing the actions of the battalion commander, it can be stated that the reason for the unwarranted delays and a lowering of the tempo of the attack was his indecisiveness, which in turn was a result of the low level of training of both the commander and his subordinates.

5. Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Saprunov (Airborne Forces). "Sovershenstvuia Boevuiu Slazhennost'" (Improving Combat Coordination), pp. 61-64.

LTC Saprunov states that the coordination of combat actions of airborne forces depends to a great extent on the quality of tactical training and battle-drill instruction which they receive. However, during such training various deficiencies have been observed: certain commanders fail to create the appropriate training situation, do not combine other training subjects with tactics, insufficiently train their troops to achieve the required norms, and develop their exercises as a whole, rather than by elements.

The author describes an airborne company-level training exercise in the course of which several deficiencies were noted. During the preparation for the attack the exercise controller checked the disposition of the troops and found that cover and concealment practices in the company were not very good. The drivers of the first platoon had moved their BMD's almost onto the crest of the hill, two squads were on the forward slope of the hill in view of the enemy, the troops were not conducting observation, and they failed to take advantage of the terrain in selecting firing positions.

When the third platoon successfully approached the enemy's flank without being detected, the controller modified the situation by adding two more gun positions in the enemy's defenses. However, these gun positions, which presented a danger to the BMD's, were not taken under fire. Only the targets which were assigned in the attack order were actually fired upon. The drivers did not use the terrain relief for concealment during halts. The second platoon commander decreased the interval between vehicles in an attempt to maintain alignment along the front, and the third platoon was slow in moving into the attack.

6. Colonels A. Dudko and A. Pavlov. "Zaniatie s Lichnym Sostavom Karaula (v pomoshch' komandiram rot i batal'onov) [Training of Guard Personnel (as an aid to company and battalion commanders)], pp. 67-70.

This article discusses the use of rather sophisticated training aids for training unit personnel to conduct various types of guard duty. The authors point out that insufficient attention is paid to appropriately equipping classrooms and training areas for this purpose. The training is conducted in a very stereotyped fashion, with the result that the troops gain only a vague impression of the objects which they are required to guard, and many questions, such as the specific duties of the sentries, are not touched upon. Thus, in the opinion of the authors, the major requirement of the Regulation on Garrison and Guard Duty is not being fulfilled.

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NONE

Volume 11

1. Lieutenant Colonel M. Karaichev. "Sorevnovanie na Takticheskikh Ucheniyakh" (Competition in Tactical Training Exercises), pp. 67-70.

Although the majority of the subunits in the author's motorized rifle regiment accepted the socialist obligation to conduct all company tactical training with only excellent marks, the first training exercise was disappointing. In the author's opinion, one of the reasons for the failure was the poor organization of socialist competition. There was a great deal of talk, but there was no real competitiveness, no actual struggle among the troops for excellent fulfillment of missions and norms.

A careful analysis revealed that within the competition there were no concrete factors. For example, prior to the training exercise, obligations were assigned by platoon and company as a whole, and there were no provisions for competition between the individual soldiers. Although the training results were published regularly, they did not indicate those soldiers who excelled and those who failed.

In several platoons, a decline in effort was noted. For example, in one platoon the soldiers did not know their concrete missions and forgot about their socialist obligations. The platoon commander even ceased publishing training results. Besides that, the Party-political work here was weakened.

2. Colonel N. Ezhov. "V Slozhnykh Usloviakh (v pomoshch' molodomu komandiru)" [Under Complicated Conditions (as an aid to the young commander)], pp. 70-73.

A certain tank company had difficulty in a training exercise which required firing while swimming the tanks across a water obstacle. The exercise controller excused the poor results with the fact that there was a strong wind and the water was choppy. However, in the author's opinion, the problem was caused by the fact that previous training had been conducted under very controlled conditions, with no wind and no waves. Moreover the tankers all used the same tank in the training, and the targets were seldom changed. Such training practices resulted in only a vague knowledge of the peculiarities of firing while afloat, having learned to determine range to target only on land. The author states that these are not isolated cases.

The commander should ensure that three tank crews conduct the exercise simultaneously, so that coordination between crews is developed. Unfortunately, some commanders, fearing a collision between tanks in the water, allow firing from only one tank, which is a waste of allotted training time.

3. Colonel B. Zhukov. "Radiotrenirovka Idet na BMD" (Radio Training on the BMD), pp. 74-76.

Colonel Zhukov discusses the problems which arise with radio communications in airborne operations and proposes a training plan to help eliminate the deficiencies. He states that some officers and sergeants experience difficulty with communication means because they lack firm practical skills and insufficient training in the rules of conduct of radio traffic and the methods for changing from one frequency to another. Their instructions and commands are frequently not specific and are too wordy, which requires their subordinates to repeat their questions several times over. This increases the length of transmissions, which makes it easier for the enemy to detect the radio station, and under conditions of severe jamming can lead to loss of radio contact.

During one airborne training exercise the company commander lost

control of his unit because of severe radio jamming. His attempt to switch to the alternate frequency was not successful. As a result the attack foundered. And this occurred, according to the author, because of the inexpert work of some of the FMD vehicle commanders in conditions of severe jamming.

4. Colonel B. Shubin. "Zashchita Zenitnykh Podrazdelenii" (Defense of Anti-Aircraft Artillery Subunits), pp. 96-101.

Colonel Shubin discusses the problems associated with the defense of anti-aircraft artillery units against weapons of mass destruction. He states that questions of administering self-aid and mutual aid to casualties are seldom worked out in training. In addition, some subunit commanders do not take measures to ensure the protection of military equipment by means of the on-board decontamination units. The anti-aircraft artillery units do not even use their own means for protection effectively. For example, in the anti-aircraft batteries the weapons have a cooling system. The system was designed to be used also for decontamination of the armament. However, its use in such a role in training is not widespread.

5. General-Major of Technical Troops N. Moiseev. "Preodolenie Zon Zarazheniia" (Overcoming Contaminated Zones), pp. 110-114.

General-Major Moiseev points out that some commanders still do not correctly consider radioactive and chemical situations in their operations, and inadequately prepare their units for well-coordinated action in such conditions. For example, during a tactical training exercise a motorized rifle battalion lost its combat effectiveness primarily because of unskillful application of measures for defense against radioactive and chemical agents.

The battalion was preparing for an attack from the march when the enemy delivered a nuclear strike which heavily contaminated the assembly area, and communication with the regimental headquarters was lost. But the radiation and chemical reconnaissance was not sufficiently well organized. The commander and chief of staff were not able to quickly gather information about the levels of radiation in the company areas and correctly assess the impact of the enemy's nuclear strike.

The mistakes which they made in calculating the probable radiation dose of their personnel caused them to make an incorrect decision. Without prior reconnaissance the battalion was moved to an alternate area, but this was done in a disorganized manner. Wearing gas masks and protective clothing, the troops followed their orders slowly and unsurely. During the time it took to load the troops in vehicles,

organize the column and depart the area of heavy contamination, the accumulated dose of radiation in two companies exceeded that which is allowed. The levels of radiation in the alternate area were lower than in the primary area, but even the simplest forms of shelter were not set up in advance. The use of only the NBC defense means organic to the vehicles did not prevent excessive radiation of personnel. In an actual battle under analogous conditions the radiation casualties in the battalion would have been excessively high.

In modern combat the danger of radioactive and chemical casualties can be so high that a basic change in plans or in methods of carrying out the plan is required. It should be noted that in training, such situations, are not often presented. In the course of tactical exercises, having received a report of a contaminated area, subunit commanders usually limit themselves to the use of individual and collective means of protection and continue to act according to the assigned plan. On the march or in the attack contaminated zones as a rule are crossed from the march along the previously assigned route, and sometimes even without detailed reconnaissance. Relying on information from higher headquarters, subunit commanders sometimes do not concern themselves with the collection and dissemination of information about contaminated areas. In some units complicated radiation and chemical situations are seldom created which have a decisive influence on the actions of the subunits. As a result, commanders and staffs do not receive sufficient experience in organizing the battle and controlling subordinates in contaminated areas.

Volume 12

1. Lead Editorial. "Boevoe Masterstvo Kuetsa v Pole" (Combat Skill Is Forged in the Field), pp. 2-5.

This lead editorial criticizes those commanders who do not spend enough time on field training, and especially night training. It states there are some commanders who, taking advantage of a lack of control from their superiors, do not willingly take their units to the field, and spend little time training at night. As a result the soldiers and leaders do not acquire the needed skills, but instead lose them.

The requirement for night training has been increased. Equipping of units with the newest combat equipment allows them to successfully accomplish the same tasks at night that they do in the daytime, and in some cases to do it faster and with fewer losses. However, these capabilities are not being used in training.

Field training in all kinds of weather, in daylight and at night, develops moral and physical endurance and psychological firmness. But these qualities cannot be achieved if preference is given to classroom studies, training in areas close to garrison, and occasional trips to the field for short periods. Such practices are intolerable, and they must be stopped by the most decisive means.

Good training centers with various types of tactical and special training areas, firing ranges, tank training areas, vehicle driver training areas, and other training facilities have been created. However, they are not sufficiently used. Several training areas have been created more for show than for training. Units do not use them for months at a time. Such a situation is unacceptable. Evidently not only the subunit commanders need to be made to answer for the insufficient use of these specially equipped training areas, but also the corresponding chiefs of branches and services.

2. General-Major of Engineer Troops S. Aganov, Chief of Engineer Troops of the Ministry of Defense, USSR. "Inzhenernoe Obespechenie - na Uroven' Sovremennykh Trebovaniy" (Engineer Support - to the Level of Modern Requirements), pp. 15-19.

General Aganov discusses problems associated with training in the use of engineer equipment. He criticizes those combat arms commanders, mostly the young ones, who are not able to quickly organize, for example, the reconnaissance of a ford, evaluate the trafficability of wet terrain, or determine the condition of a bridge or overpass. Every time they call the engineer troops for help, thereby wasting valuable time.

There are instances in training where officers display a lack of appreciation for the capabilities of engineer equipment. For example, during a recent tactical exercise a tank battalion commander ordered the tank dozer blade to be left in the motor park. In the assembly area the crews had to dig in their equipment by hand. When the dozer blade was finally brought up on the instructions of a superior officer, the skill with which the crews used it left much to be desired. The tank crews did not finish digging in in time, with the result that when the "enemy" delivered a nuclear strike the battalion suffered so many casualties that it could not participate in the attack. The battalion had to be moved to the reserve. General Aganov stresses the need for more field training with engineer equipment. He states that classroom training with the use of placards, dummy models, and various types of engineer training explosives are much less effective, and those officers who prefer them are losing much.

He says that everything has not been done to increase the

effectiveness of combat training of engineer troops. Good results depend on good training of the officers, and in some units and academic institutions of the Moscow, Central Asian, Far East, and Transbaikal Military Districts as well as in the Southern Group of Forces, there are significant deficiencies in the training of commanders. Insufficient attention is paid in particular to field training of officers in the control of subunits. Too much time is spent on various types of lectures. Here and there the same themes are presented to differing groups of officers. The themes are often chosen in a formalistic manner without consideration of the specific missions to be accomplished by the units.

There are some units where officer training is conducted irregularly. Evidently because of this some officers are hesitant to organize engineer support, and approach the solution to specific engineer missions in a stereotyped manner.

For example, ferry crossings of wide water obstacles are, at the present level of development, almost as effective and convenient as bridges, not to mention that they are less vulnerable to enemy action. However, during training, no matter how the situation develops, preference is usually given to bridge crossings. Sometimes subunit commanders conduct their estimates of obstacles using an outdated, simplified schematic, without any consideration of an actual enemy, and they do not skillfully employ the full capabilities of the mobile obstacle construction detachments and the mechanized mine-laying equipment. Such facts are convincing proof of the need for further improvement in the training of commanders.

Among the engineer troops there are still commanders who train their units under very simplified conditions. They conduct training on the very same terrain, which is well known to the troops, excessively watch over their subordinates, avoid giving them a maximum work load, and overlook a number of shortcomings. Such practice in no way aids the development among officers, sergeants and soldiers of initiative, independence and creativeness. Even worse, when they are placed in a new, albeit simpler but unfamiliar situation, the performance level of the unit drops sharply. This is exactly what happened with one engineer company which was given the mission of assembling a heavy mechanized bridge. When the exercise controller gave them a new situation which was not completely familiar to them, departing from the standard practice to which they had become accustomed, instead of an "excellent" evaluation, the company received only "satisfactory."

Training equipment in daily troop training is poorly used. For example, a unit was conducting training in mine laying, but they did not take the appropriate set of training mines with them. And among those which they did take, many malfunctioned. When an officer has such an attitude toward training, good results cannot be expected.

It is time for all commanders and staffs of engineer units to bring some order into this situation.

3. General-Lieutenant of Signal Troops I. Kulakov, Chief of Signal Troops, Ground Forces. "K Edinoi Tseli" (Toward a Common Goal), pp. 20-24.

General Kulakov criticizes the waste of valuable training time. He states that an analysis of training time in one subunit was conducted which indicated the following losses: poor selection of training methods, 10-12%; illogical structure and excessive repetition of already covered material, 9-11%; negligence on the part of the training director in preparing the material training base on time and poor use of training aids, 8-10%; poor scheduling of rotation of training groups, 6-8%. In general, the loss of training time amounted to 30-40%. In other words, one-third of the planned hours are lost only because the training process is poorly organized.

4. Colonel V. Lutsenko, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences. "Avtoritet Prikaza" (The Authority of the Order), pp. 78-81.

Pointing out that the officer possesses considerable authority and his order is law, Colonel Lutsenko criticizes the manner in which some officers issue orders to their subordinates. He says that on a recent training exercise he observed two platoon commanders who had just received orders from their company commander to dig in their positions. One lieutenant assembled his squad commanders immediately and issued precise instructions, indicating the time for completion and how best to accomplish the work. The officer was collected and smart, and he issued his instructions with an authoritative voice. His tone seemed to indicate that he had thought everything through and had no doubt about success.

The other lieutenant acted entirely differently. He delayed assembling his squad commanders, his instructions were not specific, and they were given in a weak tone of voice with many non-standard expressions. The result was as might be expected. In the first platoon the task was accomplished quickly and precisely, while in the second platoon the soldiers moved sluggishly. The company commander had to speak to the second platoon commander several times before the task was accomplished.

Some young officers do not understand how to deal with their subordinates. They act according to the principle: "Once said, it must be done!" And here they are making a serious mistake. "Stubbornness," wrote the famous Soviet psychologist B. M. Teplov, "is

caused not by reasoning of the mind, but by other motives: false pride, excessive self-confidence, and an absence of courage, necessary for recognition of one's own mistakes, -- this is not even stubbornness, but obstinacy, a very dangerous trait for a commander."

The strength of an order depends directly on the professional and moral authority of the commander issuing the order. But there are some officers who rely mainly on the authority of their position. Therefore there are many deficiencies in their work. It is known that two officers occupying identical positions and having the same rank will enjoy significantly different authority. Subordinates speak of one with love and respect, they believe in him and they imitate him, while they speak of the other one disapprovingly.